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2 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1T HER ARE few issues so likely to generate heat rather than light as the
question of the proper line between the realm of the state and that of
the church. And yet, with the gratuitous courage they so often dis-
played, the framers of the Constitution's Bill of Rights began their blueprint
for freedom by drawing exactly such a line. The first clauses of the first
amendment provide: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." If this language is,
to some, reminiscent of words of Delphi's Pythia, it should be remembered
that they were not uttered until after provision had been made for priests to
make the words meaningful for those who had to know their meaning. Nor
have these justices of the Supreme Court been wanting in advice from self-
appointed guardians. "The difficulty [with the advice] in this field, as in so
many other fields of constitutional controversy, is that the contestants are
more convincing when they criticize their opponents' interpretations than
when they seek to establish the validity of their own .... ."1 It is the function
of this essay to examine, not the theories of the commentators, but rather the
actions and words of the Supreme Court in applying the constitutional lan-
guage to the controversies that have come before it. Lest such a piece be re-
duced to what Thomas Reed Powell used to label "mere recitativo," however,
these cases will also be measured against a "neutral principle" that, it is sug-
gested, will give the most appropriate scope to the religion clauses in such a
manner as to provide guidance for the legislatures and courts that are re-
quired to abide by the constitutional command. This "neutral principle" has
been framed in reliance on the Aristotelian axiom that "it is the mark of an
educated man to seek precision in each class of things just so far as the nature
of the subject admits," rather than the Platonic precept that "a perfectly
simple principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse
of simple."
I. A DocTRI iN SEARCH oF AuTHoRrrY
Like most commands of our Constitution, the religion clauses of the first
amendment are not statements of abstract principles. History, not logic,
explains their inclusion in the Bill of Rights; necessity, not merely morality,
justifies their presence there. As Father John Courtney Murray has noted:
"Every historian who has catalogued the historical factors which made for
religious liberty and separation of church and state in America would doubt-
less agree that these institutions came into being under the pressure of their
necessity for the public peace." 2
I McCLosKEY, Tm AmaCAN SUAME COURT 251 (1960).
2 MURRAy, WE HOLD THEsE TRums 58 (1960). One need not accept.any of Murray's
other tenets in order to concur in the quoted proposition. Nonetheless, it would appear
desirable for me to set forth at the outset my personal attitudes about the highly controver-
sial subject to be discussed, so that the reader, in assessing what I have to say, may establish
his bias against bias. I write in the belief that dogma, whether it be that of a religion or that
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The factors creating this necessity were four, according to Murray. 3 The
first was the large number of unbelievers in the community that inserted these
guarantees into the Constitution. 4 The second was the great variety of de-
nominations among the believers.5 Third was the economic factor: "Persecu-
tion and discrimination were as bad for business affairs as they were for the
affairs of the soul."6 And last, and least in Murray's estimate, was the influ-
ence of the "widening religious freedom in England." There was a fifth of
which Murray took no note, but which Professor Jordan put this way:
[lit seems apparent that very considerable gains had been made in terms
of human decency, that men had come to be animated by an increasing
sensitivity to human pain and suffering. This significant and obscure de-
of a political party or that of an economic school, is anathema to liberty and freedom, and
especially to liberty of thought. "I mean by [liberty of thought] the mind's freedom from
any external pressure designed to drug, intimidate, or otherwise to reduce its full exercise
of natural capacity." MORGAN, THE LmEPTY OF THOUGHT AND THE SEPARATION OF POWExs
3 (1948). Since I believe this freedom, within the concept of ordered liberty, is among the
highest values of our society, I must reject Murray's proposition "that there is an authority
superior to the authority of individual reason." I reject, too, his proposition "that by divine
ordinance this world is to be ruled by a dyarchy of authorities, within which the temporal
is subordinate to the spiritual." Certainly the Constitution contemplated no such subordi-
nation of state to church. And I reject his theme, stated thus: "Society is rescued from
chaos only by a few men, not by the many. Paucis humanwn vivit genus. It is only the few
who understand the disciplines of civility and are able to sustain them in being and thus hold
in check the forces of barbarism that are always threatening to force the gates of the City."
MURRAy, op. cit. supra at 13, 21. I prefer Judge Learned Hand's proposition: "For myself
it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how
to choose them, which I assuredly do not." HAND, TmE BILL or RIGHTs 73 (1958). I do
know that I would not choose them on the basis of their self-proclaimed divine inspiration,
for this "leadership" concept has already cost the world too heavily in this century. See
SHIRER, THE RISE AND FAL. Or T TEnD REICH (1961). For Judge Hand, the provisions
of the Bill of Rights "are the altogether human expression of the will of the state conven-
tions that ratified them ... their authority depends upon the sanctions available to enforce
them; and their meaning is to be gathered from the words they contain, read in the historical
setting in which they were uttered. This presupposes that all political power emanates from
the people.. . ." HAND, op. cit. supra at 3. This paper proceeds on the same presupposition.
3 MURRAY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 58-59.
4 Cf. 4 JORDAN, THE DE FrOPMENT Or RELIGIous TOLERATION IN ENGLAND 475 (1940):
"It is likewise apparent that religious indifference became for the first time widespread in
England during the last decade of the revolutionary era. This most powerful dissolvent of
religious zeal was to be a factor of very great importance in the development of religious
toleration. The indifferent man is tolerant of all religions because he lends his devotion to
none."
s Cf. id. at 482: "We may suggest, furthermore, that the convincing fact of religious
diversity imposed a spiritual necessity of religious liberty quite as persuasively as it suggested
the political necessity for the legal toleration of orderly dissent."
6 Cf. TAwNEY, RELIGION AND Tm RISE OF CAvrrALism 205 (1937 ed.): "A many-sided
business community could escape constant friction and obstruction only if it were free to
absorb elements drawn from a multitude of different sources, and if each of these elements
were free to pursue its own way of life, and-in that age the same thing--to practice its own
religion."
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velopment... contributed most immediately and notably to the rise of
religious toleration. It might be suggested, indeed, that the history of cul-
ture can in one sense be interpreted in terms of the rising and falling curve
of man's sensitivity to cruelty and of his reaction to needless suffering. There
was in religious persecution a very considerable and a very ugly psycho-
logical and moral element which must be described as sadism. Innate
barbarism relieved and justified itself by the infliction of suffering for what
was conceived as a moral end.... Mhe mass of men in England came to
make a very sharp and important distinction between punishment imposed
for the judicially demonstrable fact of crime and the infliction of punish-
ment for the retention of opinion. This must be regarded as one of the
most significant cultural gains in human history. These gains of the human
race are painfully and slowly attained and they may be lost before the mass
'of men realize that they are threatened. Brutality and sadism are deeply
rooted in man's nature. They are restrained by no surer sanction than a
decent attitude toward the fact of difference, which man's biological nature
apparently teaches him to abhor but which his history has taught him he
must respect in the interest of sheer survival. 7
Religious toleration, summed up in the second of the two clauses, was,
therefore, necessary to preserve the peace. Separation, represented by the first
of the two clauses, was necessary to make such religious freedom a reality.
But the separation clause had a greater function than the assurance of toleration
of dissenting religious beliefs and practices. To suggest but two lessons of the
evils resulting from the alliance of church and state, there was abundant evi-
dence of the contributions of the churches to the warfare among nations as
well as the conflict within them and equally obvious was the inhibition on
scientific endeavor that followed from the acceptance by the state of church
dogma. It is not necessary to suggest that the Francophiles in the American
community were dedicated to the anti-clericalism that contributed to the
French Revolution, but they certainly were not ignorant of the evils that
aroused such violent reactions. For them toleration could hardly satisfy the
felt needs; separation was a necessary concomitant. But admittedly separation
was a new concept in practice. Toleration had a long English history; separa-
tion-conceived in the English writings of Roger Williams-had its begin-
nings as an historical fact only on the shores of this continent.8 It is justified
in Williams' terms by the necessity for keeping the state out of the affairs of
the church, lest the church be subordinated to the state; in Jeffersonian terms
its function is to keep the church out of the business of government, lest the
government be subordinated to the church. Limited powers of government
were not instituted to expand the realm of power of religious organizations,
but rather in favor of freedom of action and thought by the people.
7 JORDAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 476-77.
B See, e.g., Mn.mt, RociEn WELu.s (1953); ERNsT-, Tu POLrnCAL THouG~rt or Rornt
W.UnAM (1929).
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Nor were these two concepts closed systems at the time of the adoption
of the first amendment. The objectives of the provisions were clear, but the
means of their attainment were still to be developed and, indeed, are still in
the course of development. Thus, like the other great clauses of the Constitu-
tion,. the religion clauses cannot now be confined to the application they
might have received in 1789.
The utilization or application of these clauses in conjunction is difficult. For
if the command is that inhibitions not be placed by the state on religious ac-
tivity, it is equally forbidden the state to confer favors upon religious activity.
These commands would be impossible of effectuation unless they are read
together as creating a doctrine more akin to the reading of the equal protection
clause than to the due process clause, i.e., they must be read to mean that reli-
gion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental
action, whether that action be the conferring of rights or privileges or the im-
position of duties or obligations. Or, to put it in Lord Bryce's terms: "It is
accepted as an axiom by all Americans that the civil power ought to be not
only neutral and impartial as between different forms of faith, but ought to
leave these matters entirely on one side .... "9 It must be recognized, how-
ever, that this statement of the "neutral" principle of equality, that religion
cannot supply a basis for classification of governmental action, still leaves
many problems unanswered. Not the least of them flows from the fact that the
actions of the state must be carefully scrutinized to assure that classifications
that purport to relate to other matters are not really classifications in terms
of religion.10 "[Cilassification in abstract terms can always be carried to the
point at which, in fact, the class singled out consists only of particular known
persons or even a single individual. It must be admitted that, in spite of many
ingenious attempts to solve this problem, no entirely satisfactory criterion
has been found that would always tell us what kind of classification is com-
patible with equality before the law.""
It is the genius of the common law, and thus of American constitutional
law,12 that its growth and principles are measured in terms of concrete factual
situations, or at least with regard to factual situations as concrete as the defi-
ciencies of our adversary system permit them to be. It remains then to ex-
amine the cases that have arisen and the rationales offered in their solution
and to see how the suggested thesis would resolve them. Before doing so, how-
ever, it might be desirable to repeat two propositions. First, the thesis pro-
92 BRYcE, THE AmEwic~AN& ComoNwALTH 698 (3d ed. 1903).
10 Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960): "While in form this is merely
an act redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are established, the inescapable human
effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only
colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights."
11 HAYEK, THE CONSTITrrON OF LiBmTY 209 (1960). ,
12 See LEvi, AN INTRODUcTION TO LEGAL REASONING 41-72 (1948).
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posed here as the proper construction of the religion clauses of the first
amendment is that the freedom and separation clauses should be read as a
single precept that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action
or inaction because these clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion
either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden. Second, the principle offered
is meant to provide a starting point for solutions to problems brought before
the Court, not a mechanical answer to them.
II. AuTHOmiTmS IN SEARCH OF A Docnmu
A. The Early Mormon Cases
The Supreme Court's concern with the religion clauses of the first amend-
ment begins, for all practical purposes,13 with the case of Reynolds v. United
States,14 where the Court first adopted the Jeffersonian statement that the
amendment erected "a wall of separation between church and State."'5 The
case arose in the context of a general "hostility to Mormonism [that] was due
not merely to the practice of polygamy, but also to the notion that the hierar-
chy of the Latter Day Saints constituted a secret and tyrannical imperium in
imperio opposed to the genius of democratic institutions."16 Reynolds raised
the question whether a statute of the United States that made polygamy illegal
could be constitutionally applied to a Mormon. At the trial, the court had
refused Reynolds' request to instruct the jury that "if he was married... in
pursuance of and in conformity with what he believed at the time to be a
religious duty.., the verdict must be 'not guilty.' "17 Instead the judge had
told the jury that if the defendant "deliberately married a second time, having
a first wife living" the fact that he did so "under the influence of a religious
belief that it was right,-under an inspiration, if you please, that it was right,"
did not relieve him of criminal liability:
Upon this charge and refusal to charge the question is raised, whether
religious belief can be accepted as a justification of an overt act made
criminal by the law of the land. The inquiry is not as to the power of Con-
gress to prescribe criminal laws for the Territories, but as to the guilt of
one who knowingly violates a law which has been properly enacted, if he
entertains a religious belief that the law is wrong.'s
The opinion for the unanimous Court,19 which included Clifford, Bradley,
13 For earlier consideration of problems of church and state by the Court, see, e.g.,
Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844); Permoli v. Municipality # 1 of
New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845). See also cases cited note 344 infra.
14 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15.Id. at 164.
16 BRYCE, op. cif. supra note 9, at 699.
1798 U.S. at 162. isbid.
29 Mr. Justice Field took exception only to the admissibility of testimony given at an
earlier trial on a different indictment. id. at 168.
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Harlan, Miller, and Field, was written by Mr. Chief Justice Waite and sus-
tained the validity of the statute as applied. The primary line of reasoningwas
that the history behind the relevant constitutional principle demonstrated that
"Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive
of good order."20 This proposed distinction between belief and action has
often been repeated since, but it is obviously not a line that can provide real
assistance in resolving these knotty.problems. Consider only a statute which
forbade preaching or forbade meetings of religious groups: these must cer-
tainly be held violative of the first amendment even though they may be
directed only at physical acts. The sounder justification of the result is to be
found in a later portion of the opinion, framed in terms similar to the classi-
fication principle stated at the outset of this paper. But even this was not
untainted by the "action-belief" dichotomy:
In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration is within
the legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescrib-
ing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places
over which the United States has exclusive control. This being so, the only
question which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of
their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are,
then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may
be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and
go free.21
In short, if the law is within the scope of governmental authority and of gen-
eral application,22 it may-indeed probably must-be applied without regard
to the religious convictions of those whose acts constitute wilful violations of
that law. To permit individuals to be excused from compliance with the law
solely on the basis of religious beliefs is to subject others to punishment for
failure to subscribe to those same beliefs.
The tone of the Waite opinion indicates the clear antipathy of the Court
to the Mormon sect.2 3 But the wrong motivation does not rob the decision of
2o da at 164.
21 Id. at 166.
2 2
"Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when
applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle
cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.... but there cannot be a doubt that,
unless restricted by some form of constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power
of every civil government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law
of social life under its dominion." ]bid. Mr. Chief Justice Waite had previously established
the criminal nature of polygamy at common law. Id. at 164-65.
23 
"Waite himself spoke of this decision as his 'sermon.' I send you enclosed my sermon
on the religion of polygamy. * * * I hope you will not find it poisoned with heterodoxy."'
TanawA CEw JusncE WAm 244 n.18 (1938).
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its essential soundness.24 The same cannot be said of later cases dealing with
the Mormons. 25
In Davis v. Beason,26 a challenge was made to the validity of a statute of
the Territory of Idaho that made it a prerequisite to the exercise of the fran-
chise that the voter swear an oath:
Mhat I have never been convicted of treason, felony or bribery; ... that
I am not a bigamist or polygamist; that I am not a member of any order,
organization or association which teaches, advises, counsels or encourages
its members, devotees or any other person to commit the crime of bigamy or
polygamy, or any other crime defined by law, as a duty arising or resulting
from membership in such order, organization or association, or which prac-
tises bigamy, polygamy or plural or celestial marriage as a doctrinal rite of
.such organization; that I do not and will not, publicly or privately, or in
any manner whatever teach, advise, counsel or encourage any person to
commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime defined by
law, either as a religious duty or otherwise .... 27
Davis, a member of the Mormon church, took the oath and was subse-
quently indicted for conspiracy with persons unknown to pervert the laws of
Idaho by taking the oath falsely. He was found guilty and sentenced to a fine
of $500 or 250 days in jail. There was no evidence that Davis was a polyg-
amist or was guilty of any other crime. He did not appeal but immediately
sought habeas corpus on the ground that the portion of the statute italicized
above violated the first amendment and was, therefore, void. After the trial
court refused relief, Davis appealed the denial of the writ to the Supreme
Court.
In the Supreme Court, Davis asserted that the territory "could not legally
prescribe that a man who has never committed any crime should not have
the right to register and vote, or hold office, because he belonged toa church
organization that holds or teaches bigamy and polygamy as a doctrine of the
24 The principles announced in the Reynolds case were reaffirmed by the Court as re-
cently as the 1946 Term, in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946), where the Court
sustained the conviction under the Mann Act of Mormon fundamentalists who took their
"'plural wives" across state lines. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, said: "It is
also urged that the requisite criminal intent was lacking since petitioners were motivated
by a religious belief. That defense claims too much. If upheld, it would place beyond the
law any act done under claim of religious sanction. But it has long been held that the fact
that polygamy is supported by a religious creed affords no defense in a prosecution for
bigamy." 329 U.S. at 20.
25 At this distance in time it is somewhat difficult to realize the hatred for the Mormons
in this country during the second half of the nineteenth century. It was by no means con-
fined to the areas in which they settled. For the literature on this subject, see Hill, The
Historiography of Mormonism, 28 CHURCH HIsTORY 418 (1959). For one of the few bal-
anced studies of the Mormons in the United States, see O'D.A, THE MoRMoNs (1957).
26 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
27 Id. at 334. (Emphasis added.)
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church, membership in such organization not having been by law made a
crime." 28 He urged three grounds, of interest here, in support of this proposi-
tion. First, that the law violated his right to "the free exercise of religion." 29
Second, that the fourteenth amendment, presumably applicable to the Terri-
tory of Idaho, made the requirement of the oath unconstitutional. Third, that
the legislation violated the provisions of article VI, that "No religious test
should be required as a qualification to any office of public trust under the
United States." It was under this third rubric that the soundest argument was
made condemning the statute as violative of the first amendment:
That this statute requires a religious test is apparent upon its face. The
ground of disenfranchisement is membership in an organization which
encourages its members to commit bigamy or polygamy "as a duty resulting
from membership," or which practices bigamy or polygamy, or celestial
marriage, "as a doctrinal rite of such order." Simple encouragement to
commit crime by an organization of which the citizen is a member does
not disqualify him from voting, because, by the language of the act, the
encouragement must be offered upon the ground of duty, or religious
obligation arising from membership in the organization, or the latter must
teach the commission of these acts from religious motives, otherwise the
exclusion does not operate. And so also the practice must be "as a doc-
trinal rite," or the member is not excluded. In other words the practice
must be as a tenet of faith, sanctified by a religious ceremony; and the lan-
guage of the statute does not admit of such an interpretation as will dis-
franchise the members of an organization existing solely for the promotion
of crime, however heinous their acts may be, even though the primary and
sole object of the organization be to commit murder, theft, arson, rape
and other crimes which are malum in se; unless their acts are the promptings
of duty, or are performed as "doctrinal rites" or religious ceremonies, the
members are not disqualified by this statute from voting or holding
office.
The object of this legislation was not only to deprive citizens of the
elective franchise because of their membership in a religious organization,
the M&mon Church, but to confine the exclusion provided for to mem-
bers of that religious organization. 30
Mr. Justice Field, writing for a unanimous Court, paid no heed whatsoever
to the argument that the statute, both in fact and in law, singled out members
of the Mormon Church for disqualification. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,31 urged on
the Court by Davis' counsel, was ignored. The due process requirement was
similarly treated with silence. Field cavalierly disposed of the defendant's case
in a few sentences at the outset of the opinion:
28 rd. at 337. 30 Id. at 339-40.
29 Id. at 338. 31 118 US. 356 (1886).
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Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian
countries. They are crimes by the laws of the United States, and they are
crimes by the laws of Idaho. They tend to destroy the purity of the marriage
relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman and to debase
man. Few crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society and re-
ceive more general or more deserved punishment. To extend exemption from
punishment for such crimes would be to shock the moral judgment of the
community. To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the com-
mon sense of mankind. If they are crimes, then to teach, advise and counsel
their practice is to aid in their commission, and such teaching and counsel-
ing are themselves criminal and proper subjects of punishment, as aiding
and abetting crime are in all other cases. 32
He resorted again to the distinction between belief and action:
With man's relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they
impose, and the manner in which an expression shall be made by him of
his belief on those subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided
always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and
the morals of its people, are not interfered with. However free the exercise
of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the coun-
try, passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as
properly the subject of punitive legislation.33
That such a thesis would have sustained outlawry of the mass, that it would
have sustained most of the Tudor legislation restricting Catholics and most
of the legislation that forced religious dissenters to leave the shores of Europe
for haven in the New World, apparently gave concern to no member of the
Court. Field concluded his statement on this issue with the proposition that
"Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect
may designate as religion."34
In short, the Court sustained the conviction by avoiding the problem. It
treated the case as though it presented issues no different from those raised
in Reynolds. The fact that this statute made membership in the Mormon
Church without more a basis for punishment, that the alleged crime was
adherence to a religious belief, that in fact that statute was applicable only
to the Mormons, was ignored by a Court that could find no sympathy for so
militant a Christian minority sect that had caused so much turmoil.35 The
32 133 U.S. at 341-42.
33 a at 342-43. 34 Id. at 345.
35 "It is unnecessary here to refer to the past history of the sect, to their defiance'of the
governw ,, authorities, to their attempt to establish an independent community, to their
efforts to , nve from the territory all who were not connected with them in communion and
sympathy. The tale is one of patience on the part of the American government and people,
and of contempt of authority and resistance to law on the part of the Mormons. Whatever
persecutions they may have suffered in the early part of their history, in Missouri and
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analogy to certain non-Christian organizations cf the present day cannot be
overlooked. The case has lost its validity for reasons not connected with .the
religious issue. Certainly it is bad under the test of Gomillion v. Lightfoot.36
It is submitted that it is equally impotent under the proper application of the
religion clauses of the first amendment.37
B. The Apocrypha
There are in the reports of the Supreme Court of the United States a num-
ber of cases frequently referred to for propositions relating to the meaning
of the religion clauses of the Constitution that, in fact, rest on grounds com-
pletely separate and distinct from those clauses. Based on the misinterpreta-
tion of these cases, or on the dicta contained therein, or on practices that have
never been subjected to judicial test, propositions have been put forth by
various clerical organizations and their champions to support the notion that
the separation clause is merely an adjunct to the freedom clause, that its func-
tion is to effectuate the principle stated in Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, that "this is a Christian nation." 38 It cannot be gainsaid that
there is an inconsistency between the practice of government in many matters
and the commands of the first amendment. Lord Bryce explained it thus:
"Just because these questions have been long since disposed of, and excite no
present passion, and perhaps also because the Americans are more practically
easy-going than pedantically exact, the National government, and the State
Illinois, they have no excuse for their persistent defiance of law under the government of
the United States.
"One pretence for this obstinate course is, that their belief in the practice of polygamy,
or in the right to indulge in it, is a religious belief, and, therefore, under the protection of the
constitutional guaranty of religious freedom. This is altogether a sophistical plea. No doubt
the Thugs of India imagined that their belief in the right of assassination was a religious
belief; but their thinking so did not make it so. The practice of suttee by the Hindu widows
may have sprung from a supposed religious conviction. The offering of human sacrifice by
our own ancestors in Britain was no doubt sanctioned by an equally conscientious impulse.
But no one, on that account, would hesitate to brand these practices, now, as crimes against
society, and obnoxious to condemnation and punishment by the civil authority." Bradley,
J., in Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1890). In that case, in which
the Court sanctioned the confiscation of the property of the Mormon Church, over the
dissents of Fuller, Field, and Lamar, the parties apparently did not raise the issue of the
religion clauses of the first amendment. See also Snow v. United States, 118 U.S. 346 (1886);
Clawson v. United States, 114 U.S. 477 (1885); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885);
Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1881).
Each of these involved cases in which there were serious questions of the infringement of
rights under the first amendment, but in none of them did counsel present the problems for
resolution by the Court. They demonstrate the judicial climate in which the Mormons were
prosecuted.
36 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See note 10 supra.
37 Cf. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), discussed infra, at pp. 94-95.
38 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
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governments do give Christianity a species of recognition inconsistent with the
view that civil government should be absolutely neutral in religious matters." 39
But it should be made clear that these practices have not been condoned by
Supreme Court decisions, except insofar as their judgments have been mis-
construed.
1. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States. In the first of these cases,
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,40 the question for decision arose
out of the imposition of a penalty on a religious corporation on the ground
that it violated a federal statute making it illegal to make contracts with for-
eigners for labor to be performed in this country. The church had contracted
with an English clergyman to come to the United States to act as rector and
pastor of the Church of the Holy Trinity. The pious Mr. Justice Brewer trotted
out 'all the gimmicks about construing legislation in conformity with the
purpose of the legislature and rightly concluded that the function of the
statute was to inhibit the importation of manual laborers: "We find, there-
fore, that the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be remedied, the
circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, the reports of the com-
mittee of each house, all concur in affirming that the intent of Congress was
simply to stay the influx of this cheap unskilled labor."41
Brewer, the son of a missionary, chose not to rest here, however. "But
beyond all these matters no purpose of action against religion can be imputed
to any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people." 42 In
support of this proposition he offered instances of the religious adornments
to our history from Columbus to the first amendment. Thus were sown the
dragon's teeth that have produced a bitter harvest, for included in the histori-
cal panorama, apparently with approval, were such matters as the Delaware
test oath43 and Chancellor Kent's opinion in People v. Ruggles,44 sustaining
the notion of the illegality of blasphemy. The opinion is of importance pri-
marily because of such unnecessary dicta. It was correct in its statutory con-
struction and equally so in its thesis that legislation could not single out
clergymen---either as individuals or a class-for exclusion from the country.
It is submitted that it was in error in any implication that clergymen could
be the sole exception to a statutory exclusion of immigrants. Any such classi-
fication, in terms of religious occupation, favorable or unfavorable, would
run athwart the purposes and provisions. of the first amendment.
39 BRycF, op. cit. supra note 9, at 701.
40 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
41 Id. at 465. 42 Ibid.
43 "I, A.B., do profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and
in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore; and I do acknowledge the Holy Scrip-
tures of the Old and New Testament to be given by divine inspiration." Quoted, id. at 469-
70.
44 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811), quoted, 143 U.S. at 470-71.
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2. Pierce v. Society of Sisters. Probably the most abused citation in the
construction of the first amendment is the case of Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters.45 The case raised no church-state issues; the Court decided no church-
state issues. Indeed, no reference to the first amendment is made anywhere
in the Court's opinion.
In 1922, the State of Oregon, under the initiative provision of its consti-
tution, adopted a statute that, for all relevant purposes, made attendance at
public schools within the state compulsory. The statute was challenged, be-
fore it was to become effective, by tie Society of Sisters, an Oregon corpora-
tion that conducted a school teaching secular and religious subjects, i.e., a
parochial school, and by Hill Military Academy, an Oregon corporation con-
ducting a school for secular and military education. The challenge took the
form of a suit in the United States District Court, to enjoin the enforcement
of the statute. The court issued the injunction. A primary reliance of the schools
was on such decisions as the ChildLabor Tax Case46 and Coppage v. Kansas.47
In short, the primary arguments put forth were in terms of the "substantive
due process" cases that have long since been interred along with the notion
that the principles of Spencer's Social Statics were incorporated in the Con-
stitution. At that time, however, the Court was still enthralled and the opin-
ion by Mr. Justice McReynolds reads accordingly.
The premise is based on Meyer v. Nebraska4s which held unconstitutional a
state statute making it illegal to teach any modem language other than
English. The Meyer case established for the Court the proposition that there
could be no interference with the liberty of parents by "forcing [their children]
to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere crea-
ture of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obli-
gations." 49 But no parents were parties in the Pierce litigation and so the
Court had to take a broad jump:
Appellees are corporations and therefore, it is said, they cannot claim
for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
Acceptrfd in the proper sense, this is true.... But they have business and
property for which they claim protection. These are threatened with de-
struction through the unwarranted compulsion. which appellants are exer-
cising over present and prospective patrons of their schools. And this court
has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such action. Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312; Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U.S. 197.
... Plaintiffs asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and un-
lawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of
their business and property. Their interest is clear and immediate .... so
45 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 46 259 U.S. 20 (1922). 47 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
48262 U.S. 390 (1923). 49 268 U.S. at 535. 5o Id. at 535-36.
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Thus does Pierce rest clearly on protection of the business and property rights
of the schools. Insofar as the liberty of the parents was concerned, that liberty
was the freedom to choose schools other than public schools for the education
of their children. It was a principle as applicable to the military academy as
to the parochial school and, in no way, rested on any concept of "freedom
of religion."51
3. Cochran v. Board of Education. The case of Cochran v. Board of Educ.52
is of importance to the doctrine of church and state under the first amend-
ment, but not, as is generally believed, because the Court was called upon to
resolve any substantive issue relating to the religion clauses of the first amend-
ment. Although challenge had been made in the state courts of the power
to support church schools, that challenge rested entirely on the provisions
of the Louisiana constitution. In the Supreme Court the question presented
was only whether the utilization of state funds for private uses controvened
the mandate of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
On August 17, 1928, petitioners, taxpayers and parents of school children
in the parish of Caddo, Louisiana, sought an injunction from the state trial
court to prevent defendants from expending state tax funds on the purchase
of school books for children attending private and parochial schools. They
asserted that the taxes paid by the petitioners were in excess of the moneys to
be expended on school books for their own children and would, therefore,
be used to buy school books for children attending private and parochial
schools. The assertion was that these expenditures would be ilegal because:
the courses of study and the school books prescribed by the private, reli-
gious and other schools aforesaid not embraced in the public educational
system of the State of Louisiana, are different from those prescribed and
used in the free public schools of this State, and the Louisiana State Board
of Education has no right or authority to prescribe the course of study or
the school books to be used by the children attending the schools constitut-
ing no part of the public educational system of the State of Louisiana, and
petitioners show that there is a large number of such private and sectarian
or denominational schools in the State of Louisiana where religious in-
struction is included in the course of study, and many of the school books
selected, used and required in such schools, are designed and employed
51 The procedural holding of the case, too, is now doubtful at best. In the Sunday closing
law cases, standing was sought by business enterprises to assert the rights to freedom of
religion of their customers to make purchases on Sunday. In the principal opinion, the Court
said: "Since the general rule is that 'a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights
or immunities,' . . . we hold that appellants have no standing to raise this contention....
Furthermore, since appellants do not specifically allege that the statutes infringe upon the
religious beliefs of the department store's present or prospective patrons, we have no occa-
sion here to consider the standing question of Pierce v. Society of Sisters.... Those persons
whose religious rights are allegedly impaired by the statutes are not without efTective ways
to assert these rights." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961).
52 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
1961] OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 15
to aid and promote the religious beliefs, and to foster and encourage the
principles of faith, and to teach the tenets of the creed, mode of worship,-
and ecclesiastical policy of the respective churches under whose respective
control the said schools are conducted. 53
Only one federal judicial question was raised:
that the expenditure of said public monies as aforesaid for such illegal
purposes is the taking of your petitioners' property for a private purpose
without due process of law... in violation of... the 14th Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States.s4
In addition to other claims of violation of the Louisiana constitution, the
petitioners had asserted:
that said Act violates Section 8 of Article IV of the Constitution of Louisi-
ana in that it authorizes the taking of money from the public treasury for
the purpose of teaching religion, and is in aid of churches, sects, or de-
nominations of religion, which is also in violation of Section 4 of Article
I of the Constitution of Louisiana .... ss
The respondents admitted all the factual allegations, except that they
asserted:
that it is not their intention nor purpose to furnish free, or otherwise, any
sectarian or denominational text books to the school children of the State
of Louisiana... and that respondents only propose to furnish such
books to the educable school children of the State attending schools, cur-
ricula of which have been approved by the State Board of Education of
Louisiana.55
The state also asserted conclusions that it is not likely to repeat today:
that the private schools of the State of Louisiana thus become and are,
agencies of the State, aiding in the education of its children and making it
possible to educate many thousands who would otherwise be deprived of
educational advantages.... That the primary policy of the aforesaid acts
of the legislature is providing free text books for the educable school
childrefi of the State, without discrimination as to race, sex, religion or
creed, and respondents aver that if any children of the State are denied
the privilege of obtaining free school books from the State of Louisiana
because of the fact that such children are attending private or sectarian
schools, such discrimination would be arbitrary, unjust and illegal, as well
as unconstitutional, and incapable of legal enforcement.57
53 Record, p. 4.
5Id. at 6.
55 Ibid. 56 Id. at 13.
57 Id. at 16. This position differs from that taken in this paper. I believe that a classifica-
tion in terms of public and non-public schools would be valid. See the discussion of the
Everson case at pp. 67-72 infra.
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The respondents also attacked the standing of the petitioners to maintain their
actions.
The trial court picked up the last challenge. It asserted that municipal tax-
payers might have standing to challenge the expenditures of their municipality
but that state taxpayers lacked standing to enjoin the expenditure of state
funds. After lengthy quotation from the Frothingham case,58 the court con-
cluded:
The rule held to apply in the affairs of the Federal government should
apply with equal, if not greater, force in the affairs of a sovereign state.
The interest of the relators as patrons of the public schools is too remote,
indirect, and indeterminate to enable them to sue to enjoin a state officer
from the disposition of state funds.59
A petition for a writ of prohibition from the state supreme court was denied
on the ground that the petitioners lacked standing to maintain the action.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana entertained the appeal from the lower court
judgment of dismissal, however, and held that the petitioners had standing
to maintain the action, but ruled in favor of the defendants on the merits.60
The opinion rationalized the expenditure of funds for school books for chil-
dren attending parochial schools in terms that have been frequently utilized;
the benefits conferred were for the school children and not the schools:
One may scan the acts in vain to ascertain where any money is appropriated
for the purchase of school books for the use of any church, private, sec-
tarian, or even public school. The appropriations were made for the spe-
cific purpose of purchasing school books for the use of the school children
of the state, free of cost to them. It was for their benefit and the resulting
benefit to the state that the appropriations were made. True, these children
attend some school, public or private, the latter, sectarian or non-sectarian,
and that the books are to be furnished to them for their use, free of cost,
whichever they attend. The schools, however, are not the beneficiaries of
these appropriations. They obtain nothing from them, nor are they re-
lieved of a single obligation, because of them. The school children and the
state alone are the beneficiaries. It is also true that the sectarian schools,
which some of the children attend, instruct their pupils in religion, and
books are used for that purpose, but one may search diligently the acts,
though without result, in an effort to find anything to the effect that it is
the purpose of the state to furnish religious books for use of such children.
In fact, in view of the prohibitions in the Constitution against the state's
doing anything of that description, it would be legally impossible to inter-
pret the statute as calling for any such action on the part of the state .... 61
58 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 59 Record, p. 20.
60 The governing opinion was written in the companion case of Borden v. Louisiana
State Board of Educ., 168 La. 1006 (1929). The opinion in the Cochran case, incorporating
the Borden case by reference, is found at 168 La. 1030 (1929).
61 168 La. at 1019.
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The answer of the dissent to this proposition was clear and concise: "It does
not require any extended reasoning to produce the conviction that to With-
draw money from the public treasury for the purpose of purchasing books to
be used in sectarian schools is to use such money 'indirectly' if not 'directly'
in aid of the church, sect, or religious denomination conducting the schools." 62
Although the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes, quoted the language of the majority set out above,63
it was not concerned with the separation issue. At that time it was apparently
thought to be a substantial question: under the due process clause whether the
state moneys were expended for "a public purpose." The Court held that this
expenditure in accordance with the statute as interpreted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court was for such a purpose and therefore valid under the four-
teenth amendment: "The legislation does not segregate private schools, or
their pupils, as its beneficiaries or attempt to interfere with any matters of
exclusively private concern. Its interest is education, broadly; its method,
comprehensive: Individual interests are aided only as the common interest is
safeguarded." 64
Of greater interest to the church-state pioblem than its decision on the
merits was the willingness of the Court to accept the standing of the petitioners
in the trial court to raise the question of the propriety of this expenditure of
state funds. The issue was quite clearly raised in the Supreme Court by the
Attorney General of Louisiana, both in a motion to dismiss for want ofjuris-
diction 65 and again in the brief on the merits.66 The Supreme Court did not
leave the question open, as it had in the Providence Hospital case, 67 nor did it
expound on the issue. It simply stated the interest *of the appellants and pro-
ceeded to deal with the substantive issue. It cannot be treated as less than a
holding, albeit sub silentio, that the issue of standing as resolved by the state
court, satisfied the requirement of standing to maintain the appeal in the
Supreme Court of the United States.
C. The Problem of Standing to Sue
The factor that frequently keeps problems of church and state from judicial
scrutiny is the absence of a party with recognized standing to bring the issues
before the federal courts. In each of the earlier cases discussed above where
the issue of the application of the religion clauses was raised in a penal action
prosecuted by the United States, the defendants clearly had the right to raise
the issue by way of defense. Where the right asserted is put forth in an affirm-
62 Id. at 1027.
63 281 U.S. at 374-75. 64 Id. at 375.
65 Statement in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction, p. 13.
66 Brief on Behalf of Appellees, p. 30.
67 See pp. 18-20 infra.
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ative rather than a defensive manner, the problem of establishing the existence
of justiciable controversy is far more difficult. The Court has utilized various
techniques in handling the problem, but has contributed only a confusing
diversity rather than clear precedent. The Pierce and Cochran cases are ex-
amples of the inexact nature of the Court's solutions. Two other cases are
particularly worthy of comment in the context of the standing problem, a
problem that will be found recurrent in the cases to be discussed in later sec-
tions of this paper.
1. The Providence Hospital Case. One way to secure a federal judicial
forum, as evidence by Cochran, is for the Court to ignore the problem of the
presence of a plaintiff with standing to maintain the action. This is exactly
what occurred in Bradfield v. Roberts,68 as well. In Bradfield, the plaintiff
asserted his rights as a taxpayer of the United States and a resident of the
District of Columbia. He sued to enjoin expenditure of federal moneys on the
ground that such outlay would violate the separation provision. It has since
become abundantly clear that the plaintiff had no authority to raise the ques-
tion as a taxpayer of the national government. 69 It was more doubtful then.
But the Court, in a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Peckham, passed quick-
ly over the issue of standing:
Passing the various objections made to the maintenance of this suit on
account of an alleged defect of parties, and also in regard to the character
in which the complainant sues, merely that of a citizen and taxpayer of
the United States and a resident of the District of Columbia, we come to -
the main question as to the validity of the agreement between the Com-
missioners of the District and the directors of the hospital, founded upon
the appropriation contained in the act of Congress, the contention being
that the agreement if carried out would result in an appropriation by Con-
gress of money to a religious society, thereby violating the constitutional
provision which forbids Congress from passing any law respecting an
establishment of religion. Art. I of the Amendments to Constitution.70
The agreement in question was between the United States and the Providence
Hospital. It provided that the Government should pay for the erection of an
isolation building on the grounds of the hospital and that the building, upon
completion, be turned over to the hospital on conditions (1) that two-thirds of
the beds be reserved for the use of poor patients sent there by the commis-
sioners of the district, for whom the United States was to pay at the rate of
$250 per annum; and (2) that private patients admitted to the isolation build-
ing be permitted to retain physicians and nurses of their own choosing.
The Providence Hospital, it was alleged, was "a private eleemosynary cor-
68 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
6 9 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
70 175 U.S. at 295.
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poration... composed of members of a monastic order or sisterhood of the
Roman Catholic Church, and is conducted under the auspices of said church;
that the title to its property is vested in the Sisters of Charity of Emmitsburg,
Maryland ... ,"71 It was contended, therefore, that moneys paid to it pursu-
ant to the contract would be paid in violation of the separation clause. The
Court held that even if payments to a religious corporation would be invalid,
the corporation in question was not such a corporation.
(Ihe fact that its members, according to the belief of the complainant, are
members of a monastic order or sisterhood of the Roman Catholic Church,
and the further fact that the hospital is conducted under the auspices of
said church, are wholly immaterial, as is also the allegation regarding the
title to its property.... Whether the individuals who compose the cor-
poration under its charter happen to be all Roman Catholics, or all
Methodists, or Presbyterians, or Unitarians, or members of any other
religious organization, or of no organization at all, is of not the slightest
consequence with reference to the law of its incorporation, nor can the
individual beliefs upon religious matters of the various incorporators be
inquired into. Nor is it material that the hospital may be conducted under
the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church.... The meaning of the
allegation is that the church exercises great and perhaps controlling influ-
ence over the management of the hospital. It must, however, be managed
pursuant to the law of its being.7 2
The Court thereupon affirmed the decision of the lower court dismissing the
complaint for failure to set forth a cause of action.
The judgment of the Court, as well as its language, complies with the "neu-
tral principle" suggested at the outset of this paper. But it must be recognized
that the Court specifically by-passed the question whether religious corpora-
tions-presumably those incorporated for religious purposes-should be
similarly treated. It would seem, however, that in so far as the United States
was purchasing services or accommodations from private sources, the seller
can not be disqualified-any more than it can be qualified--on the ground of
religious beliefs. If it were shown that the effect of these services through sec-
tarian faciiities in fact resulted in persuasion of the beneficiaries toward the
adoption or retention of the Catholic faith, or if it were shown that influences,
subtle or direct, were exerted to these ends, or if it were shown that the moneys
paid substantially exceeded the value of the services rendered, a different
result would be required. Proof of these facts might be difficult, though no
more difficult than for those asserted in the School Segregation cases.73 But the
allegations of the Bradfield complaint, or the fact that the recipient of the
moneys from the United States was a sectarian organization, should not suffice
71 Id. at 297.
72 Id. at 298.
73 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to invalidate the contract, whether it be a contract for services or for tangible
goods. And this was the conclusion reached by the Court in sustaining the
payment by the United States of trust funds to Catholic schools voluntarily
attended by Indian beneficiaries of the trust.7 4
2. Bible Reading. Some states prohibit Bible reading in the public schools;
others command it. Either position arouses the ire of some of the cit-
izens and parents of the community. There are large numbers of state court
decisions on the subject, but no one has yet been able to get a full-scale opin-
ion from the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court did decide, in
Washington ex reL Clithero v. Showalter,75 that a state constitutional provision
banning Bible reading presented no substantial federal question. But the life
of a Supreme Court memorandum decision in this area is very short indeed,
and efforts to get the Court to rule on the validity of compulsory Bible reading
have failed for one procedural reason or another.
In Doremus v. Board of Educ.,76 two plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment from the New Jersey courts that a state statute requiring the read-
ing of five verses from the Old Testament at the commencement of each public
school day was in violation of the separation requirement of the national
constitution. One of the plaintiffs claimed the right to an adjudication on the
ground that he was a citizen and taxpayer; the other, in addition to having these
attributes, was the parent of a child attending a New Jersey school in which
the requirement was in effect. The New Jersey Supreme Court expressed grave
doubts about the standing of the plaintiffs to raise the constitutional issue,
but avoided decision on the question by ruling against them on the merits."7
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson, dismissed the
appeal for want of a "case or controversy" because of the lack of standing of
plaintiffs to maintain the action. The reference to the constitutional standard
is of significance in so far as any possibility of statutory cure may be con-
cerned. But the opinion is sufficiently ambiguous, as are the other authorities,
to leave the problem in the category of the unresolved.
Jackson said that the plaintiffs could secure no standing by reason of the
fact that they were taxpayers. But the language of the opinion leaves unclear
the specification of the deficiency, i.e., whether the state taxpayers will be con-
sidered in the same way as are national taxpayers under the Frothingham v.
Mellon78 doctrine, or whether the defect was in the lack of detail in the plain-
tiffs' pleading:
74 Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). But cf. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors,
353 U.S. 230 (1957), holding that trustees of a college who were members of a state agency
could not abide by the trust requirement limiting attendance at the college to white stu-
dents.
"5 284 U.S. 573 (1931).
76 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
77 5 NJ. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950). 78 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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There is no allegation that this activity is supported by any separate tax
or paid for from any particular appropriation or that it adds any sum
whatever to the cost of conducting the school. No information is given as
to what kind of taxes are paid by appellants and there is no averment that
the Bible reading increases any tax they do pay or that as taxpayers they
are, will, or possibly can be out of pocket because of it.79
He distinguished the EversonsO case because "Everson showed a measurable
appropriation or disbursement of school-district funds occasioned solely by
the activities complained of."BI The" status of parent, which formed the basis
for jurisdiction in McCollum and Zorach,8 2 and incidentally in Showalter, had
been dissipated in this case by the graduation of the child whose parent had
brought this suit.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, joined by Justices Reed and Burton. They
would have held that so long as the New Jersey courts entertained the issue,
the Supreme Court should also review it. But the opinion referred to no
authority in support of its position.
Neither the majority nor the minority concerned themselves with prece-
dents. No mention was made of Bradfield v. Roberts8 3 in which the Court
specifically by-passed the question but decided the case on the merits, much
as the New Jersey court did in Doremus. Nor was mention made of Cochran v.
Board of Educ.84 or Heim v. McCall ,8S where the Court clearly accepted juris-
diction, apparently on the ground that the issue of standing had been resolved
by the state court in each case. Nor was any consideration given to In re
Summers,8 6 where the Court found the existence of a case or controversy
although the Illinois Supreme Court had ruled that none existed.
The problem is a serious and difficult one. If the state court decision as to
standing is not binding on the Supreme Court, the result may be, as in Dore-
mus, that a claim of infringement of first amendment rights will have been
authoritatively denied by the state court without the possibility of review in
the Supreme Court. If the state court determination is binding, the Court may
be called on to resolve cases beyond its jurisdiction or to reject cases, as would
have been true in Summers, because of the state court's refusal to accord
standing.
79 342 U.S. at 433.
0 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See pp. 67-72 infra.
31 342 U.S. at 434.
SZ McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952). See pp. 72-76 infra.
93 See pp. 18-20 supra.
84 See pp. 14-17 supra.
' s239 U.S. 175 (1915). See notes 102 and 103 infra.
6 325 U.S. 561 (1945). See pp. 33-36 infra.
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When the Bible-reading controversy was again brought to the Supreme
Court, the Court was able to return the case to the three-judge federal court
without passi.g on the question because Pennsylvania had amended its statute
in the interim.87 Thus, both the Bible-reading question and the standing ques-
tion still remain open for future resolution.
D. "Patriotism Is Not Enough"-Or Is It?
1. The Selective Draft Law Cases. The 1917 draft law provided for exemp-
tion from service of ministers and students in divinity or theological schools.
It also provided that:
[N]othing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or compel
any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is found
to be a member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization at
present organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid
its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convic-
tions are against war or participation therein in accordance with the creed
or principles of said religious organizations .... 88
Here was a classification solely in terms of religion. Those who held certain
beliefs and belonged to church organizations appropriate to those beliefs
were exempted from duty of military service because of those beliefs and
associations. One might have thought that, in a proper case, this would have
presented the Court with a serious problem of compliance with the first
amendment. It did not. Perhaps because the case in which it was presented
was not an appropriate case.
The Selective Draft Law Cases89 brought to the Court appeals from convic-
tions for evasion of the draft law. Among the many issues raised by the de-
fendants was the question whether the classification contained in the language
quoted from the statute was invalid as a violation of the first amendment sepa-
ration clause. Mr. Chief Justice White's opinion for a unanimous Court,
rendered during the height of the American participation in World War I,
disposed of the issue quickly, but without authority or reason. "And we pass
without anything but statement the proposition that an establishment of a
religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the
First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act to which we
at the outset referred, because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to
require us to do more."90 The decision is as sound as the reasons given for it.
The statute did not exempt all whose consciences forbade them to fight. It
exempted only those with proper religious allegiances. It may be more difficult
for some than it was for Chief Justice White to see why this classification was
87 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 364 U.S. 298 (1960).
8 Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, §4, 40 Stat. 78 (1919).
89245 U.S. 366 (1918). 90 Id, at 389-90.
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not a breach in the high wall of separation. It may well be, however, that
even if the exemption clause were invalid, the defendants should not have
been entitled to relief from prosecution. But that question was never discussed
either by the Court or by the Government in its briefs.
2. Hamilton v. Regents. In 1931 when pacifism in this country and else-
where was attaining new converts at a rapid rate, the Southern California
Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church adopted a resolution "to
petition the United States Government to grant exemption from military
service to such citizens who are members of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
as conscientiously believe that participation in war is a denial of their supreme
allegiance to Jesus Christ."91 In 1932, the General Conference of that church
petitioned:
the government of the United States to grant to members of the Methodist
Episcopal Church who may be conscientious objectors to war the same
exemption from military service as has long been granted to members of
the Society of Friends and other similar religious organizations. Similarly
we petition all educational institutions which require military training to
excuse from such training any student belonging to the Methodist Episco-
pal Church who has conscientious scruples against it. We earnestly petition
the government of the United States to cease to support financially all
military training in civil educational institutions. 92
A similar request to exempt students from military training93 was presented
to the University of California at Berkeley and Los Angeles and to the Uni-
versity of Arizona by the Southern California Conference in 1933. These re-
quests went unheeded. And when Albert W. Hamilton and W. Alonzo
Reynolds, Jr., students at U.C.L.A., in turn, requested to be relieved of mili-
tary training as members of the Methodist Episcopal Church who had con-
scientious scruples against such service, they too met with failure. When they
absented themselves from their R.O.T.C. classes, the University suspended
them. The students went directly to the California Supreme Court for relief,
seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the University to readmit them without
requiring them to attend classes in military training.
The California Supreme Court first rejected the petition without opinion.
On rehearing, the unanimous court ruled that the provisions of the organic
act creating the University, as well as the regulations of the board of regents,
required military training, and that such requirement did not violate any
"rights assured to the petitioners by the Constitution of the United States."
94
For this last proposition the California court relied on the judgment of the
91 Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 252 (1934).
92 Id. at 252.
93 Id. at 252-53; Record, p. 4.
94 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 219 Cal. 663, 664, 28 P.2d 355 (1934).
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Supreme Court holding that the same issue brought up on appeal from a
Maryland judgment did not present any substantial federal question.95
In the Maryland case,96 the high court of the state relied upon dicta of the
Supreme Court in United States v. Macintosh97 and Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts.98 The Supreme Court in dismissing for want of a substantial federal
question cited several cases to the effect that an appeal may be dismissed
where the federal question raised "is wholly formal, is so absolutely devoid
of merit as to be frivolous, or has been so explicitly foreclosed by a decision
or decisions of this court as to leave no room for real controversy." 99 The
citations relevant to the merits spelled out somewhat tenuously the Court's
meaning. Atkin v. Kansas'00 had held that a state in contracting for public
work could impose the condition of a maximum eight-hour day for the em-
ployees on the job.
It cannot be deemed a part of the liberty of any contractor that he be al-
lowed to do public work in any mode he may choose to adopt, without
regard to the wishes of the State. On the contrary, it belongs to the State,
as the guardian and trustee for its people, and having control of its af-
fairs, to prescribe the conditions upon which it will permit public work
to be done on its behalf, or on behalf of its municipalities. No court has
authority to review its action in that respect. Regulations on this subject
suggest only considerations of public policy. And with such considerations
the courts have no concern. 01
The Court seemed to be saying that the conditions on which the state would
admit students to its university were entirely at the discretion of the state,
95 Coale v. Pearson, 290 U.S. 597 (1933).
96 University of Maryland v. Coale, 165 Md. 224, 167 AtI. 54 (1933).
97 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931). "The conscientious objector is relieved from the obliga-
tion to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but
because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him.
. The privilege of the ... conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes, not from
the Constitution, but from the acts of Congress. That body may grant or withhold the
exemption as in its wisdom it sees fit; and, if it be withheld, the... conscientious objector
cannot successfully assert the privilege. No other conclusion is compatible with the well-
nigh limitless extent of the war powers... which include, by necessary implication, the
power, in the last extremity, to compel the armed service of any citizen in the land, without
regard to his objections or his views in respect of the justice or morality of the particular
war or of war in general." As quoted, 165 Md. at 233, 167 AtI. at 57.
98 197 U.S. 11 (1905). "And yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his
will and without regard to his personal wishes or his peculiar interests, or even his religious
or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk
the chance of being shot down in its defense." As quoted, 165 Md. at 233, 167 AtI. at 57.
99 Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308, 311 (1902); Roe v. Kansas, 278
U.S. 191 (1929) (frivolous); American Baseball Club v. Philadelphia, 290 U.S. 595 (1933).
100 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
11 Id. at 222-23.
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including the discretion to demand military training as part of the course of
those in attendance. Heim v. McCal1o02 had reached the same concluion
with regard to a New York requirement that all work on public projects be
performed by citizens of the United States. That case had another aspect of
interest to church-state issues. 103 Stephenson v. BinfordlO4 similarly had sus-
tained the right of the state to set down conditions on which its highway may
be used by a carrier. Waugh v. Trustees of Univ. of Mississippio5 was much
closer to the particular issue of attendance at a state university in upholding
the state's right to condition a student's admission to its university on his
agreement not to become a member of a fraternity. The last of the citations
was to the Macintosh case, already referred to. The Court appears to have
ruled that the question of requiring military training as a condition of attend-
ance at the state university was controlled by these decisions, thus making the
question presented an insubstantial one.
It might be regarded as somewhat surprising then, that less than a year after
the dismissal of the Maryland case for want of a substantial federal question,
the Court should accept jurisdiction in the Hamilton case stating that "we
are unable to say that every question that appellants have brought here for
decision is so clearly not debatable and utterly lacking in merit as to require
dismissal for want of substance."106 On the merits, the Court utilized exactly
the arguments of the Maryland court by reference to the Macintosh and
Jacobson cases and then unabashedly noted that the Maryland case, "similar
to that now before us, decided against the contention of a student in the Uni-
versity of Maryland who on conscientious grounds objected to military train-
ing there required. His appeal to this Court was dismissed for the want of a
substantial federal question."107 This process of turning insubstantial ques-
tions into substantial ones and back again in very short periods of time is not
an infrequent phenomenon in the area of state-church problems.
More interesting than the majority opinion was that by Mr. Justice Car-
dozo, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone. It made explicit the assumption
that the religion clauses of the first amendment are incorporated in the four-
teenth. But it held, nonetheless, that no infringement of the religion clauses
could be found in the circumstances presented. There was no establishment
of religion involved, nor was the required instruction "an interference by the
102 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
103 Id. at 186-87. "There seems to have been no question raised as to the right of Heim
to maintain the suit, although he is not one of the contractors nor a laborer of the excluded
nationality or citizenship. The Appellate Division felt that there might be objection to the
right, under the holding of a cited case. The Court of Appeals, however, made no comment,
and we must--certainly may-assume that Heim had a right of suit; and, so assuming, we
pass to the merits."
104 287 U.S. 251, 275-76 (1932). 106 293 U.S. at 258.
105 237 U.S. 589 (1915) 107 Id. at 264.
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state with the free exercise of religion when the liberties of the constitution
are read in the light of a century and a half of history during days of peace
and war." 108 If the major appeal was to history, a minor one was to prac-
ticality:
Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have never
yet been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be
thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war,
whether for attack or for defense, or in furtherance of any other end con-
demned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private
judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and the com-
pulsion of the agencies of government. One who is a martyr to a principle
-which may turn out in the end to be a delusion or an error-does not
prove by his martyrdom that he has kept within the law.0 9
The judgment in Hamilton is clearly the correct one. Its rationale would
seem to have been elliptically spelled out in the citations to the per curiam dis-
missal of the Maryland case for want of a substantial federal question: the
issue whether exemption for conscientious beliefs should or should not be
granted is one within the discretion of the state legislatures so long as it is
equally applied to all. The one thing that the state legislature ought not to be
permitted to do was exactly what the students in these cases demanded: to
make exemption turn on religious belief or religious affiliation. Were it not for
the Selective Draft Act cases, it should be clear that exemption from military
obligations in terms of religious affiliation is unconstitutional. If military
service be considered a duty of every qualified citizen, exemption grants a
benefit to religious adherents because they are religious adherents, a result
banned by the separation clause. There should be little doubt, for example,
that the Government could not refuse commissions in the military service to
all members of specified religious sects. It can no more grant benefits on that
ground than it can deny them, unless the wall of separation is again to be
breached. Cardozo's reference to Davis v. Beason'no suggested that the high
wall was to be maintained.
3. The Flag Salute Cases. In the flag-salute cases, the thesis for which this
paper contends was approximated as it had been in Reynolds."' Al-
though it prevailed in the first flag-salute opinion, Minersville School Dist.
v. Gobiis,112 it was ignored in the opinion overruling the Gobitis case, where
it became unnecessary to the resolution of the controversy. In Gobitis, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, said:
In the judicial enforcement of religious freedom we are concerned with
a historic concept. See Mr. Justice Cardozo in Hamilton v. Regents....
108 Id. at 266.
109 Id. at 268. M1 See p. 7, supra.
110 Cited id. at 265. 112 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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The religious liberty which the Constitution protects has never excluded
legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of par--
ticular sects. Judicial nullification of legislation cannot be justified by
attributing to the framers of the Bill of Rights views for which there is no
historic warrant. Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The
mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant con-
cerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of
political responsibilities. The necessity for this adjustment has again and
again been recognized. In a number of situations the exertion of political
authority has been sustained, while basic considerations of religious free-
dom have been left inviolate.... In all these cases the general laws in
question, upheld in their application to those who refused obedience from
religious conviction, were manifestations of specific powers of government
deemed by the legislature essential to secure and maintain that orderly,
tranquil, and free society without which religious toleration itself is
unattainable.11 3
The argument as thus presented failed to take into consideration, in its sup-
port, the relevance of the separation clause. That gap was to be filled in the
subsequent dissent from the judgment overruling Gobitis. For it is necessarily
true that to exempt from duties and burdens on the ground of religious belief
is to afford a benefit to those exempted on that ground.
If the Gobitis case was not the last neither was it the first in a series of Su-
preme Court rulings on the validity of compulsory gag-salute laws. Legislation
requiring participation in flag-salute ceremonies at public schools was wide-
spread. It was frequently challenged. The flag-salute statutes of Georgia, New
Jersey, Massachusetts, California, and New York were all sustained. All but
the last were brought to the Supreme Court for consideration. In the cases of
the Georgia and New Jersey legislation, the Court dismissed appeals for
want of a substantial federal question,1' 4 relying primarily on Hamilton v.
Regents. The Massachusetts statute was sustained by a three-judge federal
court, whose judgment was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court.'"
Certiorari was denied in the California case." 6.No review was sought of the
New York judgment.n 7 Despite this plethora of authority, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit sustained the judgment of a trial court that the
113 Id. at 594-95.
114 Leoles v. Landers, 302 U.S. 656 (1937); Hering v. State Board of Educ., 303 U.S
624 (1938).
Its Johnson v. Deerfield, 306 U.S. 621 (1939).
1 6 Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306 U.S. 621 (1939).
117 People v. Sandstrom, 279 N.Y. 523 (1939).
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Pennsylvania flag-salute requirement was unconstitutional. 1 8 It was this
judgment that the Court reviewed in the Gobitis case.
The legislation in question in Gobitis was a school regulation of the Board
of Education of the Minersville Public Schools:
That the Superintendent of the Minersville Public Schools be required
to demand that all teachers and pupils of said schools be required to salute
the flag of our country as part of the daily exercises. That refusal to salute
the flag shall be regarded as an act of insubordination and shall be dealt
with accordingly.119
Lillian and William Gobitis, aged twelve and ten respectively, refused to par-
ticipate in the flag-salute ceremonies, and were expelled from school. Because
of the compulsory education laws their father was compelled to send them to
private schools or risk the penalty for the children's delinquency. He brought
suit in the Pennsylvania courts on his own behalf and that of the children to
compel reinstatement. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that their exclusion
was in violation of their freedom of religious belief because the tenets of their
faith regarded the flag salute as contradictory to the command of their religion
specified in verses 4 and 5 of chapter 20 of Exodus: "Thou shalt not make
unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven
above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth;
Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them ... "120
Judge Mars, then sitting in the district court, granted the relief requested.
He distinguished the Hamilton case:
In the case before us the attendance of the minor plaintiffs at defendants'
schools is, as we have seen, required by law. Furthermore their refusal to
salute the flag does not prejudice the public safety. Consequently Hamil-
ton... does'not support the validity of the regulation here involved. On
the contrary that regulation, although undoubtedly adopted from patriotic
motives, appears to have become in this case a means for the persecution
of children for conscience' sake. Our beloved flag, the emblem of religious
liberty, apparently has been used as an instrument to impose a religious
test as a condition of receiving the benefits of public education. And this
has been done without any compelling necessity of public safety or wel-
fare.... In these days when religious intolerance is again rearing its ugly
head in other parts of the world it is of the utmost importance that the lib-
erties guaranteed to our citizens by the. fundamental law be preserved from
all encroachment.121
He also found: "The enforcement of defendants' regulation requiring the flag
salute by children who are sincerely opposed to it upon conscientious religious
I's Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939).
119 Record, p. 6, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
120 Id., p. 7. The Court added the third verse as the basis for their complaint, apparently
in reliance on the brief rather than the complaint.
121 Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist., 21 F. Supp. 581, 585-86 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
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grounds is not a reasonable method of teaching civics, including loyalty to
the State and Federal Government, but tends to have the contrary effect upon
such children."122
Judge Clark of the Third Circuit wrote an opinion affirming the judg-
ment.123 In essence, he ruled that in a conflict between religious belief and
state interests, the latter must bow:
To summarize our analysis: compulsory flag saluting is designed to bet-
ter secure the state by inculcating in its youthful citizens a love of country
that will incline their hearts and minds to its more willing defense. That par-
ticular compulsion happens to be abhorrent to the particular love of God
of the little girl and boy now seeking our protection. One conception or
the other must yield. Which is required by our Constitution? We think
the material and not the spiritual.124
The School Board's argument that the flag salute was not a religious cere-
mony,125 like the Gobitis' argument that the word of the Bible was superior
to the Constituition,126 was disregarded by the Court as inappropriate to the
issue before it. It remained for the amici curiae to deal with the underlying
issue: was it within the power of the State of Pennsylvania, the issue of reli-
gious liberty aside, to compel the salute of the flag? The American Civil
Liberties Union brief, set down two ipse dixits. The first: "The salute pre-
scribed by the Minersville Board of Education is not-like military service
and preparation to render it-a practice which Government may encourage
by rewards and punishments, but is a ceremony having no value except as a
voluntary expression of sentiment and beief."127 Second: "It is not compe-
tent for Pennsylvania to involve the flag of the United States in a controversy
with its citizens over the forms of respect which loyalty to the flag and Gov-
ernment of the United States demand."1 2s The amicus brief filed by a com-
mittee of the American Bar Association asserted:
The requirement of such a ritual is clearly alien to our institutions. It
would be an intolerable invasion of individual liberties. Because it is in-
herent in the very nature of Americans to resent unnecessary assertions
of authority, such a measure would not further the end of promoting
loyalty and strengthening morale, but would have precisely the opposite
effect. It would be unconstitutional because there would be no 'appropriate
122 Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist., 24 F. Supp. 271, 273 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
123 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939). This is an opinion,
not untypical of this judge, that must be read to be appreciated. It cannot be adequately
summarized.
124 Id. at 692.
125 Brief for Petitioners, pp. 27-32, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
126 Respondents' Brief, passim.
127 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, p. 20.
128 Id. at 27. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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relation' between the legislative command and the prescribed punishment,
on the one hand, and the avowed objective on the other. 129
This issue the Court met head on: "The wisdom of training children in
patriotic impulses by those compulsions which necessarily pervade so much
of the educational process is not for our independent judgment. Even were
we convinced of the folly of such a measure, such belief would be no proof
of its unconstitutionality."1 30 Once that premise was established, the prin-
ciple quoted at the beginning of this section compelled the conclusion that
there could be no release from the duty solely on religious grounds.
Mr. Justice Stone's dissent rested in part on a lack of belief in the validity
of the compulsion. He talked of "a supposed educational measure." 131 Be-
cause the compulsory flag salute is of such doubtful value in inculcating pa-
triotism, the State's demands might be modified by the competing interests of
freedom. Throughout his opinion there were suggestions that freedom of
speech was as much at issue as freedom of religion. But it was on religion that
he ultimately rested: "And while such expressions of loyalty, when volun-
tarily given, may promote national unity, it is quite another matter to say that
their compulsory expression by children in violation of their own and their
parents' religious convictions can be regarded as playing so important a part
in our national unity as to leave school boards free to exact it despite the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of religion."132 Because in his mind the
Court was free to indulge in balancing the benefits to the State against
the harm to religious freedom, he did not answer the question whether a stu-
dent could constitutionally be compelled to salute the flag if his objections
to doing so were based on other than religious grounds. If he would treat the
two cases differently he would have had to deal with the separation clause.
If he would treat the two similarly then his conclusion could not have rested
on the proposition of religious freedom.
It is not often that a Court, divided eight to one, will reverse itself within
a period of three years. But the Gobitis case was specifically overruled within
such a period by Board of Educ. v. Barnette.13S There had been a change
of personnel in the interim. Stone had succeeded Hughes as Chief Justice;
McReynolds had retired; Jackson and Rutledge had been appointed. But the
new justices did not themselves account for the difference: Black, Douglas,
and Murphy shifted their positions in the interim.
The opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson for the Court stated the question to
129 Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association as
Friends of the.Court, p. 37. The Committee, at the time the brief was filed, consisted of
Douglas Arant, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Grenville Clark, Osmer C. Fitts, Lloyd K. Garrison,
George I. Haight, Monte M. Lemann, Ross L. Malone, Jr., Burton W. Musser, Joseph A.
Padway, and Charles P. Taft. Id. at 43.
130 310 U.S. at 598. 132 Id. at 605.
131 Id. at 602. 133 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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include the problem whether the requirement may be imposed on those whose
objections rested on other than religious grounds. In doing so, he was a bit
disingenuous about what the Court had done in the earlier case:
Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession of particular
religious views or the sincerity with which they are held. While religion
supplies appellees' motive for enduring the discomforts of making the issue
in this case, many citizens who do not share these religious views hold such
a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual. It is
not necessary to inquire whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from
the duty to salute unless we first find power to make the salute a legal duty.
The Gobitis decision, however, assumed, as did the argument in that
case and in this, that power exists in the State to impose the flag salute dis-
cipline upon school children in general. The Court only examined and
rejected a claim based on religious beliefs of immunity from an unques-
tioned general rule. The question which underlies the flag salute contro-
versy is whether such a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and
political attitude may be imposed upon the individual by official authority
under powers committed to any political organization under our Consti-
tution.134
In short, the question to be examined, in fact put in the Barnette case and an-
swered by the majority in the negative,135 was whether any child, regardless
of religious belief could be compelled to engage in the rite of the flag salute.
The difference between the two judgments was not in the question but in the
answer: "We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and
invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."136 The
difference between the opinions of the Court in Barnette and Gobitis rested
on the answer to the question whether the compulsion could be exerted as to
anyone, not on the answer to the question whether the religious freedom clause
exempted those asserting religious beliefs from obligations that could be
imposed on all who do not assert such beliefs.
Justices )Black and Douglas, however, preferred the proposition "that the
statute before us fails to accord full scope to the freedom of religion secured
to the appellees by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."137 They followed
the Stone position in Gobitis, although Stone himself joined the Jackson opin-
ion. They would now test imposition on religious freedom in terms of the
existence of "a grave danger" to the community resulting from failure to
comply with the commands of the state. This thesis, of course, would leave
the States free to continue the compulsory flag salute with reference to all who
do not, because of their religion, construe the words of Exodus as a higher
134Id. at 634-36. 136 319 U.S. at 642.
13S See p. 30 supra. 137 Id. at 643.
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command than that of the State; a command not to salute the flag. Mr. Justice
Murphy joined the Jackson opinion, but added one of his own. Although the
doctrine to be found there is difficult to refine, it would appear that he rested
both on the proposition offered by Mr. Justice Jackson and that offered by
Justices Black and Douglas.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion dealt with both propositions.
He rejected Jackson's argument that the flag salute was an invalid means to
a legitimate end: the Court's evaluation of the validity of the means was neces-
sarily to be subordinated to that of the legislature. Whether the flag salute is
a means of inculcating a spirit of patriotism and loyalty is sufficiently debat-
able to require the subordination of the judicial assessment to the legislative
judgment. Of more interest here is the answer to those who would grant spe-
cial exemption-because of religious doctrine-from a requirement that may
be imposed on others. Excerpts cannot give the flavor of this opinion, but
they can reveal the guiding principle. If the opinion proved unconvincing to
other members of the Court, it apparently also proved unanswerable. The
majority need not have responded to it because the asserted principle was not
in conflict with the majority opinion; the minority chose not to respond to it,
although each of them, except the Chief Justice, had once adhered to it.
The constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabili-
ties, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not
freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. Religious
loyalties may be exercised without hindrance from the state, not the state
may not exercise that which except by leave of religious loyalties is within
the domain of temporal power. Otherwise each individual could set up
his own censor against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the
public good by those whose business it is. to make laws. 38
The essence of the religious freedom guaranteed by our Constitution is
therefore this: no religion shall either receive the state's support or incur
its hostility. Religion is outside the sphere of political government. This
does not mean that all matters on which religious organizations or beliefs
may pronounce are outside the sphere of government. Were this so, in-
stead of the separation of church and state, there would be the subordina-
tion of the state on any matter deemed within the sovereignty of the reli-
gious conscience. Much that is the concern of temporal authority affects
the spiritual interests of men. But it is not enough to strike down a non-
discriminatory law that it may hurt or offend some dissident view. It would
be too easy to cite numerous prohibitions and injunctions to which laws
run counter if the variant interpretations of the Bible were made the tests
of obedience to law. The validity of secular laws cannot be measured
by their conformity to religious doctrines. It is only in a theocratic state
that ecclesiastical doctrines measure legal right or wrong.139
138 Id. at 653. 139 Id. at 654.
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Certainly this Court cannot be called upon to determine what claims of
conscience should be recognized and what should be rejected as satisfying-
the "religion" which the Constitution protects. That would indeed resur-
rect the very discriminatory treatment of religion which the Constitution
sought forever to forbid.140
The flag-salute cases left the law clear on the question whether the states
may compel that ceremony.14' Inasmuch as the majority opinion in the Bar-
nette case did not rest on the religious freedom ground for decision, it left
unrefined the principles applicable to that portion of the first amendment.
The cases clearly left a conflict between the principles enunciated by two mi-
nority opinions, that of Justices Black and Douglas and that of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter. It is not helpful to prognosis that of all the Justices who sat on
the Barnette case, these three alone are still participating in the work of the
CoU-t.14Z
4. Conscientious Objection and Admission to the Bar. The ctanection be-
tween conscientious objection to military service and the obligation to per-
form military duties or train for military service is patent. Somewhat less
clear, perhaps, is the nexus between an undertaking to bear arms and one's
right to citizenship. Almost elusive, however, is the relationship between con-
scientious objection to military duty and the capacity to practice law. Illinois
thought that there was sufficient connection to preclude a conscientious ob-
jector from admission to its bar. And the Supreme Court was able to discern
the reasonableness of that position, or at least the absence of unreasonable-
ness, in In re Summers.143
Summers was a graduate of the University of Illinois Law School. He had
been classified as a conscientious objector relieved of military service by his
draft board; for physical reasons he had not been called upon to do non-com-
batant service. He had passed the bar examinations and was teaching law at
140 rd. at 658.
141A footnote was added to the Barnette case by Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583
(1943), upsetting a conviction by a Mississippi court for teaching resistance to the compul-
sory flag-salute regulation. Mr. Justice Roberts wrote for a unanimous Court. It is of interest
that he rested on freedom of religion as the ground for decision, and apparently regarded
that as the basis for the Barnette judgment: "Tihe court has decided that a state may not
enforce a regulation requiring children in the public schools to salute the national emblem. The
statute here in question seeks to punish as a criminal one who teaches resistance to govern-
mental compulsion to salute. If the Fourteenth Amendment bans enforcement of the school
regulation, afortiori it prohibits the imposition of punishment for urging and advising that,
on religious grounds, citizens refrain from saluting the flag. If the state cannot constrain
one to violate his conscientious religious conviction by saluting the national emblem, then
certainly it cannot punish him for imparting his views on the subject to his fellows and
exhorting them to accept those views." Id. at 588-89.
142 See generally CoMMAGER, MAjoarrY RULE AND MINoRrY RiGms (1943), for an his-
torian's evaluation of the problem.
143 325 U.S. 561 (1945). Cf. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
34 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1
the University of Toledo at the time of his application for admission. He was
refused admission to the bar by the character and fitness committee whose
judgment was sustained by the Illinois Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
of Illinois announced that he was rejected "because he is a conscientious
objector."144
At the hearings before the character and fitness committee, the record of
which presents a rather sorry spectacle, 145 it developed that Summers was a
conscientious objector because of his belief in Gandhi's principles of passive
resistance, principles that he also derived from the teachings of the New
Testament. He did not assert that his refusal to perform military duty was
because of his religion: he was a Methodist. Indeed, throughout the hearings
he drew a distinction between his position as a "conscientious" objector and
the position of others who were "religious" objectors.146 But when the case
came to the Supreme Court one of the primary grounds for attack was the
violation of the petitioner's freedom of religion.
The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Reed, after disposing of
the question of jurisdiction, 47 quickly concluded that the State of Illinois
had not violated the national constitution in preventing Summers' admission
to the bar. In reaching his conclusion, he erroneously relied on the cases in
which the United States had denied naturalization to would-be citizens who re-
fused to take an oath to defend the country by taking up arms in time of war:
It is impossible for us to conclude that the insistence of Illinois that an
officer who is charged with the administration of justice must take an
oath to support the Constitution of Illinois and Illinois' interpretation of
that oath to require a willingness to perform military service violates the
principles of religious freedom which the Fourteenth Amendment secures
against state action, when a like interpretation of a similar oath as to the
Federal Constitution bars an alien from national citizenship.148
The fact is that neither Schwimnier 49 nor MacintoshlsO involved a similar
constitutional question. Mr. Justice Black in his dissent made a similar er-
144 325 U.S. at 564 n.4.
145 An example makes the point. Summers was asked about the reading that had led
him to his conclusion of conscientious objection. Among other readings he referred to some
by Reinhold Niebuhr. His inquisitor responded: "He is a Communist? A. No.He is a minis-
ter. Q. Didn't you know he was a Communist? A. I never heard of it-not Neber [sic].Q. Did you read any of his books on Russia? A. No, sir. I have not. Q. Do you know wheth-
er he wrote about Russia or not? A. I do not know of anything if he did." Record, p. 26.
146 See, e.g., Record at pp. 6, 18, 46.
147 The Illinois Supreme Court held that there was no case or controversy presented
by the application for admission.
148 325 U.S. at 573. It is equally irrelevant that those decisions have since been overruled
by the Supreme Court. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
149 United States v. Schwimrnmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
15o United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
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roneous reliance on the dissents in these cases: "Dissents in both cases rested
in part on the premise that religious tests are incompatible with our constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of thought and religion."151 Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes made clear in Macintosh what the issue really was in that case and the
same issue was presented in Schwimmer:
It is important to note the precise question to be determined. It is solely
one of law, as there is no controversy as to the facts. The question is not
whether naturalization is a privilege to be granted or withheld. That it is
such a privilege is undisputed. Ndr, whether the Congress has the power
to fix the conditions upon which the privilege is granted. That power is
assumed. Nor, whether the Congress may in its discretion compel service
in the army in time of war or punish the refusal to serve. That power is not
here in dispute. Nor is the question one of the authority of Congress to
exact a promise to bear arms as a condition of its grant of naturalization.
That authority, for the present purpose, may also be assumed.
The question before the Court is the narrower one whether the Con-
gress has exacted such a promise.152
Only if the Court, in Summers, was willing to "assume" or treat as "undis-
puted" the power of Illinois to condition admission to the bar in the same way
that Congress conditioned naturalization could it reach the same conclusion.
But the very question presented in Summers was whether there was constitu-
tional warrant for such powers as were not in contest in Schwimmer-Macin-
tosh. In short, the constitutional question was present in Summers; it was not
present in Schwimmer-Macintosh, so that the latter can hardly be authority
for the former.
The closer analogy is the flag-salute cases. If the state has the power to
compel the flag salute as a condition of remaining in school, it would seem
that the religious objection should not permit exemption. But as the majority
held in the Barnette case, the state has no right to compel such action from
any individual. So, too, it would seem that if the state has a constitutional
right to compel the oath to bear arms as a condition of admission to the bar,
the religious ground for exception ought not to be a basis for relief. The
Court in Summers found that the power did exist, although there would
seem to be less rational connection between the oath and practice of
law than between the compulsion to salute and the inculcation of patriotic
dedication.
Mr. Justice Black's dissent, for himself and three of his brethren, recognized
the relevance of Barnette, but would seem to give it different significance. He
said: "I cannot agree that a state can lawfully bar from a semi-public position
a well-qualified man of good character solely because he entertains a religious
1s' 325 U.S. at 577.
152 283 U.S. at 627.
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belief which might prompt him at some time in the future to violate a law
which has not yet been and may never be enacted."' 53 The question should
have been whether the state could bar that individual whether his belief
rested on a religious basis or not. The dissenters' answer would probably have
been the same. And if it were it would have been concerned with the facts of
this case, when it is recalled that Summers' objections on the record purported
to derive from "conscientious" rather than "religious" objection. Then, too,
the Barnette decision would have been a more relevant guide to decision.
E. The Right to Proselyte
It is not infrequent that those most intolerant of the rights of others are
the most vigorous in seeking the protection of their own. A large part of the
constitutional law relating to freedom of religion has been developed because
of the readiness of the Jehovah's Witnesses to resort to the courts for the pro-
tection of their rights and their ability to sustain the costs of carrying their
cases to the Supreme Court. Particularly in that area where freedom of reli-
gion blends into freedom of speech have the Witnesses been active, with re-
sulting confusion of doctrine but expansion of the right of militant minority
sects to the protection of the state in their virulent attacks on the views of
others.
1. Lovell and Schneider. The first of the Jehovah's Witness cases to be given
full hearing by the Supreme Court was that of Alma Lovell.154 She was con-
victed of violating a city ordinance that forbade distribution of handbills or
literature on the streets of the metropolis of Griffin, Georgia without first
securing a permit from the City Manager. She had failed to apply for a permit
to distribute copies of the "Kingdom of Jehovah," because application for
such a permit was contrary to her religious beliefs. She contended that the
restraint of the ordinance violated her rights to religious freedom, freedom of
the press, freedom of speech, and other constitutional guarantees.
Earlier, the same ordinance was attacked on similar facts but solely on the
ground that it was violative of freedom of religion. The Court of Appeals of
Georgia sustained it against such attack.155 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.156 It was
argued in Lovell that the earlier decision had disposed of the problem. The
Court rejected the argument: "[ln the Coleman case, the Court did not deal
with the question of freedom of speech and of the press, as it had not been
properly presented."' 57 The Court proceeded to hold that the ordinance under
153 325 U.S. at 578. 154 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
155 Coleman v. City of Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123 (1936). It held that other grounds for
complaint under the fourteenth amendment were not specifically raised.
156 Coleman v. City of Griffin, 302 U.S. 636 (1937).
157 303 U.S. at 450.
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attack violated freedom of the press "by subjecting it to license and censor-
ship."lss In combination, the two cases from Griffin necessarily hold that the
protection afforded did not come from the religous freedom clause but rather
from the freedom of press clause, and thus the right of distribution was pro-
tected for all whether circulating religious pamphlets or other literature.
Similar problems with municipal ordinances requiring licenses for the dis-
tribution of literature came to the Court in the 1939 Term, as a result of arrests
and convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses."59 Again the Court acted almost
unanimously, as it had in the Lovell case, by finding the ordinances in viola-
tion of the freedom of speech and press clauses. "To require a censorship
through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution
of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees." 60
Again the protection afforded was in no way restricted to those distributing
religious literature, except that the Court did exempt "commercial soliciting
and canvassing" from the protected areas.1 61
2. Cantwell'v. Connecticut. Freedom of religion was not used to justify the
Court's position in the licensing cases until its decision in Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut.162 That case arose out of the arrest of a father and his two minor sons for
engaging in the distribution of the literature of their sect and the playing of
phonograph records setting out its doctrine. Their practice was to go from door
to door and to utilize street comers for their propaganda efforts. They offered
to sell the books and pamphlets that they had, but if no purchase was made
they offered to leave a pamphlet or book with the prospect on payment of
any contribution. 63 The content of the materials that the Cantwells were dis-
tributing was typical of the literature of their sect.1 64 On the occasion in ques-
tion, they chose to engage in their calling in a neighborhood ninety per cent of
whose residents were members of the Roman Catholic Church.
All three of the defendants were convicted on two of the five counts in the
158 Id. at 451.
159 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 160 Id. at 164.
161 Id. at 165. "Conceding that fraudulent appeals may be made in the name of charity
and religion, we hold a municipality cannot, for this reason, require all who wish to dissemi-
nate ideas to present them first to police authorities for their consideration and approval,
with a discretion in the police to say some ideas may, While others may not, be carried to
the homes of citizens; some persons may, while others may not, disseminate information
from house to house. Frauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by law. Trespasses
may similarly be forbidden. If it is said that these means are less efficient and convenient
than bestowal of power on police authorities to decide what information may be dissemi-
nated from house to house, and who may impart the information, the answer is that con-
siderations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and
press." Id. at 164.
162 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
163 See Finding of Fact No. 9, Record, p. 19; Finding of Fact No. 21, Record, p. 21.
164 See Record, pp. 40-52.
38 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1
information: the third, which charged violation of a statute prohibiting solici-
tation without license, and the fifth, alleging breach of the peace, a common-
law crime in Connecticut. The statute involved provided:
No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable
thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from
other than a member of the organization for whose benefit such person is
soliciting or within the county in which such person or organization is
located unless such cause shall have been approved by the secretary of the
public welfare council. Upon application of any person in behalf of such
cause the secretary shall determine whether such cause is a religious one
or is a bona fide object of charity or philanthropy and conforms to reason-
able standards of efficiency and integrity, and, if he shall so find, shall ap-
prove the same and issue to the authority in charge a certificate to that
effect. Such certificate may be revoked at any time. Any person violating
any provision of this section shall be fined not more than one hundred
dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both.165
The breach of the peace count charged them with "inciting to violence or
tending or provoking others to break the peace," by playing the records to
patently hostile listeners. The defendants asserted throughout the proceedings
in the Connecticut courts and in the Supreme Court that their convictions
violated their rights of freedom of speech and religion as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed
the conviction of the father on both the third and fifth counts, affirmed the
convictions of the sons on the third count, but reversed them on the fifth.166
In denying the claims of the invalidity of the statutory count, the Connecticut
court said:
The further contention that this statute, as applied to the acts of the
defendants, is invalid under ... the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment... appears to be based upon a claim that the statute...
abridges or denies freedom of religious profession and worship and liberty
of speech and of the press.... § 6294 does not apply, and is not sought
to be applied in this case, to the dissemination, either by sale or free dis-
tribution, of printed matter by the defendants.... IT]he purpose of the
statute is to protect the public against imposition in the matter of solicita-
tions of funds purportedly for religious, charitable, or philanthropic
causes. This is not, and is not claimed to be, objectionable on constitu-
tional grounds. It is such solicitation which brings defendants within the
statute, not their other and apparently predominant activities in the dis-
semination of literature. 167
165 CoNN. GEN. STATS. § 6294 (1930), as amended by § 860(d) of Connecticut Public Act
of 1937.
166 State v. Cantwell, 126 Conn. 1, 8 A.2d 533 (1939).
167 Id. at 4-5, 8 A.2d at 536.
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The Connecticut court, in sustaining the conviction under the fifth count
only as to the father, narrowed the issues again. "The doing of acts or, the
use of language which, under circumstances of which the person is or
should be aware, are calculated or likely to provoke another person or other
persons to acts of immediate violence may constitute a breach of the peace."168
"It is not necessary, as claimed, to show that other persons were actually pro-
voked to the point of violence or disturbance of the peace." 169
The issues as thus drawn by the Connecticut court were rather narrow:
(1) could the state properly qualify solicitation of funds by the licensing re-
quirement set out in the statute; (2) could the state make it a crime to use
speech calculated or likely to provoke a breach of the peace.
Although the Supreme Court was not pellucid in the announcement of the
controlling doctrine, there is evidence in the opinion of the application of the
proper standard: classification in terms of religion, whether it be for pur-
poses of controlling solicitation of funds or controlling some other conduct
is invalid. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts put it this way:
The general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which
does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or
delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection,
even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation
would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of
religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.
It will be noted, however, that the Act requires an application to the
secretary of the public welfare council of the State; that he is empowered
to determine whether the cause is a religions one, and that the issue of a cer-
tificate depends upon his affirmative action. If he finds that the cause is not
that of religion, to solicit for it becomes a crime. He is not to issue a cer-
tificate as a matter of course. His decision to issue or refuse it involves
appraisal of the facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an
opinion. He is authorized to withhold his approval if he determines that
the cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means
of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the
First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within the protec-
tion of the Fourteenth. 170
The Court emphasized the discriminatory nature of the regulation involved
and the fact that its deficiencies were in terms of the improper classification:
Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply that, under
the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the
public. Certainly penal laws are available to punish such conduct. Even
the exercise of religion may be at some slight inconvenience in order that
the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt a State may
168 Id. at 7, 8 A.2d at 537.
169 Id. at 6, 8 A.2d at 537. 170 310 U.S. at 305.
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protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitations by requiring a stranger in
the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any pur-
pose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which
he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and
manner of solication generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, com-
fort or convenience. But to condition the solicitation of aid for the per-
petuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which
rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a
religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty
protected by the Constitution.' 7'
When dealing with the problem of the conviction for breach of the peace,
the Court again resorted to standards and tests applicable to all and did not
rest its decision to upset the verdict of guilt on religious freedom but rather on
principles of freedom of speech. Although the Court talked of two "liberties,"
undefined except in terms of "the realm of religious faith, and in that of
political belief,"17Z the equation of the two, and the utilization of Schenck,
Herndon v. Lowry, and Thornhill,173 as authority suggested that the protection
flowed from principles not derived from the religion clauses of the first
amendment:
Although the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity,
we think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and
punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a sub-
stantial interest of the State, the petitioner's communication, considered
in the light of the constitutional guarantees, raised no such clear and
present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to con-
viction of the common law offense in question. 174
It cannot be' suggested that the doctrine put forth at the outset of this
article was specifically adopted by the Court in the Cantwell case. But it is
clear that the results reached there and the language used are consistent with
the proposed method for handling these problems. The holding was a narrow
one precluding the State from the exercise of its licensing power on the basis
of its determination of "what is a religious cause." The holding should be
distinguished from the gloss later put on Cantwell so that it has become much
more than it was.
3. Cox, Chaplinsky, Jamison, and Largent. In Cox v. New Hampshire,175
the Court dealt summarily with a claim that a State statute requiring a license
for a parade and a fee for the license was invalid as applied to processions of
Jehovah's Witnesses walking in close order on the streets of Manchester for
the purpose of advertising, primarily by placards, a meeting at which the
171 Id. at 306-07.
172 Id at 310. 174 Id. at 311.
173 Id. at 311 n.10. 175 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
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dogma of the sect would be preached. The convictions for the violation of the
statute were attacked under both the free speech provision and the freedom
of religion clause of the first amendment. The unanimous Court, speaking
through Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, found no infringement of the rights of
speech. The statute was a valid means of controlling the use of the streets.
"There is no evidence that the statute has been administered otherwise than
in the fair and non-discriminatory manner which the state court has construed
it to require."17 6
The Court distinguished the Caitwell case on the ground that the statute
there "authorized an official to determine whether the cause was a religious
one and to refuse a permit if he determined that it was not, thus establishing
a censorship of religion."177 The freedom of religion argument just sank of
its own weight. "No interference with religious worship or the practice of
religion in any proper sense is shown, but only the exercise of local control
over the use of streets for parades and processions."178 The religious element
properly provided no basis for distinguishing the treatment of the defendants
here from any defendants parading in a non-religious cause or no cause at all.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire79 brought a question closer to the second
issue of the Cantwell case. Chaplinsky was convicted for violation of a
New Hampshire statute that made it a crime to "address any offensive,
derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street
or other public place, [or to] call him by any offensive or derisive name, [or to]
make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to
deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful busi-
ness or occupation."s0 He had been engaged in distributing literature of the
type involved in Cantwell on the streets of Rochester on Saturday afternoon.
The city marshal received complaints about his language but informed the
complainants that Chaplinsky was "lawfully engaged." He then warned
Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless. Later, a disturbance occurred
and a police officer took Chaplinsky into custody and started him on the way
to the police station. They passed the marshal who was on the way to the
scene of the disturbance where, he had been informed, a riot was under way.
It was at this time that Chaplinsky, apparently in retort to remarks of the
marshal, called the marshal a "damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist"
and said that "the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of
Fascists."181 It was for the use of this language that he was prosecuted and
convicted.
The Court again unanimously affirmed the conviction. This time the opin-
ion was written by Mr. Justice Murphy. The religion issue was quickly put
to one side:
176 Id. at 577. 179 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
177 Id. at 578. 18 N.I PuB. LAws ch. 378, § 2 (1926).
178 Ibid. 181315 U.S. at 569.
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[W)e cannot conceive that cursing a public officer is the exercise of religion
in any sense of the term. But even if the activities of the appellant which
preceded the incident could be viewed as religious in character, and there-
fore entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would
not cloak him with immunity from the legal consequences for concomitant
acts committed in violation of a valid criminal statute.'8 2
It is hard to tell what the Court is saying at this point, assuming that it is not
defining what is and what is not religion. But its action is clear. It treated the
defendant here as it would any defendant not offering the cloak of religion
for immunity. The doctrines of freedom of speech do not protect the utterances
in question. 183 The conviction must therefore be sustained.
Jamison v. Texas'8 was another case involving a municipal ordinance simi-
lar to those successfully attacked and held invalid in Lovell and Schneider on
the ground of improper infringement of the rights of free speech and press. The
Jamison case could have rested on these grounds alone. It probably did. But
the language chosen by the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, unduly
and unfortunately, sowed the seeds for argument that it was the religious
element that contributed to downfall of the ordinances in the earlier cases.
A simple comparison between the two Griffin cases referred to earlier, s85 in
which the Court refused to strike down an ordinance on religious freedom
grounds alone but did strike down the same ordinance applied to the same
activity on freedom of speech and press grounds, demonstrates the unrelia-
bility of reading the earlier cases as turning on the religious issue. The unfor-
tunate language, in an opinion written for all the participating justices, was
this:
The right to distribute handbills concerning religious subjects on the
streets may not be prohibited at all times, at all places, and under all cir-
cumstances. This has been beyond controversy since ... Lovell .... The
city contends, however, that in the instant case the prohibition is permis-
sible because the handbills, although they were distributed for the unques-
tioned purpose of furthering religious activity, contained an invitation to
contribute to the support of that activity by purchasing books related to
the work of the group. The mere presence of an advertisement of a reli-
gious work on a handbill of the sort distributed here may not subject the
182 Id. at 571.
183 "There are certain well-defined and narrbwly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Id. at 571-72. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup.
Cr. REv. 1, for other problems of the "two-level" theory of free speech.
184 318 U.S. 413 (1943). 185 See pp. 36-37 supra.
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distribution of the handbill to prohibition. In Schneider... we held that
the city of Irvington might not forbid conduct almost precisely the same.
as that with which the appellant in the instant case is charged. Even where
handbills carrying notice of a public gathering contained a statement of
an admission fee, we held that they could not be barred from distribution
on the streets.... No admission was to be charged at the meeting for
which the appellant was circulating leaflets in the instant case. In Cant well
... we said that a state might not prevent the collection of funds for a
religious purpose by unreasonably obstructing or delaying their collec-
tion.186
That this is a distortion of the holding of Cantwell is apparent from a reading
of that opinion. The essence of the unconstitutionality there was the power
given to the authorities to determine what was and what was not a religious
cause. Why this unnecessary construction should have been utilized here,
with the concurrence of the entire Court, is far from clear. What is clear is
that such reconstruction is typical of the way that constitutional law grows
or, at least, changes. 1 s 7
Mr. Justice Black went on:
The states can prohibit the use of the streets for the distribution of pure-
ly commercial leaflets, even though such leaflets may have "a civic appeal,
or a moral platitude" appended. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55.
They may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a
clearly religious activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase
of books for the improved understanding of the religion or because the
handbills seek in a lawful fashion to promote the raising of funds for reli-
gious purposes.sS
The logical next step was taken by the Court on the same day that it handed
down the Jamison case. In Largent v. Texas,18 9 in a unanimous opinion for
the Court by Mr. Justice Reed, the protection afforded the distribution of
Jehovah's Witness literature, became a matter of religious freedom. The fac-
tual data was not different from the earlier cases attacking municipal ordi-
nances requiring permits for the distribution of literature. Mr. Justice Reed,
after disposing of a jurisdictional problem, met the constitutional questions
this way:
Upon the merits, this appeal is governed by recent decisions of this Court
involving ordinances which leave the granting or withholding of permits for
the distribution of religious publications in the discretion of municipal
officers. It is unnecessary to determine whether the distributions of the pub-
186 318 U.S. at 416-17.
87 See LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL RE.EsoNINo (1948).
188 318 U.S. at 417.
189 318 US. 418 (1943).
44 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1
lications in question are sales or contributions. The mayor issues a permit
only if after thorough investigation he "deems it proper or advisable." Dis-
semination of ideas depends upon the approval of the distributor by the
official. This is administrative censorship in an extreme form. It abridges
the freedom of religion, of the press and of speech guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.l1
What was appreciated by the earlier judgments but not by those of the 1942
Term was that the unconstitutionality of the restraint turned on the censor-
ship of the dissemination of ideas and not on the religious nature of those
ideas. If the censorship were invalid with regard to other literature it was
equally invalid with reference to religious literature. If it were valid with ref-
erence to other literature, to invalidate it solely with reference to religious lit-
erature was to aid religion in violation of the separation clause by affording
it protections not given to other writings.
4. Murdock, Jones, Martin, and Douglas. The culmination of the movement
from the Griffin cases, which protected the right to free press and free speech,
was Murdock v. Pennsylvania,191 where religious literature was accorded spe-
cial protection above and beyond the rights of speech and press. The recon-
struction of the earlier cases had begun in Jamison and Largent. Murdock had
to rest, in part, on positions that could not be justified by the unreconstructed
decisions of the earlier period. More than that, however, the result in Murdock
depended upon overruling intervening judgments that accorded the earlier
opinions the scope to which they were entitled and no more.
The new series of cases derived not from statutes which required licensing
for the distribution of literature, but rather those which taxed the sale of such
items. Jones v. Opelikal92 involved three such ordinances. In each instance a
Jehovah's Witness was convicted for failure to pay the license tax for the sale
of periodicals within the municipality. The unanimity that had pervaded the
earlier judgments disappeared at this point. Mr. Justice Reed wrote for only
five members of the Court in affirming the convictions. Although the attack
was grounded on the free press and free speech provisions, it was the freedom
of religion problem that dominated the opinions, of which there were four.
Thus Mr. Justice Reed's opinion for the Court opened with an elegant state-
ment of the older concept of the distinction between thought and action:
There are ethical principles of greater value to mankind than the guaran-
tees of the Constitution, personal liberties which are beyond the power of
government to impair. These principles and liberties belong to the mental
and spiritual realm, where the judgments and decrees of mundane courts
are ineffective to direct the course of man. The rights of which our Consti-
tution speaks have a more earthy quality. They are not absolutes to be exer-
cised independently of other cherished privileges, protected by the same
190 Id. at 422.
191 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 192 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
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organic instrument. Conflicts in the exercise of rights arise, and the con-
flicting forces seek adjustments in the courts, as do these parties, claiming
on the one side the freedom of religion, speech and the press, guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment, and on the other the right to employ the sov-
ereign power explicitly reserved to the State by the Tenth Amendment to
ensure orderly living, without which the constitutional guarantees of civil
liberties would be a mockery. Courts, no more than Constitutions, can
intrude into the consciences of men or compel them to believe contrary
to their faith or think contrary to their convictions; but courts are compe-
tent to adjudge the acts men do under color of a constitutional right, such
as that of freedom of speech or of the press or the free exercise of religion,
and to determine whether the claimed right is limited by other recognized
powers, equally precious to mankind. So the mind and spirit of man re-
main forever free, while his actions rest subject to necessary accommoda-
tion to the competing needs of his fellows.193
Then the notion of balancing the interests was more specifically stated:
Believing, as this Nation has from the first, that the freedoms of worship
and expression are closely akin to the illimitable privileges of thought
itself, any legislation affecting those freedoms is scrutinized to see that the
interferences allowed are only those appropriate to the maintenance of a
civilized society. The determination of what limitations may be permitted
under such an abstract test rests with the legislative bodies, the courts, the
executive, and the people themselves, guided by the experience of the past,
the needs of revenue for law enforcement, the requirements and capacities
of police protection, the dangers of disorder, and other pertinent factors.
194
Finally, he turned to the test of non-discrimination:
There is to be noted, too, a distinction between nondiscriminatory regula-
tion of operations which are incidental to the exercise of religion or the
freedom of speech or the press and those which are imposed upon the
religious rite itself or the unmixed dissemination of information....
When proponents of religious or social theories use the ordinary com-
mercial methods of sales of articles to raise propaganda funds, it is a natu-
ral and proper exercise of the power of the State to charge reasonable fees
for the privilege of canvassing. Careful as we may and should be to protect
the freedoms safeguarded by the Bill of Rights, it is difficult to see in such
enactments a shadow of prohibition of the exercise of religion or of abridge-
ment of the freedom of speech or the press.
1 95
He then abandoned the discrimination test:
It may well be that the wisdom of American communities will persuade
them to permit the poor and weak to draw support from the petty sales of
religious books without contributing anything for the privilege of using
193 Id. at 593-94.
194 Id. at 595. 195 Id. at 596-97.
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the streets and conveniences of the municipality. Such an exemption, how-
ever, would be a voluntary, not a constitutionally enforced, contribution.196
But he returned to it:
Nothing more is asked from one group than from another which uses
similar methods of propagation. We see nothing in the collection of a non-
discriminatory license fee, uncontested in amount, from those selling
books or papers, which abridges freedoms of worship, speech or press.
... The First Amendment does not require a subsidy in the form of fiscal
exemption.' 97
Indeed, it might more properly be said that the first amendment prohibits
such a subsidy where it is granted because of the religious nature of the activity
conducted.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone's opinion did not segregate the speech and press
issue from the religious issue. For him the license tax was invalid as involving
the same kind of restraints that had been struck down when the sole issues
involved licenses without taxes. No quarrel can be had with his conclusion
about religious literature, so long as the same doctrine is applicable to non-
religious literature. If the tax impinges on freedom of speech and press it
does not do so any the less because the content of the information relates to
religion; but it doesn't impinge any the more because the content is of a reli-
gious nature. He objected to the argument of nondiscrimination, on the
ground that commercial solicitations do not receive the protection of the first
amendment freedoms. But if he did not, in his own opinion, specifically say
that the tax would be invalid even if the only protection were that of the free-
dom of religion clause, he joined Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion in which that
position was taken.
Justices Blaclk, Douglas, and Murphy, joined the Stone opinion. All four
also joined the Murphy opinion in which. after agreeing that the tax was in-
valid because of its conflict with the guaranteed freedoms of press and
speech, he went on to argue that the religion clause alone would sustain the
position:
Under the foregoing discussion of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press, any person would be exempt from taxation upon the act of dis-
tributing information or opinion of any kind, whether political, scientific,
or religious in character, when done solely in an effort to spread knowledge
and ideas, with no thought of commercial gain. But there is another, and
perhaps more precious, reason why these ordinances cannot constitution-
ally apply to petitioners. Important as free speech and a free press are to
a free government and a free citizenry, there is a right even more dear to
many individuals-the right to worship their Maker according to their
1% Id. at 598.
197 I. at 598-99.
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needs and the dictates of their souls and to carry their message or their
gospel to every living creature. These ordinances infringe that right .... 198
He had a little difficulty in stating his position as a doctrine, for qualifica-
tions to this ultimate freedom were acknowledged to exist: "There is here no
contention that their manner of worship gives rise to conduct which calls for
regulation, and these ordinances are not aimed at any such practices."l 99
Inherent in this statement was the peculiar notion that the government may
have a right to direct its limitation to what it considered to be an evil arising
out of the religious nature of the practices involved. Such difficulties fre-
quently inhere in those doctrines which would treat the separation and free-
dom clauses as distinct and unrelated guides to decision. Left unanswered
by the Murphy approach is Mr. Justice Reed's proposition that "the First
Amendment does not require a subsidy in the form of fiscal exemption." One
can only judge from Murphy's opinion that he probably thought that it did.
The last, and somewhat curious, item about the case that calls for comment
was the fourth opinion, signed jointly by Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy,
in which they announced that they thought "this an appropriate occasion to
state that we now believe that [Gobitis]... was wrongly decided."200 The
consequence of this announced change of position has already been con-
sidered.201
If the reversal of Gobitis by Barnette could not be attributed solely to a
change in the personnel of the Court, the overruling of Jones v. Opelika by
Murdock v. Pennsylvania has no other explanation. Rutledge replaced Byrnes
on the Court between the 1941 and 1942 Terms and Murdock replaced Jones.
Rehearing was granted in the Jones cases, after certiorari was granted in
Murdock. And Martin v. City of Struthers which had been "dismissed on the
ground that the record does not show that the federal question presented was
properly preserved on appeal to the Court of Appeals.. ,"202 was reconsid-
ered and probable jurisdiction noted.203 This was the same Term at which the
Court replaced Gobitis with Barnette.
The Murdock judgment was interwoven with those in two other cases de-
cided at the same time: Martin v. City of Struthers20 4 and Douglas v. City of
Jeannette.205 The majority opinion in Murdock was written by Mr. Justice
Douglas; Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Frankfurter each wrote dissenting
opinions. The Court was divided five to four.
The Douglas opinion first defined the actions of the Witnesses in the dis-
tribution of their literature as a religious rite:
191 Id. at 620-21. 202 317 U.S. 589-90 (1942).
1 la at 621. 203 318 U.S. 739 (1943).
2W0 Id. at 623-24. 204 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
201 See pp. 26-33, supra. 205 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
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The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of mission-
ary evangelism-as old as the history of printing presses. It has been a
potent force in various religious movements down through the years. This
form of evangelism is utilized today on a large scale by various religious
sects whose colporteurs carry the Gospel to thousands upon thousands
of homes and seek through personal visitations to win adherents to their
faith. It is more than preaching; it is more than distribution of religious lit-
erature. It is a combination of both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the re-
vival meeting. This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate
under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching
from the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox
and conventional exercises of religion. It also has the same claim as the
others to the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
The integrity of this conduct or behavior as a religious practice has
not been challenged. Nor do we have presented any question as to the
sincerity of petitioners in their religious beliefs and practices, however mis-
guided they may be thought to be. Moreover, we do not intimate or sug-
gest in respecting iheir sincerity that any conduct can be made a religious
rite and by the zeal of the practitioners swept into the First Amendment.2 06
The difficulty with this approach is manifest. So long as the Court may say
what is and what is not a proper religious practice-and it admitted that
bigamy cannot be defended on that ground-it must reserve to itself exactly
that discretion which it forbade to the city officials in Cantwell: it "author-
ize[s] an official to determine whether the cause is a religious one... thus
establishing a censorship of religion."207 It is somewhat difficult to under-
stand where the Court gets this power of censorship which it said the Consti-
tution denied non-judicial officials. The opinion also created another difficul-
ty, especially for Mr. Justice Douglas. For if, as he later said in the released-
time cases,208 the state is forbidden to provide physical facilities for the
execution of religious activities by reason of the separation clause, how is it
that the state must make available its facilities to the "colporteurs" ? In Mur-
dock he said that the state not only may but must make such facilities avail-
able, and free of any license fee.
In the course of his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas either wilfully or inadver-
tently limited, in order to reject, the argument of nondiscrimination:
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The
protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license
tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies
the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and
merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them alike. Such equality
in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of
speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.209
206 319 U.S. at 108-09. 208 See pp. 72-77 infra.
207 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 578 (1941). 209 319 U.S. at 115.
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But whence comes the justification for discrimination between speakers on
religious subjects and peddlers of religious books, on the one hand, and
speakers on non-religious subjects and peddlers of non-religious books, on
the other? Does the first amendment command that special privileges be
afforded those in the first category? And, if so, what of the separation clause?
Clearlyif the activities indulged by the colporteurs are protected by the freedom
of press and speech provisions, they cannot be excluded from that protection
because the subject of their activity is religion. Equally clear, if others en-
gaged in the same activity but dealing with subjects other than religion are
not protected by the free press and speech clauses, there is no warrant for the
special right being granted to the colporteur.
Mr. Justice Douglas' final contribution was the destruction of a straw
man:
Plainly a community may not surpress, or the state tax, the dissemination
of views because they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful. If that device
were ever sanctioned, there would have been forged a ready instrument
for the suppression of the faith which any minority cherishes but which
does not happen to be in favor. That would be a complete repudiation of
the philosophy of the Bill of Rights.210
The ultimate judgment in favor of the defendants is rested not alone on the
provision for freedom of religion, but on that together with freedom of speech
and press. It may well be that the judgment reached the correct result, but
not because of the religious freedom clause.
The nondiscrimination argument that the majority opinion brushed off so
lightly was stated differently in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent than in Mr.
Justice Reed's. For it was there recognized that tax exemption was not only
a relief from an obligation, but if it was a relief from an obligation that all
others must bear it amounted to the conferring of a benefit because of the
religious quality of the exempted activity:
It is strenuously urged that the Constitution denies a city the right to
control the expression of men's minds and the right of men to win others
to their'views. But the Court is not divided on this proposition. No one dis-
putes it. All members of the Court are equally familiar with the history
that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. and are equally zealous to
enforce the constitutional protection of the free play of the human spirit.
Escape from the real issue before us cannot be found in such generalities.
The real issue here is not whether a city may charge for the dissemination
of ideas but whether the states have power to require those who need addi-
tional facilities to help bear the cost of furnishing such facilities. Street
hawkers make demands upon municipalities that involve the expenditure
of dollars and cents, whether they hawk printed matter or other things. As
the facts in these cases show, the cost of maintaining the peace, the addi-
210 Id. at 116.
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tional demands upon governmental facilities for assuring security, involve
outlays which have to be met. To say that the Constitution forbids the
states to obtain the necessary revenue from the whole of a class that enjoys
these benefits and facilities, when in fact no discrimination is suggested as
between the purveyors of printed matter and purveyors of other things,
and the exaction is not claimed to be actually burdensome, is to say that
the Constitution requires not that the dissemination of ideas in the interest
of religion shall be free but that it shall be subsidized by the state. Such a
claim offends the most important of all aspects of religious freedom in this
country, namely, that of the separation of church and state.211
One need not agree with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that the license fee in Mur-
dock was valid; but it is hard to reject the proposition that its invalidity could
not-turn on the religious nature of the defendants' activities.
This last distinction was emphasized by the second of this series of cases,
Martin v. City of Struthers. It was emphasized most clearly by the difference
between Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court and Mr. Justice Murphy's
concurring opinion. The ordinance in question in Struthers made it "unlawful
for any person distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements to
ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate
or inmates of any residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such
handbills, circulars or other advertisements they or any person with them
may be distributing." 212
The appellant, a Jehovah's Witness, went from door to door in Struthers dis-
tributing handbills advertising a religious meeting. She was convicted of vio-
lation of the ordinance. She attacked the validity of the ordinance both as a
violation of her rights of freedom of press and freedom of religion. Mr. Justice
Black, writing for the majority, stated the question to be "whether the City,
consistently with the federal Constitution's.guarantee of free speech and press,
possesses this power."2' 3 The Court held that freedom of speech and press was
infringed, because the blanket nature of the ordinance prevented "dissemi-
nation of ideas." More refined protections of the householder might be valid.
"The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal
methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will
receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose
but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemi-
nation of ideas."214
For the reason that the ordinance infringed the rights of freedom of .;peech
and of the press, and for this reason alone, the conviction was upse.. 21 5 If
211 Id. at 139-40. 213 Id. at 141-42.
212 319 U.S. at 142. 214 Id. at 147.
215 "For this reason, and wholly aside from any other possible defects, on whick we do
not pass but which are suggested in other opinions filed in this case, we conclude that the
ordinance is invald because in conflict with the freedom of speech and press." Id. at 149.
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the doctrinal distinctions between this case and the Murdock case are hard
for the reader to grasp, they were equally difficult for several members of the
majority. Mr. Justice Murphy, joined by Justices Douglas and Rutledge,
turned to the freedom of religion provision in succor of the defendant in
Struthers. The reasoning may be summed up in two sentences. "There can
be no question but that appellant was engaged in a religious activity when she
was going from house to house in the City of Struthers distributing circulars
advertising a meeting of those of her belief."216 "Freedom of religion has a
higher dignity under the Constitution than municipal or personal conven-
ience." 217
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, labelled a dissent by the reporter but
not by the author, turned again to the problem of discrimination.
The Court's opinion leaves one in doubt whether prohibition of all bell-
ringing and door-knocking would be deemed an infringement of the con-
stitutional protection of speech. It would be fantastic to suggest that a city
has power, in the circumstances of modern urban life, to forbid house-to-
house canvassing generally, but that the Constitution prohibits the inclu-
sion in such prohibition of door-to-door vending of phylacteries or rosaries
or of any printed matter. If the scope of the Court's opinion, apart from
some of its general observations, is that this ordinance is an invidious dis-
crimination against distributors of what is politely called literature, and
therefore is deemed an unjustifiable prohibition of freedom of utter-
ance, the decision leaves untouched what are in my view controlling con-
stitutional principles, if I am correct in my understanding of what is held,
and I would not be disposed to disagree with such a construction of the
ordinance.218
This discrimination argument is the one that was answered by the Douglas'
opinion. It goes to discrimination between the exercise of speech and press
and other activities that fall outside that protected area. A stronger and dif-
erent argument in terms of "discrimination" is to be found in the opinion by
Mr. Justice Jackson in Douglas v. City of Jeannette.
In that case the majority had agreed to dismiss a suit to enjoin the enforce-
ment against Jehovah's Witnesses of the kinds of statutes that had been the
concern of the Court in this series of cases. In an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
Stone, the Witnesses' complaint was dismissed and the relief sought denied
for want of equity jurisdiction. But it was to this opinion that Mr. Justice
Jackson's opinion, concurring in Jeannette and dissenting in Murdock and
Struthers, was appended. It should be noted that here the author of the
Court's opinion in the second flag-salute case also emphasized the difference
between protecting freedoms that belonged to all and giving special treatment
to those who asserted a religious ground for special treatment:
216 Id. at 150.
217 Id. at 15 1-52. 218 Id. at 154.
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In my view, the First Amendment assures the broadest tolerable exer-
cise of free speech, free press, and free assembly, not merely for religious
purposes, but for political, economic, scientific, news, or informational
ends as well. When limits are reached which such communications must
observe, can one go farther under the cloak of religious evangelism? Does
what is obscene, or commercial, or abusive, or inciting become less so if
employed to promote a religious ideology? I had not supposed that the
rights of secular and non-religious communications were more narrow or
in any way inferior to those of avowed religious groups.
It may be asked why then does the First Amendment separately men-
tion free exercise of religion? The history of religious persecution gives the
answer. Religion needed specific protection because it was subject to
attack from a separate quarter.... It was to assure religious teaching as
much freedom as secular discussion, rather than to assure a greater
license, that led to its separate statement. 219
Mr. Justice Jackson might have noted, too, that the authors of the Constitu-
tion spelled out a qiialification with reference to religious freedom in terms
of separation that was not also applied to the other freedoms protected by the
first amendment. Subsidy of the press, for example, is not specifically barred
by the terms of the Constitution.
5. Child Labor, Taxes, and Public Property. Prince v. Massachusetts22 o put
the new majority doctrine to the test and it failed. The defendant was con-
victed in Massachusetts for violation of that State's child labor laws. The vio-
lation consisted of supplying her nine-year old niece and ward with copies
of Jehovah's Witness literature and taking her out into the streets in the
evening to distribute it. Both the child and the defendant claimed to be or-
dained ministers in accordance with the creed of the Witnesses. The defendant
attacked the application of the statute solely on the ground of the freedom of
religion clause of the first amendment as incorporated in the fourteenth. Here
then the religion clause was not, for purposes of decision, intertwined with
those relating to speech and press.
The majority was caught between its stated principles of freedom of religion
and its equally appealing duty to protect the right of the states to limit child
labor. It chose the latter as the dominant consideration with the sole reason
for its position that it believed the latter more important than the former. Mr.
Justice Murphy would have none of this apostasy: "If the right of a child to
practice its religion in that manner is to be forbidden by constitutional means,
there must be convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and
immediate danger to the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the
child."221 But Mr. Justice Murphy was alone among the members of the
2 19 Id. at 179.
220 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
221 Id. at 174.
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Court. Three other justices did not join the majority opinion. They preferred
the statement of position by Mr. Justice Jackson:
This case brings to the surface the real basis of disagreement among
members of this Court in previous Jehovah's Witness cases.... Our basic
difference seems to be as to the method of establishing limitations which
of necessity bound religious freedom.
My own view may be shortly put: I think the limits begin to operate
whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of
the public. Religious activities which concern only members of the faith
are and ought to be free-as nearly absolutely free as anything can be. But
beyond these, many religious denominations or sects engage in collateral
and secular activities intended to obtain means from unbelievers to sustain
the worshippers and their leaders. They raise money, not merely by passing
the plate to those who voluntarily attend services or by contributions by
their own people, but by solicitations and drives addressed to the public
by holding public dinners and entertainments, by various kinds of sales and
Bingo games and lotteries. All such money-raising activities on a public
scale are, I think, Caesar's affairs and may be regulated by the state so long
as it does not discriminate against one because he is doing them for a reli-
gious purpose.... in violation of other provisons of the Constitution.
The Court in the Murdock case rejected this principle of separating im-
mune religious activities from secular ones in declaring the disabilities
which the Constitution imposed on local authorities. Instead, the Court
now draws a line based on age that cuts across both true exercise of religion
and auxiliary secular activities.222
It is readily seen that Mr. Justice Jackson, who, from time to time, had appro-
priately stated the neutral principle that might be applied comes close to fall-
ing into the very error for which he had condemned others. By what standard
could he distinguish between "true exercise of religion and auxiliary secular
activities?" It is a line no more valid or reasonable than the ones he con-
demned. Thus, he departed from, or added to, the view he expressed in Doug-
las v. City of Jeannette, which would have brought him to the same conclu-
sion he reached in Prince, but on sounder grounds. But at the same time he
did state the nondiscrimination principle that properly should ground the de-
cision of the Court.
Indeed, the distinction between "true exercise" and "auxiliary secular ac-
tivities" in Prince was utilized to reach results with which Jackson disagreed in
Follett v. Town ofMcCormick.223 There a municipal ordinance imposed a tax on
book agents and applied it to a Jehovah's Witness. The state courts sought to
distinguish the earlier cases on the ground that here the defendant was local
and, therefore, outside the category of itinerant preachers protected by the
earlier cases.
222 Id. at 177-78.
223 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
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The opinion written for the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas was simple in
its construction. The Court need not, he said, draw the line between religious
activities and non-religious activities with regard to the distributors of litera-
ture embracing the faith of the Jehovah's Witnesses: it had previously been
decided that their activities fell on the religion side of the line. That made
the question a narrow one for resolution: can the state tax the exercise of
religion. The answer to that question, clearly, was that it cannot. Therefore,
the tax in question was invalid. Q.E.D. Finally, in response to the dissent of
Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson:
This does not mean that religious undertakings must be subsidized. The
exemption from a license tax of a preacher who preaches or a parishioner
who listens does not mean that either is free from all financial burdens of
'government, including taxes on income or property.... But to say that
they, like other citizens, may be subject to general taxation does not mean
that they can be required to pay a tax for the exercise of that which the
First Amendment has made a high constitutional privilege.22 4
Why the tax involved in Follett was not a general tax imposed on all citizens
who engaged in the activity indulged by Follett was never made clear. Mr.
Justice Murphy's opinion was less ingenuous. He, too, felt it necessary to
answer the contention of the dissent that the granting of exemption on the
ground of religion was unconstitutional: "It is claimed that the effect of our
decision is to subsidize religion. But this is merely a harsh way of saying
that to prohibit the taxation of religious activities is to give substance to the
constitutional right of religious freedom."225
The separate opinion of Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson returned to the
hard problem: would not the exemption of activity from taxation on the
ground of religion result in a subsidy to religion? If it would, would it not
violate the separation clause? But strangely enough it was only the first ques-
tion that was put. The separation clause remained a forgotten provision of
the first amendment, even to the extent of its omission in the quotation of
that amendment in the opinion.22 6 But if the second question was not put
explicitly, the problem it implicitly created was none the less there, even as
the problem was stated by these dissenters:
Follett is not made to pay a tax for the exercise of that which the First
Amendment has relieved from taxation. He is made to pay for that for
which all others similarly situated muit pay-an excise for the occupation
of street vending. Follett asks exemption because street vending is, for him,
also part of his religion. As a result, Follett will enjoy a subsidy for his
religion. He will save the contribution for the cost of government which
everyone else will have to pay.
Unless the phrase "free exercise," embodied in the First Amendment,
means that government must render service free to those who earn their
n24 Id. at 577-78. 225 Id. at 578-79. 226 See id. at 582 n.2.
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living in a religious calling, no reason is apparent why the appellant, like
every other earner in the community, should not contribute his share of
the community's common burden of expense. In effect the decision grants
not free exercise of religion, in the sense that such exercise shall not be
hindered or limited, but, on the other hand, requires that the exercise of
religion be subsidized....
We cannot ignore what this decision involves. If the First Amendment
grants immunity from taxation to the exercise of religion, it must equally
grant a similar exemption to those who speak and to the press.
Not only must the court, if it is to be consistent, accord to dissemination
of all opinion, religious or other, the same immunity, but, even in the field
of religion alone, the implications of the present decision are startling. Mul-
tiple activities by which citizens earn their bread may, with equal propriety,
be denominated an exercise of religion as may preaching or selling reli-
gious tracts. Certainly this court cannot say that one activity is the exercise
of religion and the other is not. The materials for judicial distinction do not
exist. It would be difficult to deny the claims of those who devote their lives
to the healing of the sick, to the nursing of the disabled, to the betterment
of social and economic conditions, and to a myriad other worthy objects,
that their respective callings, albeit they earn their living by pursuing them,
are, for them, the exercise of religion. Such a belief, however earnestly and
honestly held, does not entitle the believers to be free of contribution to
the cost of government, which itself guarantees them the privilege of pur-
suing their callings without governmental prohibition or interference.227
The failure of this series of cases to arrive at a doctrine is due here, as else-
where, to the failure to recognize the inseparable nature of the two religion
clauses of the first amendment. Not even the different minorities of the
Court, except by indirection, took notice of the unitary nature of the two
clauses. That such recognition would lead to restriction on the proselyting
efforts of the Jehovah's Witnesses was not a reason for rejecting the doctrine.
If the obnoxious nature of a religious group's activities is not in itself a basis
for inhibiting those activities, no more is it a basis for protecting them.
In each of the decisions relating to the right to license or tax, the Court
dealt with the use of public streets. There were statements from time to time
that an ordinance that permitted a private property owner to exclude the
Witnesses or any other religious group from intruding would be sustained.228
Marsh v. Alabama229 presented the question of the distinction between private
and public property for these purposes. An Alabama statute made it a crime
to trespass on the property of another after warning not to do so. 230 The
227 Id. at 580-83.
22s See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943).
229 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
2
" ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 426 (1940).
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defendant was convicted of violating this law when she distributed literature
in the usual manner of Jehovah's Witnesses within the confines of a "company
town." The town of Chickasaw, Alabama, was owned by the Gulf Shipbuild-
ing Corporation. The stores on the "business block" where the defendant
engaged in her proselyting endeavors all contained notices to the effect that
the property was private property and that no street vending or solicitation
was permitted without authorization. The defendant was told that she would
not be given authorization. When she persisted in her activities she was
arrested.
The question, as put by Mr. Justice Black for the Court's majority, was
"to decide whether a State, consistently with the First and ]Fourteenth Amend-
ments, can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to dis-
tribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town con-
trary to the wishes of the town's management." 2 31 The Court pointed out
that if this were property belonging to a municipal corporation, there could
be no doubt that the- statute could not be validly applied to this defendant.
interestingly enough, Mr. Justice Black stated the barrier to such action in
terms not restricted to religious literature: "[N]either a state nor a munici-
pality can completely bar the distribution of literature containing religious or
political ideas on its streets, sidewalks and public places or make the right to
distribute dependent on a flat license tax or permit to be issued by an official
who could deny it at will.... lAin ordinance completely prohibiting the dis-
semination of ideas on the city streets cannot be justified on the ground that
the municipality holds legal title to them." 232 The Court held that the instant
case could not be decided in terms of "the corporation's property interests." 233
The question did turn on the use to which the property was generally put.
And, since "the town of Chickasaw does not function differently from any
other town," 234 the same rules would be applied to it as to municipal corpora-
tions of more public nature. Despite this statement of position, the Court
modified the doctrine on which the conclusion was based. The test was a
balancing of interests:
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must
here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred posi-
tion .... In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the
premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were
held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permit-
ting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their
fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the applica-
tion of a state statute.235
231 326 U.S. at 502.
232 Id. at 504-05. 234 Id. at 508.
233 Id. at 505. 235 Id. at 509.
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Two items should be underlined. First, that the rights involved included free-
dom of the press as well as freedom of religion. Second, that the rights im-
posed on are spoken of as those belonging to the community to receive the
information rather than that of the individual to disseminate it.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter agreed that so long as the law relating to distribu-
tion in municipal streets was what it was, the ownership of this property by
the Gulf corporation should not afford a basis for distinction. It was Mr.
Justice Reed who wrote the dissenting opinion. He was joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Burton. In the course of his opinion he chose
the unfortunate but none the less frequent approach of a dissenter of making
the majority opinion stand for a much broader proposition than it undertook
to claim for itself: "What the present decision establishes as a principle is that
one may remain on private property against the will of the owner and con-
trary to the law of the state so long as the only objection to his presence is
that he is exercising an asserted right to spread there his religious views." 236
He admitted that the Court might in the future be more restrictive in the
application of that "principle," but said that in doing so it would have to rely
on the drawing of arbitrary lines rather than resting on the existing doctrine
that distinguished public from private property.
In the companion case of Tucker v. Texas237 the Court split along the same
lines. As Mr. Justice Black said, in speaking for the majority:
The only difference between this case and Marsh v. Alabama is that here
instead of a private corporation, the Federal Government owns and oper-
erates the village. This difference does not affect the result. Certainly nei-
ther Congress nor Federal agencies acting pursuant to Congressional
authorization may abridge the freedom of press and religion safeguarded
by the First Amendment. True, under certain circumstances it might be
proper for security reasons to isolate the inhabitants of a settlement, such
as Hondo Village, which houses workers engaged in producing war
materials. But no such necessity and no such intention on the part of
Congress or the Public Housing Authority are shown here. 238
Saia v. Sew York239 contains a strange bit of irony in the development of
guides in this area. The case involved the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness
who utilized a sound truck for the dissemination of his doctrine without the
license required by state law. He had previously received permission to use
loud-speaking equipment in the city park on designated Sundays. After com-
plaints about the noise, the police refused permission for further activity of
this sort. The defendant proceeded to act without the license. He was arrested
and convicted of violating the ordinance requiring a license. His appeal to the
Supreme Court asserted that the ordinance "violated appellant's rights of free-
236 Id. at 512. 23S Id. at 520.
237 326 U.S. 517 (1946). 239 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
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doam of speech, assembly, and worship under the Federal Constitution." 240
But Mr. Justice Douglas held the ordinance "unconstitutional on its face"
only on the ground that "it establishes a previous restraint on the right of
free speech in violation of the First Amendment which is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment against State action." 241 The irony lies in the fact
that the religious freedom in this area which, as has been shown, derived
from the rights accorded freedom of press and speech, is now suggested as the
appropriate base on which the rights of free speech should rest: "Unless we
are to retreat from the firm positions we have taken in the past. we must give
freedom of speech in this case the same preferred treatment that we gave freedom
of religion in the Cantwell case .... " 242 The Cantwell case, of course, decided
only the want of power of a state to determine what was religious activity.
There are qualifications here, too, on the freedom to use loudspeakers. The
absolute right is less than absolute, even though "loud-speakers are today
indispensable instruments of effective public speech." 243 "Noise can be regu-
lated by regulating decibals. The hours and place of public discussion can be
controlled." 244 It is thus once again the Court's function to balance interests
and determine for itself which interest is to be given priority. But it must recog-
nize the preferred position of the first amendment freedoms.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Reed and Burton, dissented on
the ground that the community has the right to reserve its public parks for
uses that do not interfere with other persons' utilization of the facilities. Ad-
mitting the possibility of an arbitrary and capricious application of the ordi-
nance, they found none here and were unwilling to indulge the assumption
that such action would occur. Mr. Justice Jackson's solo dissent is of interest
with reference to the religion issue, with which neither the majority nor the
other dissenters really dealt. It is of interest because it presented a dilemma
that the Court did not consider then and has since left unresolved:
But the Court points out that propagation of his religion is the avowed
and only purpose of appellant and holds that Lockport cannot stop the
use of loud-speaker systems on its public property for that purpose. If it
is to be treated as a case merely of religious teaching, I still could not
agree with the decision. Only a few weeks ago we held that the Constitu-
tion prohibits a state or municipality from using tax-supported property
"to aid religious groups to spread their faith." McCollum v. Board
of Education, 333 U.S. 203. Today we say it compels them to let it
be used for that purpose. In the one case the public property was
appropriated to school uses; today it is public property appropriated and
240 Id. at 559; see Brief for Appellant, pp. 19-24.
241 334 U.S. at 559-60.
242 Id. at 561.
243 Ibi4. 244 Id. at 562.
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equipped for recreational purposes.... And I cannot see how we can
read the Constitution one day to forbid and the next day to compel use of
public tax-supported property to help a religious sect spread its faith.245
He then pointed out the lack of discrimination and rejected the notion that
the Court rather than the local authorities should balance the interests in-
volved and reach a conclusion as to which was better for the community.
The dilemma, of course, derives from the failure of the Court to treat the
religion clauses in the unitary fashion that would require religion to be ruled
out as a measure of state action. But once again, it should be noted that Saia,
like many of its predecessors, did not at the time of its promulgation rest on
either of the religion clauses in the first amendment, despite the fact that they
were offered as a basis for decision by the appellant.
The problem of sound trucks and free speech was not put to rest in Saia.
In Kovacs v. Cooper,246 decided at the next term, the problem reappeared in
a context in which there was no religious element. The Court could not agree
on an opinion 'resolving the question whether a Trenton ordinance that for-
bade the emission of "loud and raucous" noises by sound equipment was
validly applied to the appellant. Mr. Justice Reed's opinion, in which the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Burton joined, distinguished Saia on the ground
that the Trenton statute did contain an appropriate standard, the absence of
which made the Saia ordinance invalid. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion rested on the position he had taken in Saia. He used the opinion as a
vehicle for reviewing the meaning of the proposition that first amendment
rights were to be treated as "preferred rights." Mr. Justice Jackson's concur-
rence was also repetitive of his position in Saia and he joined Mr. Justice
Black's dissenting view that Saia was effectively overruled by this decision.
Black's position rested on the fact that the charge levelled at the defendant
did not state the standard of the ordinance so that the defendant was con-
demned simply for using a loud-speaker on the public streets. He retained
the views of the majority in Saia.
It is perhaps to be suggested that, although neither Saia nor Kovacs said
so, the difference in result in Kovacs may well have rested on the fact that the
latter case did not involve any element of religious proselyting.
After a short interval the Court's attention was shifted from the problem of
noise to the problem of the use of public property for proselyting, the issue
that Mr. Justice Jackson raised in Saia. The first of this new series was Nie-
motko v. Maryland.247 But the decision there was simple. In that case, without
any statutory warrant, the defendants were arrested for making proselyting
speeches in a public park without having secured permission to do so.
"[R]arely has any case been before this Court which shows so clearly an
245 Id. at 569-70.
246 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 247 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
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unwarranted discrimination in a refusal to issue.., a license.... The con-
clusion is inescapable that the use of the park was denied because of the City
Council's dislike for or disagreement with the Witnesses or their views." 248
Although all the justices did not concur in Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion,
they all concurred in the result: the conviction was invalid under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It could as appropriately
have been based on the religion clauses of the first amendment properly
construed to prohibit classification in terms of religion.
The second case, Kunz v. New York,249 proved a bit more difficult, although
it could have been disposed of in the same manner by recognition of the sug-
gested principle of the first amendment. For there, the City of New York had
an .ordinance that prohibited the holding of "public worship" meetings on
the city streets without a permit. It was thus a classification in terms of reli-
gion and, therefore, invalid on its face, on proper analysis. The Court indeed
rested on the first amendment in upsetting a conviction for preaching without
a permit after a permit had been refused. But it concealed which provisions
of the first amendment were relied on. The defendant was not a Jehovah's
Witness, incidentally, but one whose "calling" also required him to "go out
on the highways and byways and preach the word of God"250 and to preach
it in a manner that called for "scurrilous attacks on Catholics and Jews." 251
He had earlier received a permit to engage in his "calling," but the police re-
fused renewal after experience indicated that his preaching against Jews and
Catholics in New York City had stirred his listeners to threatened violence.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, on behalf of the Court, struck down the ordinance
as "clearly invalid as a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment
rights" because it gave "an administrative official discretionary power to con-
trol in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the streets
of New York."252 Again, however, as in the comparison of the Saia and
Kovacs cases, one might draw the inference that the religious element played
a role from the fact that in Feiner v. New York,253 a conviction was affirmed
for engaging in somewhat similar activities where the speaker was inciting
the crowd on issues not religious in nature. It is also true, however, that the
Feiner case can be distinguished from the Kunz case in that Kunz involved
problems of prior restraint and Feiner did not. Strangely enough, however,
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, who wrote both opinions for the Court, made no
mention of Kunz at all in his Feiner opinion, nor of the Feiner case in his
Kunz opinion.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion included all three cases:
Niernotko, Kunz, and Feiner. After setting out the relevant precedents, and
248 Id. at 272. 251 Id. at 296.
249 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 252 Id. at 293.
250 Id. at 292. 253 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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analyzing the various relevant factors, he concluded that the Niemotko con-
viction was invalid because of the discriminatory application of the ordinance
and that the Kunz conviction was invalid because of the lack of standards in
the ordinance granting administrative authority to license. Neitherof these
grqunds is necessarily concerned with the religion clauses of the first amend-
ment. But he did say of the Kunz case, in language as ambiguous as that of the
majority: "Such a standard, considering the informal procedure under which
it is applied, too readily permits censorship of religion by the licensing
authorities. Cantwell v. Connecticut ...."254
Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent was biting. He would sustain the requirement
of the permit in Kunz. He refused to treat the ordinance in a vacuum; there was
cause here for the denial. The Chaplinsky case made clear to him that the kind
of epithets that Kunz was accuscomed to using were evils which the state had
the right to abate. To assert that the state was required to draft an ordinance
or a statute that would be valid against all claims of freedom of speech was to
ask more of the state legislative bodies than the Court itself was competent
to provide: "It seems hypercritical to strike down local laws on their faces
for want of standards when we have no standards." 255 But Jackson, too, was
talking of problems of speech and not of religion in his opinion. Little may
be derived from Niemotko and Kunz about the proper application of the reli-
gion clauses of the first amendment. But these clauses were relevant to the
next case to come before the Court.
The decision in Fowler v. Rhode Island256 was not difficult to reach on the
basis of any of the doctrines that have been suggested. The conviction of the
Jehovah's Witness in that case was for violation of an ordinance that forbade
speeches in public parks. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the majority would
seem to suggest that the statute was invalid in its application to religious
meetings. But by reason of counsel's admission at oral argument, it was not
necessary to assert any such doctrine:
[I]t was conceded at the trial that this meeting was a religious one. On oral
argument before the Court the Assistant Attorney General further con-
ceded that the ordinance, as construed and applied, did not prohibit
church services in the park. Catholics could hold mass in Slater Park and
Protestants could conduct their church services there without violating the
ordinance. Church services normally entail not only singing, prayer, and
other devotionals but preaching as well. Even so, those services would not
be barred by the ordinance. That broad concession, made in oral argument,
is fatal to Rhode Island's case. For it plainly shows that a religious service
of Jehovah's Witnesses is treated differently than a religious service of other
sects. That amounts to the state preferring some religious groups over this
one. In Niemotko... we had a case on all fours with this one .... 257
254 Id. at 286. 256 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
255 Id. at 309. 257 Id. at 69.
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But the opinion went on to eschew the power to decide what was "a religious
practice or activity" except in a "narrow" class of cases that the Court did not
distinguish, such as Davis v. Beason and Reynolds v. United States, because,
it is submitted, it has produced no doctrine capable of distinguishing them.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter would have rested the result entirely on the equal
protection clause and Mr. Justice Jackson concurred only in the result. It
should be noted that the notion of the utility of the equal protection clause in
this area is akin to the suggested thesis of this paper, except that in its appli-
cation to this case it involved discrimination among religions rather than the
problem of classification in terms of religion.
The public park problem was revived in Poulos v. New Hampshire.258
Poulos had been denied a permit to conduct religious services in a public park
in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He held the services anyway and was prose-
cuted and convicted. The New Hampshire high court affimed the conviction
on the ground that if the license had been improperly denied, the proper
remedy was by mandamus or other such writ directing the issuance of the
license. This Poulos refused to seek. The opinion of the majority makes some
things clear. The mere requirement of a license is not unconstitutional as
violative either of the free speech or religion clauses:
The principles of the First Amendment are not to be treated as a prom-
ise that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may gather around
him at any public place and at any time a group for discussion or instruc-
tion. It is a non sequitur to say that First Amendment rights may not be
regulated because they hold a preferred position in the hierarchy of the
constitutional guarantees of the incidents of freedom. This Court has
never so held and indeed has definitely indicated the contrary. It has indi-
cated approval of reasonable nondiscriminatory regulation by governmen-
tal authority that preserves peace, order and tranquility without deprivation
of the First Amendment guarantees of free speech, press and the exercise of
religion. When considering specifically the regulation of the use of public
parks, this Court has taken the same position.... In [Kunz and Saia] the
ordinances were held invalid, not because they regulated the use of the
parks for meeting and instruction but because they left complete discretion
to refuse the use in the hands of officials. 2 59
It went on to hold that Poulos was not denied any constitutional rights by the
requirement that he seek correction of erroneous action by the licensing
authorities in the Courts. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion would rest solely
on this ground. Justices Black and Douglas, who dissented, rested their posi-
tions wholly on the free speech provisions of the first amendment and rejected
both arguments of the majority as an authorization of censorship of speech.
258 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
259 Id. at 405-07.
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F. The Trial of "Saint Germain"
What may be the insoluble problem under any theory of the meaning of
the first amendment religion clauses was brought to the Court in United
States v. Ballard.260 There, the leaders of the "I Am" movement were prose-
cuted for using the mails to defraud. The indictment alleged that Mrs. Ballard,
"alias Saint Germain, Jesus, Joan of Arc, Lotus Ray King, Chanera," 261 and
others, had secured moneys by misrepresentations and had used the mails in
doing so. Among the misrepresentations alleged
were claims that Guy W. Ballard had attained a supernatural state of im-
mortality; that all the Ballards had been selected as divine messengers
through whom the teachings of St. Germain and other "ascended masters"
would be communicated to mankind; that the Ballards had the power to
conquer disease, death, old age, poverty, and misery; that they could cure
and had cured persons of physical ailments; that they had the power to
precipitate from the air money and other material riches; that they had
received diine visitations from St. Germain and other supernatural entities
who dictated the books published by defendants; that St. Germain had
appeared in person before Charles Sindelar who had painted the saint's
portrait; that books, charts, and phonograph records issued by defendants
had special salutary qualities which would be transmitted to purchasers;
that since a catclysm was about to engulf the earth it was wiser to give
money to defendants than to invest it in banks, homes, insurance,
etc .... 262
The Government demonstrated that a large number of people to whom these
representations were made contributed sums of moneys to the defendants, in
the form of donations and as the purchase price for the various books, records,
and paintings that were represented to have supernatural qualities.
In a political society dedicated to the proposition that, so far as the state
is concerned, there are no religious truths, how could the Government prove
the falsehood of the representations? As the respondents pointed out, the
representations of the Ballards were not different in kind from those made by
longer-established religions who receive money from their membership. Thus,
the promise of attainment of old age and immortality is compared with the
representations in the Old Testament that Adam reached the age of 930,
Moses, 120, Methuselah, 969, and the statement in Matthew: "Verily I say
unto you. There be some standing here, which shall not taste of death, till
they seethe Son of man coming in his kingdom."263 With regard to the divine
appointment and selection of the Ballards, the comparison is again made with
the Bible and with the Mormons:
260 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
261 Record, p. 2.
262 Petition for Certiorari, pp. 4-5. 263 Brief for Respondents, p. 53.
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It is not without precedent for one to claim revelation. The Bible from
start to finish conclusively proves and establishes that very thing. See:
Amos 3:7; Jeremiah 1:5; Genesis 5:22; Genesis 6 ....
Christ Himself was a revelator. (John 12:49-50.)...
Direct revelation is not the basis of all Christian faiths. Some churches,
for example the Roman Catholic, claim direct lineal authority from Christ.
Some, for example, the Lutheran, claim authority on the direction given
by Jesus to preach the gospel as expressed in Mark 16:15-18. But direct
revelation is the basis of authority for other religions, for example, Church
of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints, also known as Mormons.264
Similar comparisons were made with regard to the teachings allegedly con-
ducive to attainment of eventual salvation. Reference is made to the Athana-
sian Creed265 and to Mark: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved;
but he that believeth not shall be damned." 266 The sale of literature was anal-
ogized to the distribution of "the 'Christian Science Monitor,' 'Christian
Science Sentinel,' Catholic 'Tidings,' Catholic 'Messenger,' the Mormon 'Im-
provement Era,' and other church publications. Hymn books and manuals
are used in practically every religion."2 67 Again, with reference to healing,
the respondents drew comparisons with other religions not under attack for
misrepresentations: "Why were they not as justified in believing and stating
this to be the fact as those who conduct the Shrine at Lourdes, France, and
St. Anne's de Beaupre, at Quebec, Canada ?"268 "As defined by Mary Baker
Eddy the religion she founded is 'divine methaphysics'; it is 'the scientific
system of divine healing'; it is 'the law of God, the law of good, interpreting
and demonstrating the divine principle and rule of universal harmony.' "269
"Again we realize that in the Bible we are taught that healings through others
than Christ have occurred. (Mark 16:18)."270 The analogy with reference to
"precipitation" was weaker. The best that the defense could come up with was
two quotations from the New Testament: "what I do all men shall do and
greater things than these shall ye do. John 14:12.. .";271 " 'And I say unto
you, ask and it shall be given you; seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall
be opened unto you.' (Luke 11:9)"272
Again with reference to the prediction of a cataclysm, the defendants as-
serted a parallel with more widely accepted religions. Among those referred
to were the Books of Malachi and Matthew:
264 Id. at 54, 55.
265 As quoted at page 59 of Respondents' Brief: "Whosoever shall be saved; before all
things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith; which faith except every one do keep
whole and undefiled; without doubt he shall perish everlastingly. * * * This is the Catholic
faith; which except a man believe faithfully (truly and firmly), he cannot be saved"
266 Mark 16:16, as quoted ibid.
267 Id. at 69. 270 Ibid.
266 Id. at 77. 271 Id. at 7940.
269 Ibid. 2 72 Id. at 82.
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In the Book of Malachi, 4:1-5, it is stated that the "earth shall bum as an
oven and all the proud and the wicked shall bum as stubble, but unto you
that fear My Name shall the Son of Righteousness arise with healing in his
wings and ye shall go forth and grow up as calves of the stall."
In the New Testament, Jesus, in speaking of his second coming, stated:
"There shall not be left here one stone upon another that shall not be
thrown down." (Matthew 24.) See, also, Isaiah 2 and 24.273
The problem presented by the case is patent. Religious belief could not
excuse criminal activity. But a person could not be prosecuted for his reli-
gious belief. The truth of the representations cannot be measured by the courts
any more than the truth of the representations of the more established reli-
gions could be determined by law. And yet the very essence of the charge
required proof of the falsehood of the assertions.
The trial court, in consultation with counsel for both sides attempted to
find a way out. The method suggested was to measure only the good faith
of the defendants in making these representations. The trial court addressed
the jury:
Now, gentlemen, here is the issue in this case:
First, the defendant in this case made certain representations of belief
in a divinity and in a supernatural power. Some of the teachings of the de-
fendants, representations, might seem extremely improbable to a great
many people. For instance, the appearance of Jesus to dictate some of the
works that we have had introduced in evidence, as testified to here at the
opening transcription, or shaking hands with Jesus, to some people that
might seem highly improbable. I point that out as one of the many state-
ments.
Whether that is true or not is not the concern of this Court and is not
the concern of the jury-and they are going to be told so in their instruc-
tions. As far as this Court sees the issue, it is immaterial what these defend-
ants preached or wrote or taught in their classes. They are not going to be
permitted to speculate on the actuality of the happening of those incidents.
Now, I think I have made that as clear as I can. Therefore, the religious
beliefs 6f these defendants cannot be an issue in this court.
The issue is: Did these defendants honestly and in good faith believe
those things? If they did, they should be acquitted. I cannot make it any
clearer than that.
If these defendants did not believe those things, they did not believe
that Jesus came down and dictated, or that St. Germain came down and
dictated, did not believe the things that they wrote, the things that they
preached, but used the mail for the purpose of getting money, the jury
should find them guilty. Therefore, gentlemen, religion cannot come into
this case. 274
273 Id. at 83.
274 322 U.S. at 81-82.
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Despite the acquiescence of defense counsel in this statement, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the jury verdict. It "held that the ques-
tion of the truth of the representations concerning respondents' religious doc-
trines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury." 275 All nine justices
of the Supreme Court were convinced that the Court of Appeals was in error
in this position. They were not agreed as to the proper method of treating
the problem.
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, held that the truth of re-
spondents' allegations with reference to their religion could not be submitted
to any trier of fact:
Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would hardly be
supposed that they could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of
determining whether those teachings contained false representations. The
miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the
power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one could
be sent. to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teach-
ings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.... Man's rela-
tion to his God was made no concern of the state.... The religious views
espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to
most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury
charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with
the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that
task, they enter a forbidden domain.2 76
The result was that the judgment upsetting the convictions was reversed and
the case remanded to the appellate court for consideration of the other
grounds asserted by the defendants as bases for reversal.277
Mr. Chief Justice Stone, joined by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, would
have sustained the conviction. He found the Court's discussion irrelevant to
the issues presented by the case. The issue of the truth of the religious beliefs
was withdrawn from the jury. No question was presented as to whether the
facts occurred. The sole question submitted to the jury was "whether petition-
ers [sic] honestly believed that they had occurred, with the instruction that if
the jury did not so find, then it should return a verdict of guilty. On this
issue the jury, on ample evidence that respondents were without belief in the
statements which they had made to their victims, found a verdict of guilty.
The state of one's mind is a fact as capable of fraudulent misrepresentation
as is one's physical condition or the state of his bodily health."278
Mr. Justice Jackson would have reversed the conviction. His opinion, un-
275 Id. at 85-86.
276 Id. at 87.
277 The convictions were ultimately upset because women had been systematically ex-
cluded from the jury. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
278 322 U.S. at 89-90.
1961] OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 67
convincing to his brethren, sets out principles that are hard to refute and are
not adequately answered by either of the other opinions in the case:
In the first place, as a matter of either practice or philosophy I do not
see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations
as to what is believable. The most convincing proof that one believes his
statements is to show that they have been true in his experience. Likewise,
that one knowingly falsified is best proved by showing that what he said
happened never did happen. How can the Government prove these per-
sons knew something to be false Which it cannot prove to be false? If we
try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the dispute
from the very considerations which in common experience provide its
most reliable answer.
In the second place, any inquiry into intellectual honesty in religion
raises profound psychological problems.... If religious liberty includes,
as it must, the right to communicate such experiences to others, it seems
to me an impossible task for juries to separate fancied ones from real ones,
dreams from happenings, and hallucinations from true clairvoyance....
Religious symbolism is even used by some with the same mental reserva-
tions one has in teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies
or dispassionate judges. It is hard in matters so mystical to say how literally
one is bound to believe the doctrine he teaches and even more difficult to
say how far it is reliance upon a teacher's literal belief which induces fol-
lowers to give him money.
Prosecutions of this character easily could degenerate into religious per-
secution. I do not doubt that religious leaders may be convicted of fraud
for making false representations on matters other than faith or experience,
as for example if one represents that funds are being used to construct a
church when in fact they are being used for personal purposes. But that is
not this case, which reaches into wholly dangerous ground. When does
less than full belief in a professed credo become actionable fraud if one is
soliciting gifts or legacies? Such inquiries may discomfort orthodox as well
as unconventional religious teachers, for even the most regular of them
are sometimes accused of taking their orthodoxy with a grain of salt.
I would dismiss the indictment and have done with this business of
judicially examining other people's faiths. 279
It would seem to be Jackson's position that the dilemma presented by
Ballard was unresolvable. Under such circumstances, a criminal conviction
should hardly be permitted to stand. A slightly more difficult case might be
presented in a civil suit for damages, but the answer should probably be the
same.
G. The School Bus Case: The Precedent of Byron's Julia
In the cases that preceded Everson v. Board of Education,280 the Court had
seldom undertaken to supply content to that part of the first amendment con-
279 Id. at 92-95. 280 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
68 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1
cerned with separation. The Court had, theretofore, more or less assumed that
the freedom provision was separable from the separation clause and, there-
fore, could be treated in the same manner as those referring to speech, press,
and assembly. Thus, when Everson came before them, the justices were able
to write on a comparatively clean slate, at least insofar as their judgments
rather than their dicta were concerned. They fully utilized the opportunity:
the Everson problem was canvassed by three separate opinions covering seven-
ty-four pages. The Court was divided five to four.
The litigation arose out of payments made by the township of Ewing, New
Jersey to parents of parochial school children in reimbursement for the costs
of transportation of those children to their school. A taxpayer of the town-
ship took exception to the payments and brought suit to effectuate his objec-
tionis. The payments had been made for this transportation pursuant to a
state statute and a resolution of the school board of Ewing purportedly issued
in accordance with the statute. The exact language of each is relevant to an
evaluation of the various opinions. The statute read as follows:
Whenever in any district there are children living remote from any school-
house, the board of education of the district may make rules and contracts
for the transportation of such children to and from school, including the
transportation of children to and from school other than a public school,
except such school as is operated for profit in whole or in part.
When any school district provides any transportation for public school
children to and from school, transportation from any point in such estab-
lished school route to any other point in such established school route
shall be supplied to school children residing in such school district in
going to and from school other than a public school, except such school
as is operated for profit in whole or in part.
Nothing iii this section shall be so construed as to prohibit a board of
education from making contracts for the transportation of children to a
school in an adjoining district when such children are transferred to the
district by order of the county superintendent of schools, or when any
children shall attend school in a district other than that in which they shall
reside by virtue of an agreement made by the respective boards of educa-
tion 2 81
It should be noted that the statute, in authorizing payment for school trans-
portation, drew a line only between students attending non-profit institutions
and those attending schools operated for profit in whole or in part. The reso-
lution in contest was differently phrased: "The Transportation Committee
recommended the Transportation of Pupils of Ewing to the Trenton High and
Pennington High and Trenton Catholic Schools, by way of public carriers
as in recent years. On motion of Mr. R. Ryan, seconded by Mr. French, the
same was adopted."282 The language of the resolution is only once referred
281 N.J. R v. STAr. § 18:14-8 (1942). 282 Statement as to Jurisdiction, p. 2.
1961] OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 69
to in the Court's opinion in Everson. Unlike the statute, it draws the line in
terms of two public high schools and Trenton Catholic schools, on the one
hand, and all other schools on the other. It was the difference in construction
of this resolution that really caused the difference in result between the opin-
ions of Mr. Justice Black for the majority and Mr. Justice Jackson for him-
self and Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion,
joined by Mr. Justice Burton as well as Justices Frankfurter and Jackson,
would reach a different conclusion from the majority without regard to the
terms of the school board's resolution.
Mr. Justice Black's opinion first disposes of the argument that the payments
were illegal because they required the taking of some persons' property for
the private use of others. This, it will be recalled, was the major emphasis of
the appellants in the Cochran case and the argument was quickly disposed of on
that authority. "It is much too late to argue that legislation intended to facili-
tate the opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no public
purpose.... The same thing is no less true of legislation to reimburse needy
parents, or all parents, for payment of the fares of their children so that they
can ride in public busses to and from schools rather than run the risk of
traffic and other hazards incident to walking or 'hitchhiking.' "283
With reference to the first amendment problem, Black started with a review
of the history and precedents of the amendment's religion clauses. The con-
clusion to be derived from these sources was set out:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attend-
ance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be' called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice reli-
gion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizati6ns or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and
State." Reynolds v. United States .... 284
In applying this principle to the case before the Court, Mr. Justice Black came
close to the test that is advocated here: that the legislation in question cannot
classify in terms of religion. The language that he used contains italicizied
283 330 U.S. at 7.
284 Id. at 15-16.
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matter, matter that the Court itself intended to emphasize, that goes directly
to this proposition:
New Jersey cannot consistently with the "establishment of religion" clause
of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an
institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church. On the other
hand, the language of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot
hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently,
it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Bap-
tists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of
any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the bene-
fits of public welfare legislation. While we do not mean to intimate that a
state could not provide transportation only to children attending public
.schools, we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against
state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit
New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens
without regard to their religious belief.285
In short, a classification in terms of public and non-public schools would be
valid. A classification in terms of religion would be invalid. This is again em-
phasized in the Court's opinion at a later point. In sustaining the validity of
the New Jersey action in question, the opinion said: "Its legislation, as
applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get
their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from
accredited schools."M6
In order to reach this conclusion, the majority had to ignore the fact that
the resolution as adopted distinguished in terms of religion in the very manner
that the Court said a State could not do. The explanation for this was con-
tained in a footnote that suggested that, for purposes of the litigation, the
Court was reading the resolution to authorize payment of bus fares for all
children travelling the requisite distance and not merely those attending public
and Catholic schools: "Although the township resolution authorized reim-
bursement only for parents of public and Catholic school pupils, appellant
does not allege, nor is there anything in the record which would offer the
slightest support to an allegation, that there were any children in the township
who attended or would have attended, but for want of transportation, any
but public and Catholic schools." 287
It was apparently because he read the record differently that Mr. Justice
Jackson dissented in a separate opinion. He began his opinion with what has
become a famous quotation:
lTihe undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromis-
ing separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its con-
= M at 16. (All italicized in original.)
2
"/d at 18- 27 Id. at 4 n.2.
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clusions yielding support to their commingling in educational matters.
The case which irresistibly comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is
that of Julia who, according to Byron's reports, "whispering 'I will ne'er
consent,'-consented."2 88
But it was really the record and not doctrine that separated these two opin-
ions. Mr. Justice Jackson complained about the New Jersey statute on the
ground that it improperly drew a line between schools that were operated for
profit and those that were not, in determining what students should be reim-
bursed for their transportation costs' Whether that is a proper line need not be
discussed here; certainly, however, that is not a line drawn explicitly in terms
of religion. The more appropriate objection was to the application of the
statute pursuant to the resolution: "children are classified according to the
schools they attend and are to be aided if they attend the public schools or
private Catholic schools, and they are not allowed to be aided if they attend
private secular schools or private religious schools of other faiths."289 The
question, therefore, according to Jackson was: "Is it constitutional to tax
this complainant to pay the costs of carrying pupils to Church schools of one
specified denomination?"290 Given that question, there could, of course, be
but one answer. But it must be emphasized that the question that the majority
answered was really a different one: whether it was constitutional to include
parochial school students in the payment of transportation when the state
purportedly was paying the transportation of all students? It was the differ-
ence in the questions that so clearly called for different answers. But this was
not altogether clear from the language of the Jackson opinion which suggested
that any payment to parochial schools might fall under the ban, whether the
contribution was going to all schools or not. For Jackson, aid to a "Church
school is indistinguishable... from rendering the same aid to the Church
itself." 291 He reached this conclusion on the basis of his characterization of
the Catholic schools as "the most vital part of the Roman Catholic
Church."292 And, he went on, "It is of no importance in this situation whether
the beneficiary of this expenditure of tax-raised funds is primarily the paro-
chial school and incidentally the pupil, or whether the aid is directly be-
stowed on the pupil with indirect benefits to the school." 293 Despite this lan-
guage, however, when it came to stating the guiding rule, he, too, resorted
to the question of discrimination or classification in religious terms as the
ultimate test:
It seems to me that the basic fallacy in the Court's reasoning, which
accounts for its failure to apply the principles it avows, is in ignoring the
essentially religious test by which beneficiaries of this expenditure are
2 88 Id. at 19. 291 Id. at 24.
2 89 Id. at 21. 292 Ibid.
290 Ibid. 293 Ibid.
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selected. A policeman protects a Catholic, of course-but not because he
is a Catholic; it is because he is a man and a member of our society. The
fireman protects the Church school-but not because it is a Church school;
it is because it is property, part of the assets of our society. Neither the
fireman nor the policeman has to ask before he renders aid "Is this man or
building identified with the Catholic Church?" But before these school
authorities draw a check to reimburse for a student's fare they must ask
just that question, and if the school is a Catholic one they may render aid
because it is such, while if it is of any other faith or is run for profit, the
help must be withheld.294
It should be apparent that this is the test that Mr. Justice Black also stated
and the test that is proposed by this paper to be applicable not only to ques-
tions of separation but to questions of freedom as well, because the two are
not separable.
Mr. Justice Rutledge would take a more restrictive view: "The prohibition
broadly forbids state support, financial or other, of religion in any guise, form
-or degree. It outlaws all use of public funds for religious purposes." 295 He
would appear to ban payment for bus transportation to parochial school
children even if authorized to be made to all school children. "Legislatures
are free to make, and courts to sustain, appropriations only when it can be
found that in fact they do not aid, promote, encourage or sustain religious
teaching or observances, be the amount large or small. No such finding has
or could be made in this case." 296 He denied that under the facts hypothesized
"failure to provide it [bus transportation] would make the state unneutral in
religious matters, discriminating against or hampering such children concern-
ing public benefits all others receive." 297 "Of course discrimination in the
legal sense does not exist. The child attending the religious school has the
same right as any other to attend the public school." 298 He rejected the
analogy to police and fire protection as irrelevant. He then admitted that he
could place his dissent on narrower grounds. He would find the exclusion in
the statute of children attending schools run for profit an invalid classifica-
tion, as well as the limitation in the resolution to Catholic and public school
students: "There is no showing that there are no other private or religious
schools in this populous district. I do not think it can be assumed that there
were none." 299 But he preferred the broader ground, one that, in fact, makes
the application of the two religion clauses a matter for the discretion of the
Court.
H. Released Time: The Precedent of Julia Again
In 1954, the Supreme Court noted that "education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.... To separate them
294 Id. at 25. 297 Id. at 56.
293 Id. at 33. 298 Id. at 58.
296 Id. at 52-53. 299 1& at 62.
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[school children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone." 300 Thus was segregation by race within the nation's public schools
made- illegal. The fact that it had existed from the institution of public school
systems in those states that still retained it in 1954 was thought not to be a
barrier to its destruction. The Court had earlier dealt with similar problems
concerning not race but religion. The history of segregating school children
within their schools, for part of the time, by religious classifications was not
so ancient as the South's color segregation, but it was far more widespread
in the United States. It was this system of segregation that was first challenged
in the Supreme Court in McCollum v. Board of Edue.301 If the furor that
resulted from the Brown case did not cause the Court to limit its holding-
indeed it has expanded its application-the furor that followed the McCollum
case had a different effect: most of what McCollum had done was undone a
few years later in Zorach v. Clauson.30 2 If it is not fair to say that the Supreme
Court follows the election returns, it may nonetheless be true that there are
times when some of its members may seem to anticipate them.
In Champaign, Illinois, students were released from their public school
classes for a period of thirty or forty-five minutes each week so that they
might take religious instruction. This instruction was given on the school
premises by teachers approved but not employed by the public school. It was
given in the regular classrooms to those students whose parents indicated
that they desired their children to take such instruction. Students who did not
take religious instruction were required to leave their classrooms to continue
their secular studies elsewhere in the building. Student attendance at the reli-
gious classes was reported to the school authorities.
Mrs. McCollum, who chose not to have her child take such religious train-
ing, sued to enjoin the continuance of the system on the ground that it violated
the first and fourteenth amendments by utilization of the compulsory edu-
cation law to compel attendance at religious courses. Mr. Justice Black, writ-
ing for theCourt, had little difficulty in disposing of the case. "Pupils com-
pelled by law to go to school for secular education are released in part from
their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes. This
is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in Everson .... t1303
He emphasized two grounds as the basis for the conclusion reached by the
300 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 494 (1954).
301 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
302 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 303 333 U.S. at 209-10.
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Court: "Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings
used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords sec-
tarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their reli-
gious classes through the use of the State's compulsory public school machin-
ery. This is not separation of Church and State." 304
Mr. Justice Frankfurter found the problem somewhat more complex in the
opinion he wrote for himself and Justices Jackson, Rutledge, and Burton, the
last two of whom also joined the majority opinion. He reviewed the history
of the secularization of education and of the development of various "re-
leased-time" programs. He emphasized the uniqueness of each of the released-
time programs and suggested that each would have to be dealt with on its
merits. But he also emphasized the destructiveness of the Champaign released-
time program, in language that suggests the psychological terms used later in
the School Segregation cases:
The fact that this power has not been used to discriminate is beside the
point. Separation is a requirement to abstain from fusing functions of
Government and of religious sects, not merely to treat them all equally. That
a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not elimi-
nate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to the con-
science and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, and
non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children. The result
is an obvious pressure upon children to attend.... The children be-
longing to these non-participating sects will thus have inculated in them
a feeling of separatism when the school should be the training ground for
habits of community, or they will have religious instruction in a faith
which is not that of their parents. As a result, the public school system of
Champaign actively furthers inculcation in the religious tenets of some
faiths, and in the process sharpens the consciousness of religious differences
at least among some of the children committed to its care. These are con-
sequences not amenable to statistics. But they are precisely the consequences
against which the Constitution was directed when it prohibited the Gov-
ernment common to all from becoming embroiled, however innocently,
in the destructive religious conflicts of which the history of even this coun-
try reports some dark pages.3 05
Mr. Justice Jackson, who concurred in the Frankfurter opinion, also wrote
an opinion of his own. He questioned the standing of the parent to maintain
the action, since there could be no showing of monetary cost to the community
in maintaining the system. But his greater complaint was the possibility that
the injunction would now be in the sweeping terms requested by the plaintiff:
While we may and should end such formal and explicit instruction as the
Champaign plan and can at all times prohibit teaching of creed and cate-
chism and ceremonial and can forbid forthright proselyting in the schools,
U 4/d, at 212- 305 Id. at 227-28.
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I think it remains to be demonstrated whether it is possible, even if desir-
able, to comply with such demands as plaintiff's completely to isolate and
cast out of secular education all that some people may reasonably regard
as religious instruction.... While I agree that the religious classes in
volved here go beyond permissible limits, I also think the complaint de-
mands more than plaintiff is entitled to have granted. So far as I can see
this Court does not tell the State court where it may stop, nor does it set
up any standards by which the State court may determine that question
for itself.
The task of separating the secular from the religious in education is one
of magnitude, intricacy and delicacy. To lay down a sweeping constitution-
al doctrine as demanded by complainant and apparently approved by the
Court, applicable alike to all school boards of the nation, "to immediately
adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting all instruction in and
teaching of religious education in all public schools," is to decree a uni-
form, rigid and, if we are consistent, an unchanging standard for countless
school boards representing and serving highly localized groups which not
only differ from each other but which themselves from time to time change
attitudes. It seems to me that to do so is to allow zeal for our own ideas of
what is good in public instruction to induce us to accept the role of a super
board of education for every school district in the nation.306
As it turned out, Mr. Justice Jackson's fears proved groundless. No one
accepted the decree suggested by Mrs. McCollum as binding on non-partici-
pants: the local schools reacted to the judgment with the same disrespect for
the "law of the land" as the Southern schools reacted to the School Segrega-
tion cases. The phrase "super board of education" was readily picked up to
castigate the Court for its work. And the Court lacked that consistency that
Jackson feared it might display.
Mr. Justice Reed's lonesome dissent raised questions as to the ground for
the majority action. He could not tell whether the evil was the use of the school
buildings, the release of students during school hours, the assistance of teach-
ers in keeping attendance and securing permission cards, or the action of
higher authority in arranging the program. What seemed to be rhetorical
questions to some turned out to be ones of very real importance when the
problem was later re-examined. He would rely here, as he chose not to do in
the School Segregation cases, on the "well-recognized and long-established
practices" as proof of validity of the Illinois program: "This is an instance
where, for me, the history of past practices is determinative of the meaning
of a constitutional clause, not a decorous introduction to the study of its text.
The judgment should be affirmed." 307
Once again, as in the flag-salute cases, a lone dissent was to turn into a
majority. Between McCollum and Zorach, Justices Murphy and Rutledge were
replaced by Justices Clark and Minton. But again the new justices were not
306 Id. at 235, 237. 307 Id. at 256.
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themselves enough to make the difference. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Jus-
tices Douglas and Burton, who had been in the majority in McCollum were
also in the majority in Zorach; indeed, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the latter
opinion. Between the two cases there also came the condemnation of almost
all the organized church groups in the country and no little criticism from the
legal periodicals. 308
The invitation of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson to treat the various re-
leased-time programs individually rather than in gross was accepted by the
New York courts. They found the New York City released-time program
valid in spite of the McCollun case. Factually, the only difference between
the Champaign and New York City programs was that the students released
to take religious education in New York left the school premises in order to
do so. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion almost conceded this to be the only dis-
tinction, but regarded it as a distinction that made a difference:
In the-McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction
and the force of the public school was used to promote that instruction.
Here, as we have said, the public schools do no more than accommodate
their schedules to a program of outside religious instruction. We follow
the McCollum case. But we cannot expand it to cover the present released-
time program unless separation of Church and State means that public
institutions can make no adjustments of their schedules to accommodate
the religious needs of the people. We cannot read into the Bill of Rights
such a philosophy of hostility to religion. 309
The author of the McCollum opinion was unable to recognize the difference.
Mr. Justice Black's dissent pointed out: "As we attempted to make categori-
cally clear, the McCollum decision would have been the same if the religious
classes had not been held in the school buildings."310 "McCollum ... held
that Illinois could not constitutionally manipulate the compelled classroom
hours of its compulsory school machinery so as to channel children into sec-
tarian classes." 311 The compulsion exerted in Zorach was neither less nor dif-
ferent from that held invalid in McCollum. He concluded: "State help to reli-
gion injects political and party prejudices into a holy field. It too often substi-
tutes force for prayer, hate for love, and persecution for persuasion. Govern-
ment should not be allowed, under cover of the soft euphemism of 'co-opera-
tion,' to steal into the sacred area of religious choice."312
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who joined Jackson's dissenting opinion, also pro-
vided one of his own. The difference between closing the school completely
and allowing some to be relieved of the obligation to attend on condition that
30S See, e.g., Religion and the State--A Symposium, 14 LAw & CONTEMp. N OB. 1 (1949).
309 343 U.S. at 315. 311 Id. at 317.
310 Id. at 316. 312 Id. at 320.
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they attend religious instruction was too clear to permit the former to be used
as authority for the latter. He charged that the reliance on the absence in the
record of any proof of coercion was footless, for the case came up on plead-
ings and the complaint asserted coercion.
Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion put the issue quickly, and assuming the con-
tinued vitality of McCollum, or even without it, unanswerably: "Stripped to
its essentials, the plan has two stages: first, that the State compel each student
to yield a large part of his time for public secular education; and, second,
that some of it be 'released' to him on condition that he devote it to sectarian
religious purposes." 313 He also, more than adequately, disposed of the lack
of coercion argument:
The greater effectiveness of this system over voluntary attendance after
school hours is dle to the truant officer who, if the youngster fails to go
to the Church school, dogs him back to the public schoolroom. Here
schooling is more or less suspended during the "released time" so the non-
religious attendants will not forge ahead of the churchgoing absentees.
But it serves as a temporary jail for a pupil who will not go to Church. It
takes more subtlety of mind than I possess to deny that this is governmental
constraint in support of religion. It is as unconstitutional, in my view, when
exerted by indirection as when exercised forthrightly.31 4
Of the distinction of the McCollum case, he said:
The distinction attempted between that case and this is trivial, almost to
the point of cynicism, magnifying its nonessential details and disparaging
compulsion which was the underlying reason for invalidity. A reading of
the Court's opinion in that case along with its opinion in this case will show
such difference of overtones and undertones to make it clear that the
MeCollum case has passed like a storm in a teacup. The wall which .the
Court was professing to erect between Church and State has become even
more warped and twisted than I expected. Today's judgment will be more
interesting to students of psychology and of the judicial processes than to
students of constitutional law. 315
Not much need be added to that proposition except to suggest that even stu-
dents of constitutional law would prefer the honest and open retraction uti-
lized in the other cases to the patently disingenuous method of revision
used in Zorach.
I. Of Czar and Commissar
On June 6, 1960, after a decade and a half of litigation, the question of the
right to the use and possession of the premises at Nos. 13-15 East 79th Street
in New York City was unanimously decided by the Supreme Court of the
313 Id. at323-24.
314 Id. at 324. 315 Id. at 325.
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United States.316 Such questions of proprietary interests in real property are
not the usual grist for the Supreme Court mill. Indeed, Mr. Justice Jackson
had told his brethren some eight years earlier, when the issue was first before
the Court, that the question of the use of these premises was none of its
business.317 His brethren thought otherwise then and announced adherence
to the same position in 1960, because the premises in question constitute the
St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church.
Basically, the contest that came twice to the Supreme Court involved the
conflicting claims of Leonty Turkevitch and Benjamin Fedchenkoff, and their
respective successors, to the right of occupancy of the Cathedral. The former
asserted his rights by reason of his election to the office of Metropolitan of
All America and Canada and Archbishop of New York by a convention of
American bishops, clergymen, and laymen, acting as a "soboer" or governing
body of the Church. The latter's claims derived from an appointment as
Archbishop of the Archdiocese of North America and the Aleutian Islands
by the Patriarch locum tenens of Moscow and All Russia and his Holy Synod.The resolution of the conflict demanded an understanding of church his-
tory easier to assert than to prove.318 The best that can be made from the
record3l9 and briefs follows. From 987 A.D. until about the time of the fall
of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, the Russian Church was part of the
Church of Constantinople, ruled by the Ecumenical Patriarch there. When
the center of Eastern orthodoxy was taken by unbelievers, the Russian
Church asserted its independent right to choose its own metropolitan, without
securing the approval of the Ecumenical Patriarch, and did so. In 1598, when
the Russian and Constantinople branches of the church were reconciled, the
agreement was predicated on a recognition of the independent authority of
the first Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. After the fall of Moscow to
later-day unbelievers, the American branch of the Russian church, which had
originated in Alaska and the Aleutians in 1793, sought to make history
repeat itself by establishing its independence, but failed to satisfy the Supreme
Court of the validity of such historical judgment.
316 Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
317 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 126 (1952).
3 18 See, e.g., ANDERSON, PEOPLE CHRca, AND STATE n MoDNn RUSSIA (1944); BOL-
SHAKOFF, CHRSTIAN CHURCH AND SovIET STATE (1942); BoLsHAxoFF, THE FOREIGN Mis-
SIoNs OF Tm RussmN ORTHODOX CHURCH (1943); CASEY, RELiGION IN RuSSIA (1946);
CuRnss, CHURCH AND STATE IN RussIA (1940); DANZAS, THE RUSSIAN CHURCH (1936);
EmHARDT, RELIGION IN SoVIET RUSSIA (1929); FEDOTOrr, Tur RUSSIAN CHURCH SNcE Tm
REVOLUTION (1928); FORTESCuE, ORTHODOX EASTERN CHiUCH (1916); FRENCH, TIM EAST-
EN ORTHODOX CHURCH (1951); SPINKA, THDE CHURCH AND THE RUSSIA REVOLUTION
(1927); TmASHEFF, RELIGION IN SovIET RUSSIA 1917-1942 (1942); ZERNov, THE RfTssiANS
AND THEIR CHURCH (1945).
319 The same record was used in both the Kreshik and Kedroff cases.
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After the control and domination of the Church by the Czar was broken
by the 1917 revolution, the administration of the Church was recognized
during the short-lived, if long-lamented, Kerensky regime. In 1917-18, at a
sobor, the patriarchate, which had been abolished by Peter the Great, was
restored. The Patriarch replaced the procurator of the Czar as the head of
the Holy Synod. The sobor was established, or re-established, as the fount
of authority. But this reform, like others of the time, was soon jeopardized
by the continuing events of the revolution, and Tikhon, former Archbishop
of North America who had been blected Patriarch at the 1917-18 sobor, and
the Holy Synod issued a ukase in anticipation of the difficulties that they
foresaw. Among other things, this ukase of November 20, 1920, provided
that:
[I]f the highest Chuich Administration itself with the Holy Patriarch at
the head would for any reason discontinue their church-administrative
activity, the Diocesan Bishop will immediately get into communication
with the Bishops of his neighboring Dioceses for the purpose of organizing
a superior instance of Church Authority for several dioceses which would
find themselves in similar conditions. (Be it in the form of a temporary
highest Church Government or a Metropolitan District or even other-
wise.) 320
In 1922, as anticipated, the Patriarch was arrested. Various attempts to set
up a "living church" more consonant with the tenets of the Communist dog-
mas failed. But until 1927, the patriarchate as established by the 1917-18
sobor, was not functioning.
Purportedly in pursuance of the ukase of Tikhon, quoted above, a sobor
was held in Detroit in 1924, pursuant to which the American Dioceses set up
an American church, independent of the Russian hierarchy, until such time
as that hierarchy should be freed from the control of the Russian state.321 In
1945, a ukase was issued by the Moscow church authorities calling for the
reunion of the American and Russian churches. This was rejected by the
American congregations at their Cleveland Sobor of 1946. American delegates
to a 1945 sobor in Moscow failed to arrive in time to participate in the
actions that resulted in the 1945 ukase. In the meantime, the contest between
the American church appointee and the Russian church appointee over the
control of the Cathedral in New York and other churches was carried to the
courts and litigated and relitigated.322
At this point, and at the instigation of the American church, the New York
legislature intervened:
Article 5-C was added to the Religious Corporations Law of New York
in 1945 and provided both for the incorporation and administration of
321 See 344 U.S. at 103 n.8. 322 See i at 10.4 n.9.32c Record, p. 177.
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Russian Orthodox churches. Clarifying amendments were added in 1948.
The purpose of the article was to bring all the New York church, formerly
subject to the administrative jurisdiction of the Most Sacred Governing
Synod in Moscow or the Patriarch of Moscow, into an administratively
autonomous metropolitan district. That district was North American in
area, created pursuant to resolutions adopted at a sobor held at Detroit
in 1924. This declared autonomy was made effective by a further legislative
requirement that all the churches formerly administratively subject to the
Moscow synod and partriarchate should for the future be governed by the
ecclesiastical body and hierarchy of the American metropolitan district.323
The New York courts gave effect to this statute and judgment was entered
in favor of the American church designate to control the use of the Cathe-
dral.324
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reed, held the statute
unconstitutional. It rejected the New York Court of Appeals' thesis, which it
described:
Since certain events of which the Court took judicial notice indicated to it
that the Russian Government exercised control over the central church
authorities and that the American church acted to protect its pulpits and
faith from such influences, the Court of Appeals felt that the Legislature's
reasonable belief in such conditions justified the State in enacting a law to
free the American group from infiltration of such atheistic or subversive
influences.32S
Mr. Justice Reed recognized the power to punish even ecclesiastics for sub-
version, but there was no subversive action by any ecclesiastic involved here.
He followed, after extensive quotation, the decision of Watson v. Jones,326
although that case involved no constitutional issue and applied a "general
federal common law" which has since been recognized to have no validity.
The contest over church property resulting from the Presbyterian church
schism involved in Watson was decided on the ground that, in a hierarchical
church, questions as to the beneficial use of church property must be deter-
mined according to the decision of "the highest of these church judica-
tories."327 The Court's conclusion was, therefore, readily reached:
Ours is a government which by the "law of its being" allows no statute,
state or national, that prohibits the free exercise of religion. There are occa-
sions when civil courts must draw lines between the responsibilities of
church and state for the disposition or use of property. Even in those
cases when the property right follows as an incident from decisions of the
323 Id. at 97-99.
324 Saint Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1959).
325 344 U.S. at 108-09. 326 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
327 Quoted from 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727, in 344 U.S. at 113.
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church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls.
This under our Constitution necessarily follows in order that there may
be free exercise of religion.328
This conclusion rested, however, on an earlier proposition of more doubtful
validity: "We find nothing that indicates a relinquishment of this power by
the Russian Orthodox Church."329 And, again, "Nothing indicates that either
the Sacred Synod or the succeeding Patriarchs relinquished that authority or
recognized the autonomy of the American church."330 Both of these state-
ments failed to recognize the possibility that the authority of the American
church to make itself independent was properly grounded on the authoriza-
tion of the Patriarch Tikhon quoted above.331 Although the opinion noted
the existence of this authorization it did little more than that.
The opinion pointed out that the factual issue that would have to be re-
solved in order to decide that question was not answered by the New York
Court of Appeals: "The court did consider 'whether there exists in Moscow
at the present' time a true central organization of the Russian Orthodox
Church capable of functioning as the head of a free international religious
body.' It concluded that this aspect of the controversy had not been sufficiently
developed to justify a judgment upon that ground." 332 The New York courts
need not have resolved the question in light of their decision in favor of the
American church. But if the Tikhon ukase was to be given any effect, the Su-
preme Court would have to know the answer to that question before it could
decide in favor of the Russian hierarchy.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for himself and Justices Black and Doug-
las, the last of whom joined the majority opinion as well, reached the same
conclusion. He, too, found in Watson v. Jones the guiding principle, but he
went further in limiting the power of the legislature to act:
[W]hen courts are called upon to adjudicate disputes which, though gen-
erated by conflicts of faith, may fairly be isolated as controversies over
property and therefore within judicial competence, the authority of courts
is in strict subordination to the ecclesiastical law of a particular church prior
to a schism. Watson v. Jones .... This very limited right of resort to courts
for determination of claims, civil in their nature, between rival parties
among the communicants of a religious faith is merely one aspect of the
duty of courts to enforce the right of members in an association, temporal
or religious, according to the laws of that association....
Legislatures have no such obligation to adjudicate and no such
power .... 33
328 344 U.S. at 120-21.
329 Id. at 120.
330 Id. at 105-06. 332 344 U.S. at 106.
331 See text accompanying note 320 supra. 333 Id. at 122.
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Unlike the majority, however, he went on to deal with the argument that the
Russian patriarch was not the leader of the Church. But he did not deal
specifically with the effect of the Tikhon ukase:
Finally, we are told that the present Moscow Patriarchate is not the
true superior church of the American communicants.... Even were there
doubt about this it is hard to see by what warrant the New York Legisla-
ture is free to substitute its own judgment as to the validity of Patriarch
Alexi's claim and to disregard acknowledgement of the present Patriarch by
his coequals in the Eastern Confession, the Patriarchs of Constantinople,
Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, and by religious leaders throughout
the world, including the present Archbishop of York. 334
He also disposed of Mr. Justice Jackson's argument in dissent that there was
here in question only the right to possession of realty and, therefore, the
controversy was within the control of the State of New York:
St. Nicholas Cathedral is not just a piece of real estate. It is no more that
than is St. Patrick's Cathedral or the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. A
cathedral is the seat and center of ecclesiastical authority. St. Nicholas
Cathedral is an archepiscopal see of one of the great religious organiza-
tions. What is at stake here is the power to exercise religious authority.
That is the essence of this controversy. It is that even though the religious
authority becomes manifest and is exerted through authority over the
Cathedral as the outward symbol of a religious faith.335
For Mr. Justice Jackson, in dissent, the religious freedom issue was non-
existent. The controversy was solely one over real property-an action of
ejectment to be determined by state law. "The fact that property is dedicated
to a religious use cannot, in my opinion, justify the Court in sublimating an
issue over property rights into one of deprivation of religious liberty... "336
He also interjected the suggestion that the limitations that the first amendment
religion clauses impose on the national government may be greater than those
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. It is an idea that
has not received Court sanction but has found adherents among students of
the subject.3 37
On remand, the New York courts again reached their original conclusion,
but rested this time on judicial power rather than the validity of the New York
statute.338 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam decision
on the ground that in Kedroff the Court had ruled that the right of use and
possession "was 'strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government,' and as such
334 Id. at 125.
335 Id. at 121. 336 Id. at 130.
337 See, e.g., Howe, The Constitutional Question, in RELIGION AND THE FE SOCIETY
54-55 (1958).
338 Saint Nicholas Cathedral v. Kreshik, 7 N.Y.2d 191, 181 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1959).
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could not constitutionally be impaired by a state statute... ."339 It followed,
for the 1960 Court, that what could not be done by statute could not be done
by judicial decree. There were no dissents noted.
There is nothing in any of the opinions to suggest why church property is
entitled to more favorable or less favorable treatment than other property.
There is a suggestion in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion that the issue
should be treated in the same way that a question arising over the property
of any "voluntary association" would be.340 This, too, was the direction of
the Jackson dissent. Especially difficudt to comprehend is the compulsory with-
drawal of state power in favor of "ecclesiastical government" when the very
issue in the case was which of two ecclesiastical governments was entitled to
make the decision. If the Supreme Court has the power to choose between
the two, which it did, why is a state precluded from doing so? Finally, the pos-
sible anomoly of the decision is worth noting, although it would be difficult
indeed to resolve: the reading of the first amendment that precludes the
State of New York from applying its law because of the necessity of separation
of church and state may result in the domination of a church in this country
by the government of a foreign and unfriendly power.341
J. Never on Sunday
Sunday closing legislation has had a long history and most of it was set
out at length in one or another of the opinions rendered by the Court on the
subject of its constitutionality during the 1960 Term. Indeed, in the four
cases disposed of by opinion, the Court contributed well over two hundred
pages to the discussion of the subject34Z--this despite the fact that the problem
had been presented to the Court many times in recent years in cases disposed
of by orders of dismissal for want of a substantial federal question.343 Nor
was there an absence of older Supreme Court opinions on the subject. 344 It
339 363 U.S. at 190.
340 See text accompanying note 333 supra.
341 There was no contest of the fact that one of the commands of the Russian church as
administered from Moscow to the American communicants was "to abstain 'from political
activities against the U.S.S.R.'" 344 U.S. at 105.
342 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
34 3 See, e.g., Friedman v. New York, 341 U.S. 907 (1951); McGee v. North Carolina,
346 U.S. 802 (1953); Gundaker Central Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 354 U.S. 933 (1957);
Grochowiak v. Pennsylvania, 358 U.S. 47 (1958); Ullner v. Ohio, 358 U.S. 131 (1958); Kidd
v. Ohio, 358 U.S. 132 (1958).
344 In addition to the cases discussed in the text there were many others not decided
with relevance to the constitutional problems. The first case reported in the United States
Reports on this subject was a case decided not by the Supreme Court of the United States
but by the Supreme CQurt of Pennsylvania. The case in full: "In this case (which was tried
on Saturday, the 5th -6f April), the defendant offered Jonas Phillips, a Jew, as a witness;
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should be obvious, therefore, that any exegesis here must take the form of
synopsis rather than expansive analysis.
The first time the Court had a serious look at a closing regulation, it in-
volved Thursdays rather than Sundays. In Richardson v. Goddard,345 a carrier
had delivered cargo at a wharf in Boston; the cargo was thereafter destroyed
by fire. The consignee brought a suit in admiralty against the ship for im-
proper delivery on the ground that "by the appointment of the Govenor of
Massachusetts, [Thursday) was kept and regarded by the citizens as 'a day of
fasting, humiliation, and prayer,' " during which the people of Massachusetts
abstained "from all secular work."3 46 The consignees urged that the
delivery was, therefore, improper. Mr. Justice Grier noted, first, that the
Massachusetts high court had ruled that the only day on which business was
suspended was Sunday; second, that even with reference to the ban on secular
business on Sunday by both Church and State, "lading and unlading of ships
in maritime commerce"347 was an exception; and, third, that while it was cus-
tomary in Massachusetts to enforce "the most rigid observance of the Lord's
day as a Sabbath," they did not enforce fast days or prayer days in order
that the people of Massachusetts "might enjoy liberty of conscience."3 48
Thus, drawing a distinction between the sabbath and mere fast days or prayer
days, the Court ruled that the delivery was proper.
During the same term of court, Mr. Justice Grier delivered another opinion
in admiralty, in which he rejected a defense that because the damaged ship
was transporting goods on Sunday, the vessel was precluded from collecting
for the injury resulting from collision with an obstruction to navigation negli-
gently left in the water by the defendant.349 The reasons for his conclusion
were two: (1) "The law relating to the observance of Sunday defines a duty of
the citizen to the State, and to the State only. For a breach of this duty he is
liable to the fine or penalty imposed by the statute, and nothing more." 350
(2) "We have shown, in an opinion delivered at this term, that in other Chris-
but he refused to be sworn, because it was his Sabbath. The court, therefore, fined him
10 £; but the defendant, afterwards, waiving the benefit of his testimony, he was discharged
from the fine." Stansbury v. Marks, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 213 (1793).
Among the cases to reach the Supreme Court of the United States were: Pence v. Lang-
don, 99 U.S. 578 (1878) (rescission of contract on Sunday); Gibbs & Sterret Mfg. Co. v.
Brucker, Ill U.S. 595 (1884) (contract made on Sunday); Bucher v. Cheshire R.R., 125
U.S. 555 (1888) (passenger travelling on Sunday barred from negligence suit against rail-
road carrier); Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891) (jury verdict on Sunday); Stone v.
United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897) (jury verdict on Sunday). See also Soon Hing v. Crowley,
113 U.S. 703 (1885).
345 64 U.S. (23 How.) 28 (1859). 347 Id. at 42. (All italicized in original.)
36 Id. at 37. 348 Id. at 43.
349 Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Philadelphia, & Havre de Grace Steam Towboat Co.,
64 U.S. (23 How.) 209 (1860).
350 Id. at 218.
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tian countries, where the observance of Sundays and other holidays is en-
forced by both Church and State, the sailing of vessels engaged in commerce,
and even their lading and unlading, were classed among the works of necessity,
which are excepted from the operation of such laws." 35 '
Hennington v. Georgia3S2 sustained a state law that prohibited the opera-
tion of railroad trains within the state on Sundays, against the contention
that the state statute was in conflict with the commerce clause. The first Mr.
Justice Harlan found the law to be merely a proper exercise of the police
power that did not burden interstate commerce improperly. "In our opinion
there is nothing in the legislation in question which suggests that it was
enacted with the purpose to regulate interstate commerce, or with any other
purpose than to prescribe a rule of civil duty for all who, on the Sabbath day,
are within the territorial jurisdiction of the State. It is none the less a civil
regulation because the day on which the running of freight trains is prohibited
is kept by many under a sense of religious duty"353-this despite Mr. Justice
Brewer's statement a few years earlier that "the laws respecting the observance
of the Sabbath" offered proof "that this is a Christian nation." 354 Petit v.
Minnesota3S5 sustained a state Sunday closing law against an attack on the
ground that it violated the equal protection clause. In that case the statute
exempted works of "necessity or charity" and specifically provided that bar-
bering was not a work of "necessity." Petit, convicted for keeping open a
barber shop on Sunday, was brushed off in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller, in which he said, inaccurately but none the less conclusively: "We
have uniformly recognized state laws relating to the observance of Sunday as
enacted in the legitimate exercise of the police powers of the State. The sub-
ject was fully considered in Hennington... and it is unnecessary to go over
the ground again." 356 He was correct, however, in observing that "innumer-
able decisions of the state courts have sustained the validity of such laws." 357
Soon Hing v. Crowley,358 in which the Court disposed not of a Sunday closing
law, but rather of a law limiting the hours during which the complaining
laundryman might work in his laundry, also contained relevant dicta: "Laws
setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are upheld, not from any right of the
government to legislate for the promotion of religious observances, but from
its right to protect all persons from the physicaland moral debasement which
comes from uninterrupted labor." 35 9 These declamations on behalf of the
protection of the poor working people would have a more sincere ring today if
351 Id. at 219.
352 163 U.S. 299 (1896). 353 Id. at 304.
354 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
355 177 U.S. 164 (1900). 357 Ibid.
356 Id. at 165. 358 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
359 Id. at 710.
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"freedom of contract" had not been so invulnerable a concept at the time these
decisions were reached. The dicta might also be more persuasive were the
holdings of more certain vitality.
This, then, was the record of Supreme Court activity on which the Court
could rely when the Sunday closing cases of the 1960 Term were brought be-
fore them.
In the first of the four cases, McGowan v. Maryland,36o the attack was
made on the Maryland statute by seven employees of a discount store who
had been arrested and convicted for selling "a three-ring loose-leaf binder, a
can of floor wax, a stapler and staples, and a toy submarine"3 61 on Sunday in
violation of the statute. Three arguments were made: 1) that the statute de-
nied the defendants the equal protection of the laws; 2) that the statute was
void for vagueness; and 3) that "the statutes are laws respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 362 It is only the last
that will be considered here, but it should be noted that the Court ruled against
the defendants on all three.
The opinion for the Court was written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
joined by Justices Black, Clark, Brennan, Whittaker, and Stewart. Over Mr.
Justice Douglas' dissent, the Court held that the appellants lacked standing to
raise any question of infringement of religious freedom. The opinion, there-
fore, purported to deal only with the "establishment" question. The difficul-
ties were patent. Clearly the Sunday closing laws in their origins were pro-
mulgated to accomplish religious objectives; even today the closing laws are
beneficial to those religions that require the observance of Sunday as part of
their religious precepts.
First, the Chief Justice accorded a wider function to the establishment
clause than would those who contend for its application only in furtherance
of the freedom clause.363 "If the purpose of the 'establishment' clause was
only to insure protection for the 'free exercise' of religion, then what we have
said above concerning appellants' standing to raise the 'free exercise' conten-
tion would appear to be true here. [I.e., appellants would lack standing to
attack the validity of the statute on the basis of the first amendment.] How-
ever.., the establishment of a religion was equally feared because of its
tendencies to political tyranny and subversion of civil authority."364 The
appellants have standing because they have suffered economic injury "alleged-
ly due to the imposition on them of the tenets of the Christian religion." 365
The Chief Justice then acknowledged that the original Sunday laws "were
360 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
361 Id. at 422. 362 Ibid.
363 See, e.g., Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. Con. L. Xv. 426
(1953).
364 366 U.S. at 430. 365 Ibid.
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motivated by religious forces."366 But even "before the eighteenth century,
nonreligious arguments for Sunday closing began to be heard more distinctly
and the statutes began to lose some of their totally religious flavor."367 Today,
the "proponents of Sunday closing legislation are no longer exclusively repre-
sentatives of religious interests."368 What then of the statute that combines
objectives of a secular nature with those of religious character? The Court
started here with the proposition "that the 'Establishment' Clause does not
ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely hap-
pens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." 369
From there it went by imperceptible steps to the proposition that the secular
reasons were dominant rather than coordinate:
In light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing Laws through the cen-
turies, and of their more or less recent emphasis upon secular considera-
tions, it is not difficult to discern that as presently written and adminis-
tered, most of them, at least, are of a secular rather than of a religious
character, and that presently they bear no relationship to establishment
of religion as those words are used in the Constitution of the United States.
... The present purpose and effect of most of them is to provide a uni-
form day of rest for all citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of
particular significance for the dominant Christian sects, does not bar the
State from achieving its secular goals. To say that the States cannot pre-
scribe Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes solely because centuries
ago such laws had their genesis in religion would give a constitutional
intc-pretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than one of mere
separation of church and State.370
Turning to the Maryland statute in question, the Court put a unique twist on
the various exemptions provided by Maryland law. Having disposed of the
contention that these exemptions do hot result in invalid classification for
purposes of the equal protection clause or undue vagueness under the due
process clause, the Court pointed out that they were not merely exemptions
for "works of charity or necessity" which would comport with the early inter-
pretations of the religious restrictions on Sunday labor, but rather reveal that
they are "clearly to be fashioned for the purpose of providing a Sunday at-
mosphere of recreation, cheerfulness, repose and enjoyment. Coupled with
the general proscription against other types of work, we believe that the air
of the day is one of relaxation rather than one of religion."371 Here, at last,
exceptions proved the rule.
There remained, then, only the need to demonstrate why, if the objective
of the law was assurance of relaxation from work, the statute could specify
the day rather than provide that persons must take off at least one day in
366 Id. at 431. 369 Id. at 442.
367 Id. at 433-34. 370 Id. at 444-45.
368 Id. at 435. 371 Id. at 448.
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seven. The answer was two-fold. First, it was desirable that a single day should
be chosen so that it might be shared by the family and community. Second,
the designation of the day would make the enforcement of the law more
feasible than the suggested alternative.3 72
The concluding paragraph of the opinion then asserted a principle not
diverse from that proposed in this thesis, that if the basis for action were
religious in nature the statute would be invalid:
Finally, we should make clear that this case deals only with the consti-
tutionality of § 521 of the Maryland statute before us. We do not hold that
Sunday legislation may not be a violation of the "Establishment" Clause
if it can be demonstrated that its purpose---evidenced either on the face of
the legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history, or in its operative
effect-is to use the State's coercive power to aid religion. 373
In Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 74 Warren's opinion com-
manded only a plurality and not a majority of the Court. Justices Brennan
and Stewart, who helped form the majority in McGowan were in dissent in
Gallagher. The Court disposed of the equal protection and establishment
arguments largely on the basis of McGowan. The fact that the Massachusetts
law spoke in terms of observation of "the Lord's Day" proved to have no
impact on the judgment: "It would seem that the objectionable language is
merely a relic." 37" Equally impotent was the fact that here-unlike McGowan
where the lower courts had found that the purpose of the statute was secular
-- "the three-judge district court found that Massachusetts had no legitimate
secular interest in maintaining Sunday closing." 376 So far as the "freedom of
religion" issues raised in Gallagher were concerned, they were disposed of on
the basis of the opinion for the same four Justices in Braunfeld v. Brown,377
where the "allegations" were "similar" but even more "grave." 378
In Braunfeld, in the opinion which commanded the votes of four members
of the Court, the Chief Justice disposed of the equal protection and estab-
372 In distinguishing the McCollum case at this point, the Court raised real doubts about
the vitality of Zorach v. Clauson. See pp. 72-77 suipra. "in McCollum, state action permitted
religious instruction in public school buildings during school hours and required students
not attending the religious instruction to remain in their classrooms during that time. The
Court found that this system had the effect of coercing the children to attend religious
classes; no such coercion to attend church services is present in the situation at bar. In
McCollum, the only alternative available to the nonattending students was to remain in
their classrooms; the alternatives open to nonlaboring persons in the instant case are far
more diverse. In McCollum, there was direct cooperation between state officials and reli-
gious ministers; no such direct participation exists under the Maryland laws. In McCollum,
tax supported buildings were used to aid religion; in the instant case, no tax monies are
being used in aid of religion." Id. at 452-53.
373 Id. at 453.
374 366 U.S. 617 (1961). 376 Id. at 630.
375 Id. at 627. 377 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
378 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617, 631 (1961).
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lishment arguments on the grounds advanced in McGowan and Two Guys
from Harrison-Allentown Inc. v. McGinley,379 where the freedom issue was
not relevant. Thus, the emphasis in Braunfeld was on the question whether a
Sunday closing law was invalid as applied to Orthodox Jewish storekeepers
who were compelled, by their religion, to remain closed on Saturday. In sus-
taining the validity of the legislation, the Chief Justice began by asserting the
proposition that the state had no power to coerce belief; at its greatest the
power extended only to the control of actions. But even actions were not
absolutely subject to control by the state. Direct proscription of religious ac-
tions was sanctioned in Reynolds38O and Prince.38 ' "In such cases, to make
accommodation between the religious action and an exercise of state authority
is a particularly delicate task... because resolution in favor of the State
results in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious prin-
ciple or facing criminal prosecution." 382 The Braunfeld case presented no such
problem. The Pennsylvania statute did not directly impinge on any religious
practice: "the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied
to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs
more expensive." 383 Indirect burdens on religion, apparently like indirect
burdens on interstate commerce, do not-almost by definition-violate the
freedom of religion provision. "To strike down, without the most critical
scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise
of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious prac-
tice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature."
384
Warren then approached the statement of a test not vastly different from
that suggested herein:
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is
constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as
being only indirect. But if the State regulated conduct enacting a general
law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the
State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on reli-
gious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden.3aS
Admittedly, the qualifying clause at the end of'this quotation is not a neces-
sary ingredient of the standard suggested in this essay. It is in response to the
qualification that the Chief Justice was called upon to answer the argument
379 366 U.S. 582 (1961). This case was disposed of in an opinion for the Court by Mr.
Chief Justice Warren essentially on the same basis as the McGowan case. It need not, there-
fore, be considered any further here.
380 See pp. 6-8 supra. 383 Ibid.
381 See pp. 52-53 supra. 384 Id. at 606.
382 366 U.S. at 605. 385 Id. at 607.
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that the State's purposes could be accomplished by exempting those from the
operation of the Sunday closing laws who, by reason of their religious obliga-
tions, observe some other closing day. His response was that "reason and
experience" show that such exemptions undermine the purpose of a day with-
out "the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity." 38 6 Moreover, it
would require inquiry by the state into religious beliefs; it might interfere with
the effectuation of the fair employment practices law; it would make enforce-
ment difficult. But the most cogent argument set forth on this score underlines
the proposition that the two religion clauses of the first amendment are not
separable in their treatment. Mr. Justice Black would seem to be recognizing
this proposition when, in each of the cases presented, he asserted that persons
who had standing to litigate the "establishment" issue, also, necessarily, had
standing to litigate the "freedom" issue. The Chief Justice's recognition comes
more obliquely: "To allow only people who rest on a day other than Sunday
to keep their businesses open on that day might well provide these people
with an economic advantage over their competitors who must remain closed
on that day; this might cause the Sunday observers to complain that their
religions are being discriminated against." 38 7 In short, classification of ex-
emption in terms of religious belief raises problems under the freedom and
establishment clauses, problems that are not separable. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana recognized this as long ago as 1874, when it struck down a con-
viction of a non-Jew for operating his business on Sunday when Jews were
permitted to carry on their business at that time: "Before the constitution,
Jews and Gentiles are equal; by the law they must be treated alike, and the
ordinance of a City Council which gives to one sect a privilege which it denies
to another, violates both the constitution and the law, and is therefore null
and void."388
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, agreed with the
conclusions reached by the Chief Justice in each of the four cases. He filed a
separate opinion because he thought it appropriate to do so in a constitu-
tional matter where: "Such expression of differences in view or even in empha-
sis converging toward the same result makes for the clarity of candor and
thereby enhances the authority of the judicial process." 389 One may admire
the extensive research and history revealed in this concurring opinion and yet
wonder whether its very breadth of coverage will add clarity or confusion
for those lawyers and judges called upon.to put these materials to further use
3 86 Id. at 608.
387 Id. at 608-09.
311 Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Ann. 671, 672 (1874). See also State v. Haining, 131 Kan.
853, 293 Pac. 762 (1930); Commonwealth v. Has, 122 Mass. 40 (1877); State v. Weiss, 97
Minn. 125, 105 N.W. 1127 (1906); People v. Rudnick, 259 App. Div. 922, 22 N.Y.S.2d 996(1940); People v. Adler, 174 App. Div. 301, 160 N.Y. Supp. 539 (1916).
399 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (separate opinion).
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in tha future procession of constitutional litigation. 390 One may wonder, too,
whether the advantages to be gained from the separate opinion would have
been limited in any way had Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in the opinion of
the Chief Justice in Gallagher and Braunfeld, at least, in order to provide an
opinion for the Court, however slight the danger might be that the plurality
opinion should not be considered as authoritative disposition of the issues.3 91
Mr. Justice Frankfurter began with a statement of the "balancing-of-inter-
ests" doctrine, with which his opinions in the due process area are so closely
associated:
If the value to society of achieving the object of a particular regulation is
demonstrably outweighted by the impediment to which the regulation sub-
jects those whose religious practices are curtailed by it, or if the object
sought by the regulation could with equal effect be achieved by alternative
means which do not substantially impede those religious practices, the
regulation cannot be sustained.392
He then denied the separability of the freedom and establishment clauses
without accepting their inseparability; for him, they overlap. "In view of the
competition among religious creeds, whatever 'establishes' one sect disadvan-
tages another, and vice versa." 393 He also concurred in the Chief Justice's
position that the separation clause does more than provide a buttress for the
:reedom clause. "IP]rotection of unpopular creeds, however, was not to be
the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental
intrusion in matters of faith."394 In restating this conclusion, he later came
closer to stating the theme for which this paper contends and at the same time
provided an answer to one of the primary thorny problems of the cases: what
is to be done when the secular interests of the state parallel more ancient
religious interests of a church:
The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to assure that the national
legislature would not exert its power in the service of any purely religious
end; that it would not, as Virginia and virtually all of the Colonies had
done, make of religion, as religion, an object of legislation.
... The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate
legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of
human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcenden-
tal idea and man's expression of action of that belief or disbelief....
With regulations which have other objectives the Establishment Clause,
390 The only opinion of importance omitted from consideration would seem to be that
of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Garvin. See HERBERT, THE UNCOMMON
LAW 13 (6th ed. 1948).
391 See Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare
Decisis, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 99 (1956).
392 366 U.S. at 462.
393 d. at 463. 394 Id. at 464.
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and the fundamental separationist concept which it expresses are not con-
cerned.... [O]nce it is determined that a challenged statute is supportable
as implementing other substantial interests than the promotion of belief,
the guarantee prohibiting religious "establishment" is satisfied.
To ask what interest, what objective, legislation serves, of course, is not
to psychoanalyze its legislators, but to examine the necessary effects of
what they have enacted. If the primary end achieved by a form of regula-
tion is the affirmation or promotion of religious doctrine-primary, in the
sense that all secular ends which it purportedly serves are derivative from,
not wholly independent of, the advancement of religion-the regulation is
beyond the power of the state. This was the case in McCollum. Or if a stat-
ute furthers both secular and religious ends by means unnecessary to the
effectuation of the secular ends alone-where the same secular ends cohld
equally be attained by means which do not have consequences for promo-
tion of religion-the statute cannot stand.a95
And, finally, back to the proposition that the establishment clause is more
than a supplement to the freedom clause: "the constitutional prohibition of
religious establishment is a provision of more comprehensive availability than
the guarantee of free exercise, insofar as both give content to the prohibited
fusion of church and state." 396 From this he drew the somewhat doubtful
conclusion that because they are different in their nature, they are separable
in their application.
At this point in his opinion came the extensive historical proof of the reli-
gious origins of the observance of Sunday by abstention from matters of
worldly affairs, both in England and the United States, and an equally lengthy
showing of the development of the secular reasons for a day of recreation in
each week, with the conclusion, also reached by the Chief Justice, that the
secular became dominant over the religious. By this evidence he demon-
strated that the application of the principles that he had previously stated
required the validation of the Sunday closing laws as consonant with the
dictates of the establishment clause.
In balancing the interests of the state in securing the secular objectives of
the Sunday closing laws against the economic injury done to Orthodox Jews
who are compelled by religious reasons to close on Saturday as well, he con-
cluded that the state's choice was a reasonable one for reasons not unlike those
put forth in the Warren opinions. Nor was he particularly troubled by the
other due process and equal protection arguments asserted; but, unlihe Mr.
Justice Harlan, he would give the plaintiffs in the Braunfeld case an opportu-
nity to prove the allegations in their complaint that the "Pennsylvania Sunday
retail sales act is irrational and arbitrary."397
Mr. Justice Douglas was alone in dissenting from the judgments in all
four cases. He would pose the problem differently from the others. "The ques-
395 Id. at 465-67. 396 Id. at 467. 397 Id. at 543.
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tion is whether a State can impose criminal sanctions on those who, unlike the
Christian majority that makes up our society, worship on a different day or
do not share the religious scruples of the majority."398 For him, the author
of Zorach,399 both the separation and the freedom clauses establish absolutes
that cannot be qualified. "With that as my starting point I do not see how a
State can make protesting citizens refrain from doing innocent acts on Sunday
because the doing of those acts offends sentiments of their Christian neigh-
bors." 400 That Sunday closing is religious in its objectives was clear to him:
"Sunday is a word heavily overlaid with connotations and traditions deriving
from the Christian roots of our civilization that color all judgments concern-
ing it. This is what the philosophers call 'word magic.' "401 "We have then
in each of the four cases Sunday laws that find their source in Exodus, that
were brought here by the Virginians and by the Puritans, and that are today
maintained, construed, and justified because they respect the views of our
dominant religious groups and provide a needed day of rest." 402
In addition to the absolute commands of the two religion clauses, Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas recognized their inseparable nature: "The reverse side of an
'establishment' is a burden on the 'free exercise' of religion." 403 He did not,
however, note that the reverse side of "free exercise" might be "establish-
ment." But his principal problem derived not from this conjunction, but rather
from his notion of the absolute nature of the first amendment commands. He
can distinguish Reynolds and Prince: "None of the acts involved here impli-
cates minors. None of the actions made constitutionally criminal today in-
volves the doing of any act that any society has deemed to be immoral." 404
Are the absolutes of the first amendment then qualified where minors are
involved or where the acts involved are accepted by some societies as "im-
moral"? Mr. Justice Douglas did not answer Lhe question; it is doubtful
whether he can in such a way as to reconcile on principle the cases that he
can reconcile on the facts.
Essentially, Mr. Justice Douglas seemed to believe that, however well cov-
ered up by proffered secular reasons, the basic function of the Sunday closing
laws was td assure the Christian churches conformity with their dictate that
Sunday be observed as a day of rest and prayer. It is here that his quarrel with
the majority really lay, for if they accepted his characterization of the function
of the closing laws, they too would find them unconstitutional both in terms
of establishment and in terms of freedom. The Douglas conclusion need not
399 Id. at 561. 4N 366 U.S. at 562.
399 See pp. 72-77 supra. 401 Id. at 565.
402 Id. at 571. The observation of the first day of the week does not derive from Exodus
but is generally associated with the resurrection of Christ. But this, of course, makes no
difference to the argument offered by Mr. Justice Douglas.
403 Id. at 578. 404 Id. at 574.
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rest on the absolutism of construction that he espouses. As stated, his differ-
ence with the majority in this case was really to be found elsewhere.
Treating the problem of establishment and freedom the way he did, Mr.
Justice Douglas did not have to answer that difficult problem that faced the
other minority of two Justices, Brennan and Stewart, who found no establish-
ment but did find interference with the freedom of religion of Orthodox Jews
who wanted to open their stores on Sunday because they had kept them closed
on Saturday.
The opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan in the Braunfeld case served
for all four cases. Sunday laws are not promulgated for religious purposes but
rather for secular ones. The only issue, therefore, was whether the Constitu-
tion required an exemption for those whose religious beliefs called upon them
to close on a day other than Sunday. None of the reasons offered by the Chief
Justice or by Mr. Justice Frankfurter proved persuasive that the difficulties
that would result from such exemption were sufficiently large so as to warrant
this hardship on religious minorities. After all, "a majority-21--of the 34
States which have general Sunday regulations have exemptions of this kind."405
Brennan and Stewart were apparently not concerned with the problem wheth-
er an exemption from a validly promulgated police regulation framed in
terms of religious belief constituted a violation of the "establishment
clause."406
Of the two hundred pages of opinions, it might be noted that only those
few contributed by Justices Brennan and Stewart are inconsistent with the
thesis offered herein. This is not to suggest that the Court had adopted the
views tendered here, but only that in the search for the appropriate neutral
principles, the Sunday closing law cases offer no barrier to the appropriate
rationale.
K. The Notary's Oath
Unanimity was restored to the Court's views on church and state problems
when it decided that Maryland could not constitutionally require an office
holder to swear to his belief in God before being permitted to enter upon his
office. American politics being what it is, a devotion to God, to country, and
to mother is usually readily professed by every actual and potential office
holder. There is hoary tradition for this: George Washington added the words
"'so help me God" to his presidential oath and every successor has done the
same. The unlikely case that came to the Court involved only the office of
notary public. In Torcaso v. Watkins,407 the appellant had been appointed to
that high office by the Governor of Maryland but had been barred from exer-
cising the perquisites of office because of his refusal to swear to a belief in
405 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 614 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
4o6 See cases cited note 388 supra.
407 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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God. The Maryland constitution had barred all religious tests for office except
this one.40s The Maryland courts upheld the right of the State to demand such
an oath against Torcaso's contentions that such a requirement violated the
first and fourteenth amendments.409
Mr. Justice Black, on behalf of six of his brethren, wrote the opinion for the
Court reversing the judgment of the Maryland high court. Justices Frankfur-
ter and Harlan concurred in the result. Black quickly disposed of the notion
on which the Maryland courts had. based their conclusions, that Zorach had
repudiated the grounds of decision stated in Everson. Equally deficient was
the argument that a person could not be compelled to profess his beliefs, but
the granting of an office could be conditioned on such profession since there
was no right to hold office. The rationale was quickly and easily stated:
Nothing decided or written in Zorach lends support to the idea that the
Court there intended to open up the way for government, state or federal,
to restore the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of prob-
ing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who
have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief in some particular
kind of religious concept.
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws nor impose re-
quirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can
aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those
religions founded on different beliefs.... The fact.., that a person is
not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an excuse for bar-
ring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitu-
tion.410
The Court did not bother to distinguish Davis v. Beason4i, and it left the dic-
tum of Church of the Holy Trinity412 unnoticed, thus paying it its due regard.
IH. CONCLUSION
One need not turn back many pages of history to recognize the importance
and delicacy of the problems presented by the relation of religion to govern-
ment. The many faces of these issues have been making recent newspaper
headlines in profusion. Some of them are beyond judicial cognizance: for
example, those so well recorded in Mr. White's book on the 1960 presidential
election. 413 There are others that may or may not become appropriate subjects
408 "[N]o religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office or profit
or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God.... ." MD.
CONsT. art. 37.
409 223 Md. 49, 162 A.2d 438 (1960). 411 See pp. 6-8 supra.
410 367 U.S. at 494-96. 412 See note 43 supra.
413 Wmtri., THE MAKING OF THm PaRsmina 1960 (1961).
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for judicial scrutiny, such as the continuing question whether the national
government can contribute financially to parochial education, directly or
indirectly. (Anyone suggesting that the answer, as a matter of constitutional
law, is clear one way or the other is either deluding or deluded.) Fortunately,
the church-state problems in this country have not been those of countries
like Spain and Colombia, where intolerance-indeed, persecution-is a policy
of state and church in combination. But these countries provide ample con-
temporary evidence of the wisdom of the framers of the first amendment in
their objectives of keeping the church free from domination by government
and the state free from alliance with religion. There is little quarrel, today,
about the goals to be achieved by the religion clauses of the first amendment.
The problem that has bemused and confused the Court has been that of stat-
ing appropriate principles to serve as means to agreed-upon ends. But there
has been no consistency in the judicial opinions of the Court. The seeming
simplicity of the "absolutist" construction of the first amendment is only too
patently disingenuous. The method of weighing constitutional objectives in
order to choose among them affords no guidance for further action, except
on what Holmes called a "pots and pans" basis. The action-belief dichotomy
is obviously inadequate to attainment of the stated goals of the religion
clauses.
This paper has stated and examined, in the context of the Court's opin-
ions, a principle believed to be appropriate to the first amendment objectives.
The principle tendered is a simple one. The freedom and separation clauses
should be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize reli-
gion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together
as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer
a benefit or to impose a burden. This test is meant to provide a starting point
for the solution to problems brought before the Court, not a mechanical an-
swer to them. Perhaps such a search for rules of decision is futile or undesir-
able. Certainly the recent plea for "neutral principles" of constitutional ad-
judication414 has not met with uniform acclaim. 415 Only if equality and cer-
tainty are still fundamental objectives of our legal structure do such principles
have a function to serve. And perhaps this notion of law is outdated in the
society in which we live. But no apologies are offered for the belief that demo-
cratic society cannot survive if these elements of the rule of law are rejected.
414 Wechsler, TowardNeutra! Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
415 See, e.g., Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27
U. Ou. L. REv. 661 (1960).
